Only a few years ago, Lithuania had no alternative gas supply and electricity interconnections with European Union countries, except limited interconnections with Latvia. In order to reduce Lithuania’s dependence on energy supplies from a single source, a number of projects were implemented. The liquefied natural gas (“LNG”) terminal in Klaipeda was completed at the end of 2014, and at the end of 2015, the electricity interconnections between Sweden and Lithuania (“NordBalt”) and between Poland and Lithuania (“LitPol Link”) became operational.

From 31 December 2009, due to the permanent shutdown of the state owned Ignalina NPP, Lithuania’s electricity generation structure (shown in Fig. 2) changed significantly, and Lithuania changed from a net exporter of electricity to a net importer of electricity.

The energy sector is particularly important to the Lithuanian economy and energy security is a strategic priority for the Government. It is being ensured by breaking Lithuania’s energy isolation (alternative ways to import energy resources are established) and by seeking to secure sufficient and competitive internal capacities of energy production.

The shutdown of Ignalina NPP at the end of 2009 required a clear and strategically binding attitude how the generation capacity of Ignalina NPP could be replaced by other generation capacities.

In June 2010, the Government approved the National Renewable Energy Sources Development Strategy, which aims to achieve at least a 23% share in the gross final energy consumption to be produced from renewables by 2020. The biggest potential is foreseen in wind energy, hydropower and biomass (mostly for heat production).

Recently, Lithuania has taken steps to liberalize its electricity market and has ensured a consumer’s right to choose his or her electricity supplier and to purchase electricity for a real market price. Lithuania’s regulated tariffs benefit only household consumers, but these tariffs will be abolished by 2020. On 1 January 2010, the electricity market was officially started in Lithuania (the first among the Baltic States) — a crucial step towards the common Baltic electricity market. A restatement of the Law on Electricity, which came into force in February 2012, created legal preconditions for the integration of Lithuania’s electricity market into the Nordic market. This integration has led to the launch of a bidding area (which is a network area in which market participants in energy trading submit their bids) in June 2012 in Lithuania by Nord Pool Spot AS, Europe’s leading Nordic power exchange. The Nord Pool Spot intraday market (ELBAS) in Lithuania was launched in 2013. This completed the Baltic Energy Market Interconnection Plan (“BEMIP”) long term goal of creating a modern and integrated Baltic power market connected to the Nordic region.

Fossil primary energy resources in Lithuania are rather scarce. In order to meet energy requirements, local oil, peat, wood, geothermal, wind, solar and hydropower, as well as energy from chemical processes could be used. In 2015, the share of related energy sources in the country’s primary energy balance was 24.6%. Since 2001, renewable energy sources have played a more important role. In 2015, the share of renewables in the balance of indigenous energy resources increased to 81%. Currently, the main renewable energy resource is biomass (including wood waste, boughs, wood chips, pellets, sawdust and waste from agriculture). The contribution of hydropower in absolute value fluctuates depending on climatic conditions, with small changes. The contribution of biofuels, used as a motor fuel for road transport, as well as that of wind energy is increasing.

Over the last few years, support for renewable energy has been growing continuously both at the national and European levels. Therefore, in 2015 renewable energy sources in Lithuania accounted for 25.8% of gross final energy consumption and 15.5% of gross electricity consumption in Lithuania, respectively, with wind, hydropower and biomass being the largest contributors. At the end of 2016, wind power was the biggest single technology, accounting for over 63% of installed capacity, while hydro and solar are other major sources of renewable power, accounting for 15.8% and 9% respectively, in the current mix of renewable electricity generation capacity.

In 2015, Lithuania’s import of the primary energy resources was 74.6%.

TABLE 1. ESTIMATED AVAILABLE ENERGY SOURCES

	Estimated available energy sources
	Fossil fuels			Nuclear	Renewables
	Solid (peat)	Liquid	Gas	Uranium	Hydro	Wind	Solar	Biofuel
Total amount in specific units*	15	2.3			141	840	100	390
Total amount in exajoule (EJ)

*Solid, Liquid: Million tons; Gas: Billion m³; Uranium: Metric tons; Hydro, Renewable: MW.

The development of the total primary energy consumption in PJ is shown in Table 2. Oil and oil products were the most important fuels in Lithuania over several decades. However, since 1990, their share in the primary energy balance has fluctuated in a comparatively large range with a reduced role due to decreasing consumption of heavy fuel oil for production of electricity and district heat. In 2010, after closure of the Ignalina NPP (INPP), the share of oil products increased to 36.9%. At present, natural gas is one of the most important fuels in Lithuania. In 2015, its share in the Lithuanian primary energy balance was 35.9%.

During the period 1990–2009, the share of nuclear — the cheapest imported fuel — was high. The role of nuclear was very important because being comparatively cheap, nuclear fuel helped to relieve certain burdens of balance of payments and therefore softened social problems. Nuclear fuel helped to increase the security of the primary energy supply, especially in the power sector. The share of nuclear energy in the primary energy balance in the year 2009 (year of final closure of the NPP) was 29.6%. Until the year 2009, Lithuania was a net electricity exporter. Over the period 2010–2015 (due to closure of the main electricity generation source), more than 50% of electricity required to meet the country’s gross electricity demand was imported from neighbouring countries; in 2015 the share of electricity import in the primary energy balance was equal to 8.7%.

Final electricity consumption and demand decreased from 12 TWh in 1990 to 6.2 TWh in 2000 but increased by 4.8% per annum during the period 2000–2008. Electricity consumption increased in all sectors of the national economy. In 2009, due to economic recession, the total final electricity demand decreased by 7.4%. Over the period 2009–2015 final electricity demand increased on average by 1.8% per year.

TABLE 2. ENERGY STATISTICS

									Average annual growth rate (%)
	1980	1990	2000	2005	2010	2013	2014	2015*	2000 to 2015
Energy consumption**
- Total	508.1	675.7	301.8	370.0	294.9	292.3	294.2	298.8	-0.1
- Solids***	47.7	33.4	3.9	7.7	8.7	11.9	10.3	8.6	5.5
- Liquids	335.7	286.7	90.7	112.5	106.9	104.4	105.5	108.7	1.2
- Gases	106.8	195.9	86.4	103.7	104.3	90.6	86.5	86.6	0.0
- Nuclear		185.8	91.9	112.8	—	—	—
- Hydro	1.7	1.5	1.2	1.6	1.9	1.9	1.4	1.3	0.2
- Other RES	13.6	11.9	27.0	35.3	42.7	49.1	52.2	58.2	5.2
- Other sources		3.6	5.5	7.0	8.8	9.4	10.8	9.6	3.8
- Electricity		-43.1	-4.8	-10.7	21.6	25.0	27.4	26.0
Energy production
- Total	24.5	203.9	139.9	167.5	63.8	68.7	73.3	76.0	-4.0
- Solids***	6.1	0.6	0.5	0.8	0.4	1.6	1.9	1.9	9.2
- Liquids	0.0	0.5	13.5	9.2	4.9	3.7	3.5	3.1	-9.3
- Gases
- Nuclear		185.8	91.9	112.8	—	—	—
- Hydro	1.7	1.5	1.2	1.6	1.9	1.9	1.4	1.3	0.2
- Other RES	13.6	11.9	27.3	36.1	47.8	52.2	55.6	60.2	5.4
- Other sources		3.6	5.5	7.0	8.8	9.4	10.8	9.6	3.8
Net import (Import - Export)	483.7	471.8	161.9	202.5	231.1	223.5	220.8	222.8	2.2
- Total

* Latest available data.

** Energy consumption = Primary energy consumption + Net import (Import – Export) of secondary energy.

*** Solid fuels include coal, lignite, peat and non-renewable waste.

Note: RES: Renewal energy sources. Other sources include energy from chemical processes.

In January 2009, the Ministry of Energy of the Republic of Lithuania was reestablished for the purpose of reforming the Lithuanian energy sector. Since then, a number of reforms have been undertaken in the energy sector.

In 2009, the European Union adopted the Third Energy Package, a package of legislative measures aimed at liberalizing European Union energy markets. Based on the ownership unbundling requirements of the Third Energy Package, Lithuania successfully reformed the electricity sector by separating transmission from generation and supply activities. In 2010, four blocks of energy companies were established (consisting of energy transmission, production, distribution and maintenance activities). Ownership unbundling was aimed at increasing the overall efficiency of the electricity system, preventing discrimination against new market participants connecting to the grid, optimizing the use and development of infrastructure, incentivizing economic investment and ensuring competitive prices for electricity consumers. Due to historical factors, Lithuania’s high voltage electricity transmission grid is directly interconnected with the high voltage grids of Latvia, Belarus and the Russian Federation. These interconnections allow extensive exchanges of power with such neighbouring systems. However, a core objective of Lithuania’s energy strategy is the integration of its power system into the common European electricity market as well as synchronous interconnection with the European Continental Power Network of ENTSO-E. Seeking integration into European Union energy systems, a number of energy projects are being carried out.

A marine underwater high voltage cable (“Estlink I”) was completed in 2006 as a result of a joint venture between power companies in Finland and the Baltic States. Estlink I allows the transfer of electricity between Finland and Estonia, but in a limited capacity (350 MW). After a successful trial operation period, Estlink II, the interconnection between Estonia and Finland with capacity of 650 MW, commenced commercial operations at the beginning of February 2014. The electricity is then transferred through Estonia to the electricity transmission grids of Latvia and Lithuania. As the constituent parts of the integration of the Baltic electricity market into the common European electricity market, new interconnection lines between Lithuania and Sweden (NordBalt) and Lithuania and Poland (LitPol Link) were installed at the end of 2015.

NordBalt is a 700 MW submarine power cable between Lithuania and Sweden. This electricity bridge enables Lithuania to exchange electricity with countries situated in northern Europe and diversify sources of electricity supply.

LitPol Link is a 500 MW electricity link between Lithuania and Poland which connects the three Baltic States, namely Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, to the European Union energy market and system. This interconnection is a crucial step towards integration of the Baltic States’ electricity grids with continental Europe.

The Baltic States also share the view that the electricity system of the Baltic States must operate synchronously with the continental European network. This goal was confirmed jointly by the Prime Ministers of the Baltic States in 2014, when they stated that synchronization should be fulfilled by 2025. The importance of such synchronization is also recognized in the framework of European Union energy policy. This project is included within the European Energy Security Strategy and the European Union Energy Union as a Project of Common Interest and of critical importance to the European Union energy security. The goal of implementing the Baltic States’ synchronization with the continental European networks by 2025 is also included in a reinforced BEMIP.

Lithuania was also considering the development of a new Visaginas NPP, in the vicinity of the Ignalina NPP, which is currently under decommissioning. However in the ongoing renewal of the National Energy Strategy of Lithuania, the continuation of this project is not foreseen.

Electricity in Lithuania is produced from thermal, hydro and renewables sources, with installed capacities of 1850 MW, 1028 MW and 711 MW, respectively. The main generators are Elektrenai (condensing), Vilnius CHP, Kaunas CHP, Kaunas HPP and Kruonis PSPP, and there are other small scale hydroelectric, wind, solar, biomass, biogas, waste and other renewable sources.

AB ESO is the Lithuanian distribution network operator. ESO distributes and transmits electrical power throughout the entire country and is a distribution network operator. The grid is made up of low and medium voltage lines and equipment.

The electrical power provided through ESO distribution grid reaches more than 1.577 million clients.

Litgrid AB, the Lithuanian electricity transmission system operator, maintains stable operation of the national power system, controls electricity flows and enables competition in an open domestic electricity market. Litgrid is responsible for integrating the national power system into the European power infrastructure and electricity market. The company also operates strategic cross-border electricity links, namely, NordBalt and LitPol.

TABLE 3. ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION, CONSUMPTION AND CAPACITY

							Average annual growth rate (%)
	1980	1990	2000	2010	2015	2016	2000 to 2012
Capacity of electrical plants (GWe)
- Thermal	2,308	2,646	2,644	2,574	2,532	1,850
- Hydro	0,107	0,106	0,914	1,028	1,028	1,028
- Nuclear		2,600	2,600
- Wind				0,161	0,438	0,509
- Geothermal
- Other renewable			0,001	0,032	0,158	0,202
- Total	2,415	5,352	6,159	3,795	4,156	3,589
Electricity production (TWh)
- Thermal	11,200	10,959	2,361	3,979	2,321	1,385
- Hydro	0,466	0,414	0,643	1,295	1,013	1,018
- Nuclear		17,033	8,419
- Wind				0,224	0,807	1,131
- Geothermal
- Other renewable			0,001	0,250	0,459	0,440
- Total1	11,666	28,406	11,425	5,748	4,600	3,974
Total Electricity consumption (TWh)	11,559	16,430	10,088	11,738.4	11,806	12,247

¹ Electricity transmission losses are not deducted.

* Latest available data

Source: www.litgrid.eu.

TABLE 4. ENERGY RELATED RATIOS

	1980	1990	2000	2005	2010	2013	2014	2015
Energy consumption per capita (GJ/capita)	148.3	182.7	87.6	114.6	95	99	100.5	102.9
Electricity consumption per capita (kW h/capita)	2973.0	4023.5	2516.7	3187	3470	3663	3821	3907
Electricity production/Energy production (%)	171.7	50.2	29.5	32	32.4	25	22	23
Nuclear/Total electricity (%)		60.0	73.7	69.9
Ratio of external dependency (%)1	95.2	69.8	52.9	53.5	81	77	75	75

¹ Net import / Total energy consumption.

* Latest available data

The decision to build a nuclear power plant in the Baltic region for electricity supply to the Baltic States, Belarus and Kaliningrad was made by the former Government of the Soviet Union at the beginning of the 1970s. After the formal agreement of the Lithuanian Government, the site on the shore of Druksiai Lake, near the borders of Lithuania, Latvia and Belarus was selected. Construction of the first unit of the Ignalina NPP commenced in April 1978; the second unit followed in April 1980, and the third unit in 1985. The town of Visaginas (formerly Snieckus) was built for the workers of the Ignalina NPP. The first unit was commissioned in December 1983 and the second in August 1987. In August 1988, the former USSR Council of Ministers suspended the construction of the third unit. In November 1993 the Lithuanian Government decided to abandon the construction of Unit 3 and dismantle the existing structure. The development of the Ignalina NPP design was carried out by the Research and Development Institute for Energy Technology (VNIPIET) of Russia. This institute developed the design of the reactor internals and other related structural components. The development of the Accident Localization System was carried out by the Sverdlovsk branch of the above mentioned institute. Metal structures of the main building were designed by the Main Design Office of “Leningrad Steel Design”. The turbine hall, the open distributive system and the auxiliary facilities were developed by the Atomic Energy Design Organization of Ukraine. It was intended that Ignalina NPP would be the pilot NPP for the RBMK-1500 reactor type. The scientific supervisor of the RBMK-1500 project was the Kurchatov Atomic Energy Institute of Russia. The principal designer of the nuclear steam supply system was the Research and Development Institute of Power Engineering (RDIPE — Russian abbreviation NIKIET), Moscow, Russian Federation. These two institutes prepared and published the Technical Safety Justification of the RBMK-1500 reactor in 1987. These institutes, together with the Research and Development Institute for Energy Technology, prepared the Technical Safety Justification of the Ignalina NPP in 1988. This safety report came closer to the Western standard in comparison with the Technical Safety Justification of the RBMK-1500 reactor. However, the Technical Safety Justification of the Ignalina NPP was not officially approved.

In 1999, the decision was made to shut down Unit 1 of Ignalina NPP before 2005, and in 2002 it was decided to shut down Unit 2 in 2009.

The following state institutions and bodies are involved in nuclear power related activities:

Ministry of Energy;

• State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate (VATESI);

• Ministry of Health;

• Radiation Protection Centre;

• Ministry of Environment;

• Environmental Protection Agency;

• Lithuanian Geological Survey;

• Ministry of Economy;

• Ministry of Social Security and Labour;

• Ministry of Transport and Communications;

• Ministry of National Defence;

• Ministry of the Interior;

• Ministry of Education and Science;

• State Security Department;

• Governmental Emergencies Commission;

• Local authorities.

The Ministry of Energy is responsible for the implementation of state policy, organizes bilateral and multilateral international cooperation in the sphere of nuclear energy and is the responsible authority for promotion and ownership of nuclear facilities. The Ministry of Energy is the owner of the Ignalina NPP and is responsible for a broad range of activities: tariffs, the pricing system, organization and financial audits. The Ministry supervises the nuclear power sector and is responsible for the preparation of regulatory acts governing nuclear power and for coordination of assistance for nuclear safety improvements.

The Radioactive Waste Management Agency (RATA) was established in 2001 by the Ministry of Economy for management and disposal of all transferred radioactive waste generated by the Ignalina NPP during operation and decommissioning, as well as to collect, process and dispose of institutional waste. The Agency’s task is to construct and operate the repositories for both short lived and long lived radioactive waste. At present, the Ministry of Energy is the owner of RATA and is responsible for coordination of its activities.

The Ministry of Economy is responsible for the issuing of licences for the export, import and transit of strategic goods. “Strategic goods” are defined as goods, materials, equipment, technologies, software and services which are subject to export, import and transit control.

The State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate (VATESI) is the main regulatory and supervisory institution of nuclear safety. It sets safety and security requirements, controls compliance of activities with them, issues licences and permits, and performs safety assessments, regulatory inspections and other functions. The mission of VATESI is to perform the state regulation and supervision of safety of nuclear facilities, activities with nuclear and nuclear fuel cycle materials, and activities with sources of ionizing radiation used in the nuclear power sector in order to protect the public and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation. VATESI is a governmental institution, established in 1991. The Head of VATESI directly reports to the President and the Government. The main goals of VATESI are:

State regulation and supervision of safety and physical security at Ignalina NPP and radioactive waste management facilities;

• Supervision of use of nuclear materials and technologies for peaceful purposes (application of the IAEA and EURATOM safeguards);

• State regulation and supervision of physical security of nuclear facilities, nuclear material and nuclear fuel cycle materials and sources of ionizing radiation used in the nuclear power sector;

• State regulation and supervision of transportation of nuclear fuel cycle materials, nuclear and fissile material;

• State regulation and supervision of radiation protection of workers at nuclear facilities;

• State regulation and supervision of emergency preparedness at nuclear facilities.

The Ministry of Health:

Prepares and approves standard acts and rules on the health of the personnel of nuclear facilities and the population residing in the monitored zones of the facility and controls compliance therewith;

• Undertakes environmental health studies of radiation impact on people and the environment and establishes health protection requirements;

• Agrees on the siting for nuclear facilities and undertakes state environmental health analysis of their construction;

• Takes part in the authorization of the constructed or reconstructed nuclear facilities, and issues the environmental health passport for work with radioactive materials and other sources of ionizing radiation;

• Establishes the standards for medical examination for the personnel working with radioactive materials and sources of ionizing radiation, the frequency of the examination and contraindications, and controls compliance with the standards;

• Undertakes monitoring of the health of nuclear facility personnel and the residents of the monitored zone of the facility;

• Ensures the preparedness of medical institutions for the elimination of the consequences of the accident;

• Establishes the radiation protection norms for the population and controls compliance with them;

• Organizes medical examination of the containment forces of a nuclear accident and the population affected by radiation exposure and submits findings and proposals for the reduction of radiation exposure;

• Determines occupational diseases for the personnel in the sphere of nuclear energy and studies the causes of the diseases;

• Carries out education on radiation protection of the population.

Most of these functions are delegated to the Radiation Protection Centre (RPC), which is the regulatory body that coordinates the activities of the executive and other bodies of public administration and local government in the field of radiation protection, monitoring and expert examination of public exposure. Among other responsibilities, the RPC is responsible for supervision of the fulfilment of the requirements regarding radiation protection of workers (excluding in nuclear facilities) and the general public from negative impacts caused by ionizing radiation. In case of a nuclear accident at Ignalina NPP, RPC presents recommendations to the State Emergency Commission, all levels of Emergency Management Centres and executive and other bodies of public administration for the reduction of exposure doses and prevention of deterministic and stochastic effects of radiation on the public and emergency workers. RPC performs analysis of foods, drinking water and other samples contaminated by radionuclides, and presents suggestions to the Ministry of Health to approve foods and their raw materials, drinking water and temporary maximum permissible levels of radioactive contamination for the emergency consequences liquidation period. It also organizes supervision and control of their compliance. Also, RPC presents suggestions to the Ministry of Health about the necessity of applying iodine prophylaxis and provides information to the public, within the limits of its competence, about protective actions. In order to continually ensure emergency preparedness, RPC has approved the emergency preparedness plan and established an internal EPO.

The Ministry of Environment or its authorized institution, according to the manner set out by the legal acts, conducts the state construction supervision of the building of structures of nuclear installations, prepares and approves methodology of assessment of damage caused by ionizing radiation to the environment and its compensation and periodically informs the general public and the state and municipal authorities on the radiation situation in the country.

The Ministry of Social Security and Labour is responsible for compliance with the requirements of labour, safety at work and related statutory acts.

The Ministry of Transport and Communications participates in the drafting of laws and subordinate legislation and the training and certification of personnel who transport nuclear and radioactive materials.

The Fire and Rescue Department is the coordinating institution with respect to the preparation of emergency plans and their implementation in the event of an accident at the Ignalina NPP. The department organizes the training sessions for population protection in the event of a nuclear accident.

The Ministry of the Interior ensures fire protection of the NPP and other nuclear facilities. It also ensures physical protection of the NPP, other nuclear facilities located close to State borders and nuclear materials during transport across the country. The Ministry of the Interior is responsible for preparation, coordination and implementation of the interdepartmental antiterrorist and antipenetration action plans, and investigating cases of theft and illegal possession of nuclear and radioactive materials and dual use items.

The State Security Department exercises prevention of subversive, sabotage and terrorist acts, as well as other offences aimed at damaging the interests of state security at nuclear facilities, in their environment, and on transportation routes for nuclear and radioactive materials. It performs the trustworthiness check of personnel of nuclear facilities and personnel involved in transportation of nuclear material.

The Governmental Emergencies Commission is responsible for the coordination of the activities of all the bodies and forces taking part in the containment of a nuclear accident and its consequences.

The local authorities, based on the Government approved state plan for protection of the population in the event of a nuclear accident, shall develop preparedness for nuclear and (or) radiological accidents as well as the preventive measures envisaged in the municipality’s plan for control of emergency situations. In the event of a nuclear and radiological accident, local authorities shall inform the population about the radiation situation on the sites of nuclear installations and about the measures undertaken for civil protection.

Ignalina NPP is the only nuclear power plant in Lithuania. It contains two RBMK-1500 reactors, which have their own design peculiarities compared to RBMK-1000 and belong to the category of “boiling water” channel type reactors. Ignalina NPP is located in the north-eastern part of Lithuania, near the borders with Latvia and Belarus. The power plant was built as part of the Soviet Union’s North-West Unified Power System. Ignalina NPP Unit 1 was connected to grid at the end of 1983, and Unit 2 in August 1987. The design lifetime of the units was projected to 2014 and 2017 accordingly. In total, four units were originally planned to be built on the Ignalina NPP site. Construction of the third unit was suspended in 1988 due to political pressure, and construction of the fourth never started. Ignalina NPP Unit 1 was shut down on 31 December 2004 and Unit 2 on 31 December 2009 in compliance with the protocol of Lithuania’s European Union accession.

On 28 December 2006, Unit 1 was designated as permanently shut down. Defueling of Unit 1 began in 2006 and was completed in December 2009. Some of the removed spent fuel assemblies (in total 978) were transported to Unit 2 for after-burning and the remaining assemblies were put into spent fuel storage pools. Unit 1 is maintained in the post-operation state, based on the VATESI operation licence and in accordance with the requirements of the Technical Specification for Unit 1 Operation during the Fuel Removal from the Spent Fuel Storage Pools.

Unit 2 was designated as permanently shut down on 24 July 2012. After shutdown, Unit 2 was maintained in the post-operation state based on the VATESI operation licence and in accordance with the requirements of the Technical Specification for Operation of Unit 2. Defueling of Unit 2 reactor started in 2010, but was suspended because of lack of free space in the existing storage facility and spent fuel ponds and while waiting for the new Interim Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage Facility to be put in operation. The defueling has been restarted in September 2016 after VATESI issued the licence for operation of the above mentioned new facility. Completion of fuel removal from the Unit 2 reactor is planned in 2018. Defueling of the spent fuel ponds in the Units is planned to be completed in 2022.

Decommissioning of various Unit 1 and Unit 2 facilities is underway. These activities are performed in accordance with the Ignalina NPP Final Decommissioning Plan and in line with Unit 1 and Unit 2 Decommissioning Projects.

Projects are currently being implemented related to dismantling and decontamination (D&D) of the Ignalina NPP systems and equipment that have totally lost their functions, are isolated and have no impact on the safe handling of spent nuclear fuel and safe operation of other safety systems and equipment remaining in operation. Each INPP D&D project is implemented only after approval of the technological design and corresponding safety analysis report with the regulatory body and after amending of the corresponding operational licence conditions, including development of the Environmental Impact Assessment Report for each D&D project and issuance of the affirmative decision by the competent authority on the admissibility to perform D&D activities under consideration. The projects are implemented in compliance with the technological solutions and the sequence developed and accepted in the technological design documents and within the very clearly defined equipment dismantling boundaries.

TABLE 5. STATUS AND PERFORMANCE OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS**

Reactor Unit	Type	Net Capacity [MW(e)]	Status	Operator	Reactor Supplier	Construction Date	First Criticality Date	First Grid Date	Commercial Date	Shutdown Date	UCF for 2016
IGNALINA-1	LWGR	1185	Permanent Shutdown	INPP	MAEP	1977-05-01	1983-10-04	1983-12-31	1985-05-01	2004-12-31
IGNALINA-2	LWGR	1185	Permanent Shutdown	INPP	MAEP	1978-01-01	1986-12-01	1987-08-20	1987-12-01	2009-12-31
IGNALINA-3	LWGR	1380	Cancelled Constr.	INPP	MAEP	1985-06-01				1988-08-30

Data source: IAEA - Power Reactor Information System (PRIS).

Note: Table 7 is completely generated from PRIS data to reflect the latest available information and may be more up to date than the text of the report.

** Latest available data.

+ Date, when first major placing of concrete, usually for the base mat of the reactor building is done.

++ Date of the first connection to the grid.

Note: UCF (Unit Capability Factor) for the latest available year (only applicable to reactors in operation).

Source: IAEA PRIS database (www.iaea.org/pris).

2.2.2. Permanent Shutdown and Decommissioning Process

Decommissioning: Information and Plans

On 5 October 1999, the Parliament of the Republic of Lithuania (Seimas) approved the National Energy Strategy, in accordance with which Unit 1 at Ignalina NPP was to be shut down by 2005, given the long term substantial financial support from the European Union, G-7 and other countries and international financial institutions. On 31 December 2004, Unit 1 was shut down in compliance with Protocol No. 4 of Lithuania’s European Union accession, and Unit 2 was to be operated until the end of 2009.

On 19 February 2001, the Government approved the Decommissioning Programme for Ignalina NPP Unit 1 envisaging the measures for 2001–2004. On 2 February 2005, the Government of the Republic of Lithuania approved the new Decommissioning Programme for both Units of Ignalina NPP. The main objectives of the Programme are:

To ensure safe operation of Ignalina NPP during the preparation for decommissioning and during the actual decommissioning activities.

• To develop, modify and add to the legal acts related to Ignalina NPP decommissioning.

• To ensure the work of Ignalina NPP Decommissioning Service and Unit 1 Surveillance Service.

• To evaluate (in the order defined by the legal acts) both the projects undertaken in preparation for decommissioning and the decommissioning projects with respect to nuclear safety, radiation protection and physical security, as well as license them.

• To mitigate negative social and economic effects. It also specifies necessary organizational, technical, economic and social measures to achieve the above mentioned objectives.

Furthermore, on 25 February 2005, the plan was approved by the order of the Minister of Economy on implementation of measures of the decommissioning programme for INPP Units 1 and 2, envisaging the measures for addressing environmental, social and economic problems, as well as the consequences of premature decommissioning. The document is reissued once a year. Starting with the year 2014, it was replaced by the Interdepartmental Action Plan covering a period of 3 years with annual updates.

The main objectives set in the Action Plan include:

To ensure a safe and fluent Ignalina NPP decommissioning process by using allocated funds in a transparent and efficient manner;

• To mitigate the negative social and economic consequences within the Ignalina NPP region as a result of the INPP decommissioning.

In order to reach the first objective, several tasks must be fulfilled, including:

To ensure a safe and efficient Ignalina NPP decommissioning process and its supervision;

• To develop radioactive waste management infrastructure based on the state of the art technologies, and ensure safe and effective INPP operational and decommissioning radioactive waste management;

The following tasks are set for reaching the second objective:

To provide for the possibility for INPP employees who have already been dismissed or are to be dismissed to integrate into the labour market and mitigate dismissal consequences;

• To reduce energy consumption in public facilities and multistory buildings within the Ignalina NPP region.

As appendices, the Action Plan contains Measures for Implementation of the Ignalina NPP Decommissioning Interdepartmental Action Plan objectives and tasks for the period of 2016–2018 (amended), and the assessment criteria for reaching the above mentioned objectives.

The Final Decommissioning Plan

Pursuant to the provisions of the Law on Nuclear Energy and General Requirements for Decommissioning of the Ignalina NPP, VD-EN-01-99, which were in force at the time of preparation for decommissioning of the Ignalina NPP, the Ignalina NPP prepared the Final Decommissioning Plan (FDP) which was finally approved by the Ministry of Economy in July 2005. In compliance with the Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-1.5.1-2015 Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities, the FDP shall be reviewed at least once every 5 years considering the experience gained during the implementation of the decommissioning process, changes in the decommissioning strategy, decommissioning performance schedule, financing, etc.

Therefore, in 2010, the process for the FDP update was initiated and the updated FDP was approved by the Ministry of Energy in August 2014.

Though the final date of termination of the overall decommissioning process has shifted, the adopted decommissioning strategy remains unchanged and is further implemented as the strategy of immediate dismantling.

Immediate dismantling was adopted for a number of reasons, not least of which is the desire to utilise as much of the existing workforce as possible and benefit from their knowledge and expertise in operating nuclear facilities.

The FDP evaluates the main milestones of decommissioning, including cost estimation for the post-shutdown period, and the cost of the necessary decommissioning preparatory work and decontamination and dismantling activities. The FDP also determines the configuration of Unit 1 and Unit 2 systems during fuel unloading from the reactor (first phase) and during fuel unloading from the spent fuel storage pools (second phase).

The Plan encompasses the entire period of the Ignalina NPP decommissioning (preparatory work for step by step dismantling of separate installations, systems and equipment not needed any more to ensure the safe operation and maintenance of the Ignalina NPP; actual dismantling and decontamination of those installations; construction of new facilities dedicated for interim storage of spent fuel and radioactive waste; removal of spent fuel from the units to the constructed interim storage facility; demolition of emptied buildings; and the final recultivation of the site).

In order to implement the adopted strategy, decommissioning activities and implementation of separate projects are carefully planned. The FDP describes principles, methods and technologies, as well as the general schedule necessary to ensure nuclear safety, radiation protection, physical security, environmental protection and an efficient decommissioning process.

The Ignalina NPP FDP covers the following areas of concern:

Applied regulatory framework;

• Dismantling strategy adopted for the Ignalina NPP installations;

• Description of the plant to be decommissioned;

• Decommissioning plan and schedule;

• Licensing strategy of the decommissioning process;

• Dismantling techniques and tools;

• Decontamination technology;

• Radiological characterization of the Ignalina NPP installations, buildings and territory;

• The Ignalina NPP decommissioning project technical concept;

• Ignalina NPP waste management strategy;

• Description of radioactive and hazardous materials already accumulated and to be accumulated during the decommissioning process;

• Decommissioning safety assessment;

• Description of the decommissioning environmental impact assessment process;

• Radiation protection programme;

• Ignalina NPP organizational chart during the decommissioning stage;

• Decommissioning expenses and financing;

• Description of the management system;

• Demolition of buildings and restoration of the site.

The overall Ignalina NPP decommissioning process is subdivided into several stages in order to facilitate the mitigation of arising risks and to ensure reliable distribution of funds and consecutive implementation of work. The general planning of the decommissioning activities shall be specified in separate dismantling and decontamination projects when identifying interrelated activities.

The updated FDP of 2014 includes all of the decommissioning process changes that have occurred in the period from 2004 to early 2014. On the basis of Ignalina NPP decommissioning experience and international experience with decommissioning NPP power units, recommendations of the members of the Ignalina NPP international technical support experts group led to the development of a new decommissioning project structure that was subsequently implemented in 2013. On the basis of this structure, the Ignalina NPP Decommissioning Megaproject Schedule, including the decommissioning costs, was developed and presented in the reviewed FDP. According to the established Megaproject Schedule, Ignalina NPP equipment dismantling and decontamination activities and further demolition of redundant buildings including the site restoration are foreseen to be completed by the end of 2038.

The updated FDP also considers the changed situation from the Ignalina NPP staffing point of view, i.e. change of the status and mission from that of an Electrical Power Generator to that of a Nuclear Decommissioning Organization, leading to the need for retention of the knowledge of the currently employed staff gained during the power plant operation for subsequent use for the decommissioning, as well as training of the staff to accommodate for skills needed during the decommissioning and operation of the new radioactive waste treatment facilities.

Decommissioning Project for Ignalina NPP Unit 1 and Unit 2 Final Shutdown and Defueling Phase

The Decommissioning Projects for the Ignalina NPP Unit 1 and Unit 2 Final Shutdown and Defueling Phase, including the Safety Analysis Reports and Environmental Impact Assessment Reports, were prepared and approved by the competent State authorities in 2006 and 2010, respectively.

The Decommissioning Projects cover works which have to be performed within the frames of prolonged operational licences for Ignalina NPP Unit 1 and Unit 2. Decommissioning Projects provide description of the Ignalina NPP Unit 1 and Unit 2 systems that may be modified and isolated at each defueling stage as a consequence of losing their functions to ensure safe operation of other safety systems remaining in operation and normal operation functions.

The Projects do not cover dismantling work, since they are performed within the frames of separate Ignalina NPP Unit 1 and Unit 2 process equipment dismantling and decontamination projects.

The following dismantling and decontamination projects were already successfully implemented:

Dismantling of equipment located in Bld. 117/1,2 (hydro vessels, valves and pipes of the fast acting subsystem of the emergency core cooling system (ECCS), which lost its functions after the reactor final shutdown due to absence of conditions requiring actuation of the this subsystem of the ECCS);

Dismantling of Unit 1 Bld. 119 (Boiler House) equipment;

• Dismantling of Unit 1 Turbine Hall (Bld. G1) systems and equipment;

• Dismantling of systems and equipment of Unit 1 Reactor Gas Circuit (Bld. V1) (1st stage).

Dismantling and decontamination projects in progress:

Dismantling of Unit 2 Turbine Hall (Bld. G2) systems and equipment;

• Dismantling of Unit 1 Control, Electrics and Deaerator equipment (Bld. D-0,1);

• Organization of primary waste treatment area in Unit A-1.

Historical enhancement of Ignalina NPP performance

The Safety Analysis Report (SAR) of 1995–1996 was the first Western style safety analysis for any Soviet-design NPP. Specialists from the Ignalina NPP, Canada, Russian Federation (main RBMK designer RDIPE), Sweden, United Kingdom and United States of America participated in the project. The SAR team supported the Ignalina NPP management, showing that (1) an adequate safety case for continuing operation had been demonstrated; (2) the safety case would be adequate to the point of first gap closure, which will be the lifetime limiting factor; and (3) the plant’s safety standards and practices had been assessed and recommendations for improvement had been made and accepted by Ignalina NPP. A significant conclusion stated in the SAR is that none of the analysed safety concerns require the immediate shutdown of the plant.

The Review of Safety Analysis Report (RSR) of 1995–1997 was an independent review of the SAR, performed by Western (France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom and United States of America) and Eastern (Lithuania, Russian Federation) experts. The RSR team agreed with almost all the SAR team’s recommendations for improvement and made some additional recommendations. They, however, were not able to agree that a fully adequate safety case had been demonstrated and gave a set of recommendations both on the additional analyses and on safety improvement measures to be implemented. These recommendations formed a basis for the Ignalina NPP’s Second Safety Improvement Programme (SIP-2), approved in 1997.

Lithuania, Russian Federation, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States of America and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development participated in the performance of the Safety Improvement Programme SIP-2, which was started in 1997. The objective of the SIP-2 programme was to improve safety of INPP with reference to equipment, operating procedures and management to a level of international good standards.

The safety of Ignalina NPP Unit 2 operation was based upon Safety Analysis Report SAR-2. SAR-2 was prepared in 2000 and after review by VATESI in September 2004, Ignalina NPP received an indefinite validity licence for Unit 2 operation.

From 2006 to 2008, Ignalina NPP updated the SAR for Unit 2. The update was implemented taking into account the results of modifications, analytical work and changes to the Ignalina NPP safety management system carried out during the period of 2001–2007. Based on review report of SAR-2 (RSR-2), VATESI requirements, as well as based on INPP’s own initiative as part of the process of updating SAR-2, 127 modifications of Unit 2 main equipment and 50 analytical work projects were carried out. The results of the analytical work were used as a basis for implementation of a number of modifications at Unit 2, such as the use of uranium–erbium fuel with 2.8% enrichment, commissioning of a diverse shutdown system and use of cluster control rods. Implementation of these modifications allowed for a significant increase of nuclear safety of Ignalina NPP Unit 2.

The main modification at Ignalina NPP Unit 2 was installation of the Diverse Shutdown System (DSS). In October 2004, DSS was put into trial industrial operation. The requirement of the Regulations on the availability of two independent Shutdown Systems was implemented. DSS implementation was fully completed in 2008, including training of operating and maintenance staff.

In 2001, Ignalina NPP made an important step towards the management of beyond design basis accidents — in addition to emergency procedures, the Symptom-Based Emergency Operating Instructions (SOAI) were introduced. Symptom based emergency operating procedures are easy to handle in the accidents in which it is difficult to correctly diagnose the cause. In order to prevent the evolution of design basis accidents into beyond design basis accidents and to mitigate the consequences of beyond design basis accidents, the Guidelines on the management of beyond design accidents (Russian abbreviation — RUZA) were developed at Ignalina NPP for Unit 2. In order to implement RUZA strategies, during the period 2007–2008 the existing Ignalina NPP equipment was modified and Ignalina NPP personnel involved in emergency response activities were trained. Further, a leak before break (LBB) concept was implemented at Ignalina NPP in 2007. This assured the fulfilment of existing nuclear requirements.

The implementation of these systems helped to increase the safety of Unit since it allowed detection of small coolant leaks at early stages.

After the permanent shutdown of Ignalina NPP Units, the Emergency Operating Procedures, including RUZAs, were revised and applied to current state of Ignalina NPP Units.

Pursuant to the Law on Nuclear Safety, the licence holder (for Ignalina NPP — state enterprise Ignalina NPP) shall prepare a periodic safety evaluation report for a nuclear facility not less than every 10 years and shall submit it to the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate for review. The Periodic Safety Analysis Report for Unit 1 was developed and submitted to the regulatory body in March 2017 for review. Such report for Ignalina NPP Unit 2 is expected to be prepared in 2020.

In response to the event at Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, the European “stress tests” were carried out at Ignalina NPP in 2011–2012. In accordance with the ENSREG specification, the “stress tests” were carried out for the two permanently shutdown Ignalina NPP Units, the operating Dry Spent Fuel Storage Facility (DSFSF) and the New Interim Spent Fuel Storage Facility (NISFSF), which was under construction at that point. Taking into account results and conclusions of Ignalina NPP “stress tests” as well as suggestions and recommendations provided by peer review experts, the Ignalina NPP Action Plan was developed and approved by VATESI. Continuing the participation in follow-up activities for the “stress tests”, the Plan of Strengthening Nuclear Safety in Lithuania (National Action Plan) was developed by VATESI. This plan is associated with post-Fukushima lessons learned and “stress test” peer review recommendations and suggestions as well as results of the IAEA mission on Emergency Preparedness Review that was conducted in Lithuania in 2012. The National Action Plan was prepared in accordance with ENSREG requirements and was presented during the National Action Plans Workshops in 2013 and in 2015, which were organized by ENSREG. All safety improvement measures related to nuclear safety of Ignalina NPP Units and the operating Dry Spent Fuel Storage Facility and the New Interim Spent Fuel Storage Facility were completed in 2016. More details on Lithuanian participation in European “stress tests” and follow-up activity are provided on the ENSREG web site (http://www.ensreg.eu/EU-Stress-Tests).

Upon Lithuania’s decision regarding continuation of development of nuclear power, three energy companies of the Baltic States — AB Lietuvos Energija, AS Latvenergo and Eesti Energia AS — conducted a feasibility study concerning implementation of the new NPP project in Lithuania at the end of 2006. It was concluded that the project is feasible to implement and was substantiated from economic, technical, environmental and legal points of view.

The Visaginas Nuclear Power Plant (VNPP) project comprises construction of a new NPP and related infrastructure in Lithuania. Upon implementation of the project, the shutdown Ignalina NPP Units will be replaced by modern, safe and environmentally friendly electric power production technology.

Considering the fact that Lithuania already had an operating NPP, as well as sufficient experience in developing nuclear power infrastructure and maintaining a high level of nuclear safety, this experience could be used when constructing VNPP. The VNPP will be constructed next to the current Ignalina NPP, which is located on the south bank of Drukšiai Lake, six kilometres from the town of Visaginas and next to the border with Latvia and Belarus.

The preparations for the new NPP project in Lithuania were started at the end of 2006. The JSC “Visaginas NPP project” (VAE) was established in August 2008 and took over the preparatory work, which was carried out by the Nuclear Energy Department of Lietuvos Energija AB starting at the end of 2006.

VAE was responsible for the implementation of the preparatory work for construction of VNPP, such as: comprehensive study of construction sites, transportation study, environmental audit, and other project preparatory work necessary in order to have proper arrangements (after the establishment of a project implementing company) to develop the VNPP construction project.

In July 2007, the environmental impact assessment for the construction of a new NPP in Lithuania began. A consortium of Finish and Lithuanian companies implemented a project, “Preparation of environmental impact assessment programme for NPP”, in which the scope of the new NPP environmental impact assessment guidelines was determined. In the report of the EIA, possible environmental impacts of the construction and operation of the new NPP were assessed in cooperation with other Finish and Lithuanian institutions (Lithuanian Energy Institute, Institute of Botany, Institute of Ecology and National Public Health Surveillance Laboratory). The possible international impact of the new power plant on the Republics of Latvia and Belarus was also assessed. According to the EIA report of 2009, positive evaluations of the responsible institutions were made concerning the planned economic activity, and therefore, following this report, the Ministry of Environment decided on the possibilities for new NPP construction in Lithuania. The resolution on the permissibility of construction and operation of a new NPP, based on generation III or III+ PWR, BWR or PHWR technology with power capacity up to 3400 MWe, was adopted by the Ministry of Environment in April 2009.

VNPP is a regional project and the electricity which the new nuclear plant will produce is expected to be distributed to the entire region. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are officially participating in the project as regional partners. In December 2009, Lithuania started a procedure to attract experienced investors with strong credentials in the development of new generation and operation of NPPs to the VNPP project.

The Government of Lithuania conducted direct negotiations with potential strategic investors early in 2011. Two competitive proposals were received in May 2011. In July 2011, the Government of Lithuania selected Hitachi Ltd. (Japan) as strategic investor and Hitachi-GE Nuclear Energy (Japan) as engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) contractor. Hitachi proposed to build a single 1350 MWe Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR) unit. It is expected that the reactor will be commissioned in 2020–2022.

The Government of Lithuania has agreed the Concession Agreement with the strategic investor and project company for the VNPP Project in May 2012. In June 2012, the European Commission, after the careful assessment of the VNPP Project, issued its favourable opinion on this regional project.

At the end of June 2012, Parliament approved the Law on the Concession to be granted to the VNPP project development company and the selection of Hitachi as the strategic investor, as well as the development of the project based on the Hitachi-GE ABWR technology. It was expected that Lithuania and Hitachi would establish the project development and construction company and sign the agreements on the conditions approved by Parliament by the end of 2012. However, due to the negative result of the referendum on new NPP construction in Lithuania, held in middle of October 2012, future negotiations and project development and construction company establishment slowed down.

In order to make a formal decision on Visaginas NPP project, in line with referendum voting results, the Government of the Lithuanian Republic that came into power after the 2012 Parliamentary elections established a working group to evaluate the Visaginas NPP project economics and to review the National Energy Independence Strategy. The conclusions of this working group were announced in the first half of 2013. The working group concluded that the new Visaginas NPP project could be further developed if the project economics were improved and more favourable agreements were reached with the strategic investor and regional partners.

In February 2013, shares of Visaginas NPP project development company Visagino Atomine Elektrine (VAE) were transferred from the Ministry of Energy to be held in trust by the Ministry of Finance. In August 2013, the state owned energy business group and its parent company Visagino Atomine Elektrine were renamed “Lietuvos Energija”, JSC. The change of the business name occurred as a part of the corporate governance reorganization of the group of energy companies.

In November 2013, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under the Ministry of Environment based on the application provided by “Lietuvos Energija”, JSC confirmed the validity of the Visaginas NPP Environmental Impact Evaluation and prolonged the decision allowing construction of a new nuclear power plant at confirmed sites approved by the Ministry of Environment in 2009 for another 5 years.

Development of a “special transportation route plan” for heavy and large-scale equipment transportation from seaport to the new NPP construction site was completed in 2014. The approval and coordination of the special transportation route plan with 35 local municipalities, institutions and coordinating authorities were completed at the end of September 2014. The special transportation route plan was inspected and approved by the Territorial Planning and Construction Inspectorate at the end of October 2014. In November 2014, the special transportation route plan was submitted to Ministry of Transport and Communication and it was approved by the Ministry of Transport and Communication and registered in the Territories planning document register in the beginning of February 2015.

From May 2015, the review of National Energy Strategy (NES) launched with Visaginas NPP a project option reevaluation as a part of a general evaluation of the Lithuanian energy sector. This review consisted of two main parts. The first part was aimed at evaluating Lithuanian energy sector development perspectives (technical–economic aspects), including the energy security perspective, and reviewing the current National Energy Strategy, in force since 2012. The second part covered macroeconomic impact assessment of the proposed new National Energy Strategy scenarios.

Subsequently, in the process of ongoing procedure of renewal of the National Energy Strategy of Lithuania, on 24 November 2016, the Ministry of Energy of the Republic of Lithuania approved the “Recommended Key Guidelines of the National Energy Strategy of Lithuania” (the Guidelines). In addition to other energy policy matters, the Guidelines also addressed the issue of the Visaginas NPP project, suggesting suspending the project until it becomes cost effective with regard to market conditions, or it becomes necessary with regard to the circumstances of security of energy supply.

However in the process of the ongoing renewal of the National Energy Strategy of Lithuania, the continuation of this project is not foreseen.

TABLE 8. PLANNED NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

Station/Project name	Type	Capacity	Expected construction start year	Expected commercial year
Visaginas NPP	ABWR	1350 MWe	NA

Not applicable.

Not applicable.

Not applicable.

In 2009, following the decision of the Ministry of Environment in the course of the preparatory work for the construction of the new NPP, VAE initiated the Construction Site Evaluation according to IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) safety standards. The selection and evaluation of NPP sites according to IAEA safety standards is defined in the special Decree of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania No. 300.

The objectives of the evaluation were to assess suitability of the potential VNPP construction sites against IAEA Safety Standards Series No. NS-R-3, Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installations, and the VATESI regulations. Under the agreement Assessment of Potential Visaginas NPP Construction Sites in Respect of External Events between VAE and LEI, the tasks on external factors (such as human induced events, meteorological phenomena, site flooding) assessment were performed.

Moreover, site seismic and engineering geological investigations were conducted in 2009–2010 by a number of Lithuanian and foreign companies. The document “Geotechnical, Geological, and Seismological Data Inventory (GGSDI) for the Visaginas Sites” concludes that both potential VNPP construction sites are favourable for new construction. Additionally, the site evaluation results were reviewed by an Independent IAEA Site Safety Review Mission (SSRM) which took place 8–12 November 2010. The IAEA mission stated: “Sites evaluation is conducted in line with IAEA requirements and guides, the volume of investigation is sufficient, and sites are suitable for construction of Visaginas NPP.”

In May 2012, Engineering Geological (Geotechnical) Soil Investigations for NPP Design were initiated by the signing of a contract by a consortium of Lithuanian and US companies. The purpose of the work was to obtain sufficient engineering geological information and geotechnical engineering parameters of geological layers to support the final design of ABWR safety related structures at the construction site of VNPP. The fieldwork activities were completed in September 2012.

The site evaluation report was submitted to the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate (VATESI) and to the other Lithuanian authorities involved in the site evaluation process. At the end of October 2014, Lithuanian nuclear power regulator State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate (VATESI) approved the new nuclear power plant “Site Evaluation Report”. It was concluded that the site evaluation was performed in accordance with Lithuanian and IAEA requirements and potential sites are suitable for the new Visaginas nuclear power plant design and construction. These sites are next to the current Ignalina NPP. The approval is based on VATESI review and positive conclusions regarding site suitability obtained from the Lithuanian Geological Survey, Fire Safety and Rescue Department, Ministry of Health, Lithuanian Hydrometeorological Service and Civil Aviation Administration.

The site evaluation included analysis of seismic factors, geotechnical conditions, meteorological conditions, terrain flooding probability, human induced external events and others. The Site Evaluation Report approval is a second major step after Environmental Impact Assessment in the nuclear power plant construction licensing process in Lithuania. The Site Evaluation Report provides design basis parameters and conditions for new nuclear plant design and comprises a part of the application for a Construction and Operation Licence.

The advisory referendum on supporting new Visaginas NPP construction in Lithuania was held in the middle of October 2012. The results of voting showed negative public opinion against new NPP construction and project development, with 34% of voters supporting new NPP construction and 63% of voters against it. However, local community in two districts next to the planned NPP site — Ignalina and Zarasai, as well as nearby Visaginas city, showed the highest support in Lithuania for construction of the new Visaginas NPP.

In Ignalina district, 45% of voters supported new NPP construction in Lithuania, and in Zarasai 65% supported it. In Visaginas city itself, more than 84% of the local community accepted and supported the decision on construction of a new NPP, just 6 km away from Visaginas city.

It is expected that the updated NES will provide, among other things, the answer to the question under consideration about what should be the level of local electricity generation and the installed capacities in the country.

Historically, public acceptance of nuclear energy in Lithuania was quite high. When Lithuania, in the treaty of accession to the European Union, committed itself to close down the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant (NPP), popular initiative brought the issue to a referendum on the extension of the operation of the Ignalina NPP on 12 October 2008. In that referendum, 88.58% votes (1 156 738) were in support of the extension of the operation of the Ignalina NPP. However, the referendum was announced invalid due to the low turnout, which stood at 48.44% and was lower than the required 50%.

After the nuclear accident at the Fukushima NPP and with two new NPP projects under development near Lithuania’s borders (Ostrovets NPP in Belarus and Kaliningrad NPP), public acceptance towards nuclear power in Lithuania declined. The advisory referendum on supporting the new Visaginas NPP construction in Lithuania was held in the middle of October 2012. The results of the referendum revealed the prevailing negative public opinion on the construction of a new NPP. Just 34% of the voters (463 966) supported the construction of a new NPP, while 63% of the voters (853 163) were against it.

Lithuanian Energy Institute, Centre for Physical Sciences and Technology, Kaunas University of Technology, and Vilnius Gediminas Technical University are involved in nuclear or nuclear related activities, mainly as technical support organizations (TSOs). They provide expertise and necessary technical/scientific support during preparation of safety submittals and safety reviews, and verification of safety justifications. Some of these TSOs are also involved in international projects implemented through international and bilateral cooperation.

Lithuanian Energy Institute performs a wide range of nuclear-related activities, some of which are listed below:

Safety assessment of nuclear power plants;

• Research related to construction of a new nuclear power plant in Lithuania;

• Thermal-hydraulic analysis of accident and transient processes;

• Assessment of thermohydraulic parameters in NPPs;

• Simulation of radionuclide and aerosol transport in the compartments;

• Assessment of nuclear reactor core modifications and analysis of postulated reactivity accidents;

• Safety analysis of thermonuclear fusion reactors;

• Analysis of new generation nuclear power plants;

• Reliability estimation and control of energy systems;

• Level 1 and Level 2 probabilistic safety assessment of NPPs;

• Strength analysis of construction, piping and components in complex technical systems.

Activities of the Nuclear and Environmental Radioactivity Research Laboratory of the Centre for Physical Sciences and Technology are development and application of nuclear spectroscopy methods, radionuclide metrology and standardization, investigations in environmental radioactivity, radionuclide tracer studies, radio-ecological monitoring and dose assessment.

The Centre for Non-Destructive Testing at Kaunas University of Technology and the Laboratory of Welding and Material Analysis at Vilnius Gediminas Technical University are highly qualified in the indicated areas. They are equipped with modern instrumentation and also play an important role as technical support organizations.

With the aid of the European Commission, these facilities were equipped with modern instrumentation.

Not applicable.

Lithuania has or had multilateral and bilateral projects, mostly concerning safety of NPPs, including with Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States of America.

The main multilateral projects were the TACIS founded International RBMK Safety Review Consortium, Lord Marshall’s Users Group for Soviet Designed Reactors and the IAEA extra-budgetary programme on RBMK reactors. One of the most important projects for Lithuania was the international project “Safety of Design Solutions and Operation of NPPs with RBMK Reactors”, which covers a broad range of safety related topics, with Unit 2 of the INPP used as a reference plant.

The BARSELINA project (1992–2001) — level 1 and 2 probabilistic safety assessment of the Ignalina NPP was conducted by Lithuania, Russian Federation and Sweden. This project provides a unified basis for the assessment of severe accident risks for RBMK type reactors and the preparation of remedial measures. Some of the improvements highlighted by the PSA have already been implemented at the Ignalina NPP.

Another project of the Lithuanian–Swedish bilateral programme was the application of modern non-destructive testing (NDT) systems for in-service inspection of the pressure boundary system. One other project is the preparation of an “Overall Plan for Radioactive Waste Management” in Lithuania by Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Co. SKB. The project “Fire and flooding protection” helped to improve the whole fire protection system at Ignalina NPP.

The performance of SAR (1995–1996), RSR (1995–1997), the review of SAR-2 (2001–2003), safety analyses recommended by SAR, RSR and Ignalina Safety Panel (1997–1999), and Safety Improvement Programme SIP-2, which was started in 1997, should be mentioned as a good example of multilateral collaboration.

IAEA offers many courses for training nuclear specialists. One of the most important national Technical Cooperation projects — Systematic approach to training (SAT) for NPP personnel, completed in 2000, helped to strengthen safety and reliability of the Ignalina NPP.

There have been a number of projects implemented with the United States of America, financed by the Department of Energy and USAID in the framework of the Nuclear Safety Assistance Programme for Lithuania. Cooperation in nuclear safety improvement at the Ignalina NPP with Japanese specialists started in 1994. In the framework of the Agreement of Co-operation for Safety Improvement at the Ignalina NPP signed in 1996, Japan Science and Technology Agency started two big projects: “Co-operation on plant operation management” and “Co-operation on fuel channel integrity”.

GRS (Germany) and Lithuanian Energy Institute are involved in the cooperative project Analysis of Safety Aspects of Ignalina NPP, which includes studies of neutron dynamics and thermal hydraulics. Lithuanian Energy Institute and American Nuclear Society signed a memorandum of cooperation in February 2007, which was prolonged for another five year period in February 2011.

In 2009, the Lithuanian Energy Institute was accepted to the European Technical Support Organisation Network (ETSON), with members (at that time) including Bel V (Belgium), ÚJV (Czech Republic), and VTT (Finland), IRSN (France) and GRS (Germany). In 2009, members of ETSON decided to create the European Nuclear Safety Training and Tutoring Institute (ENSTTI). Thus, in 2009 two European TSOs (IRSN in France and LEI in Lithuania) created ENSTTI. Later, Bel V (Belgium) and GRC (Germany) joined ENSTTI. The Lithuanian Energy Institute has actively participated in international collaboration projects:

6th Framework Programme:

Network of Excellence for a Sustainable Integration of European Research on Severe Accident Phenomenology and Management (SARNET) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2004–2008);

• Nuclear Plant LIFE Prediction (NULIFE) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2006–2011).

7th Framework Programme:

Treatment and Disposal of Irradiated Graphite and Other Carbonaceous Waste (CARBOWASTE) — Lithuanian Energy Institute, Center for Physical Sciences and Technology (2008–2012);

• REDOX Phenomena Controlling Systems — Center for Physical Sciences and Technology (2008–2012);

• Safety and Efficacy of a New and Emerging Dental X-ray Modality (SEDENTEXCT) — Vilnius University (2008–2011);

• Fate of Repository Gases (FORGE) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2009–2013);

• Network of Excellence for a Sustainable Integration of European Research on Severe Accident Phenomenology (SARNET2) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2009–2013) ;

• MATerials TEsting and Rules (MATTER) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2011–2014);

• Proposal for a harmonized European methodology for the safety assessment of innovative reactors with fast neutron spectrum planned to be built in Europe (SARGEN_IV) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2012–2013);

• New MS Linking for an AdvaNced Cohesion in Euratom Research (NEWLANCER) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2011–2013);

• Sustainable network of Independent Technical Expertise for radioactive waste disposal (SITEX) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2012–2013);

• Code for European Severe Accident Management (CESAM) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2013–2017);

• CArbon-14 Source Term (CAST) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2013–2018);

• Advanced Safety Assessment: Extended PAS (ASAMPSA_E) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2013–2016);

• Building a platform for enhanced societal research related to nuclear energy in Central and Eastern Europe, (PLATENSO) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2013–2016);

• Nuclear Cogeneration Industrial Initiative — Research and Development Coordination (NC2I-R) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2013–2015);

• Assessment of Regional CApabilities for new reactors Development through an Integrated Approach (ARCADIA) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2013–2016);

• Preparing NUGENIA for HORIZON2020 (NUGENIA-PLUS) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2013–2016).

H2020 Programme:

Implementation of activities described in the Roadmap to Fusion during Horizon 2020 through a Joint programme of the members of the EUROfusion consortium (EUROfusion) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2014–2018);

• Baltic Region Initiative for Long Lasting InnovAtive Nuclear Technologies (BRILLIANT) — Lithuanian Energy Institute, Center for Physical Sciences and Technology, UAB VAE SPB (2015–2018);

• Sustainable network for Independent Technical EXpertise of radioactive waste disposal — Interactions and Implementation (SITEX-II) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2015–2017);

• INcreasing Safety in NPPs by Covering gaps in Environmental Fatigue Assessment (INCEFA-PLUS) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2015–2020);

• In-Vessel Melt Retention Severe Accident Management Strategy for Existing and Future NPPs (IVMR) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2015–2019);

• FAST Nuclear Emergency Tools (FASTNET) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2015–2019);

• European Joint Programme for the Integration of Radiation Protection Research (CONCERT) — Radiation protection Center (2015–2020);

• History of Nuclear Energy and Society (HoNESt) — European Humanities University (2015–2018);

• Bentonite Mechanical Evolution (BEACON) — Lithuanian Energy Institute;

• Thermal treatment for radioactive waste minimisation and hazard reduction (THERAMIN) — Lithuanian Energy Institute;

• Research and Development in support of the GEMINI Initiative (GEMINI Plus) — Lithuanian Energy Institute.

A number of Lithuanian experts participate in IAEA training courses as Agency experts.

Currently, Lithuanian Energy Institute, Lithuanian Center for Physical Sciences and Technology and UAB “VAE SPB along with partners from Estonia, Latvia, Poland and Sweden are taking part in EU HORIZON 2020 financed “BRILLIANT”, or “Baltic Region Initiative for Long Lasting InnovAtive Nuclear Technologies” project⁽¹⁾ whose main objectives are: identify the real barriers for nuclear power development in Baltic region countries and prepare the ground for overcoming them; support the exchange of scientific knowledge and competences between Baltic region countries; and develop better synergies with ongoing and future Euratom projects, in particular those offering access to research infrastructures in conjunction with education and training. The project started in July 2015 and the duration of the project is three years.

VATESI, which was established in 1991, is an independent state institution exercising state regulation and supervision of nuclear safety, activities involving nuclear materials and other activities in the area of nuclear energy involving sources of ionizing radiation, which acts in accordance with the Law on Nuclear Safety, other laws and the Statute of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate. VATESI reports to the President and the Government.

The main responsibilities of VATESI are:

To exercise the functions of state regulation and supervision of nuclear safety; physical security of nuclear facilities, nuclear fuel cycle materials and other nuclear materials; accounting for and control of the nuclear materials; radiation protection in nuclear facilities; and oversight of use of sources of ionizing radiation within nuclear facilities;

• To draft and approve by the order of the Head of VATESI the requirements and rules for nuclear safety; physical security of nuclear facilities, nuclear fuel cycle materials and other nuclear materials of the defined quantity; accounting for and control of the nuclear materials; and radiation safety in the area of nuclear energy, mandatory to all the state and municipal authorities and to all persons engaged in nuclear energy related activities;

• To analyse and assess the documents submitted by applicants for obtaining a licence or a permit as well as the documents submitted by licence holders or permit holders or other persons, to adopt relevant decisions regarding such documents, and to review and evaluate nuclear safety;

• To supervise and inspect applicants, licence and permit holders or the persons rendering services, supplying goods or performing works for them or other persons engaged in activities pertaining to nuclear materials and nuclear fuel cycle materials;

• To issue or suspend licences and permits, revoke suspension of licences and permits, or revoke licences and permits; to establish or make changes to their conditions and supervise compliance with such conditions;

• To issue, suspend and revoke certificates for approval of package design and shipment of radioactive material;

• To cooperate with foreign institutions exercising state regulation and supervision in the sector of nuclear energy, within its competence to participate in activities of international organizations and institutions, committees and groups of the European Union;

• Within its competence and in the manner laid down by the legal acts, to prepare and/or submit to the Government the draft laws and legal acts of the Republic of Lithuania on the issues of nuclear safety; physical security of nuclear facilities, nuclear materials and nuclear fuel cycle materials; accounting for and control of nuclear materials; and radiation safety in carrying out nuclear energy related activities involving sources of ionizing radiation;

  To prepare and submit to the Government or its authorized institutions proposals regarding improvements of the system ensuring nuclear safety; physical security of nuclear facilities, nuclear materials and other nuclear fuel cycle materials; accounting for and control of nuclear materials; and radiation safety in the area of nuclear energy;

• In the event of a nuclear and (or) radiological accident, to provide the interested state and municipal authorities with the time critical information about the radiation situation in the nuclear installation, estimated threats of the nuclear and (or) radiological accident and other related information;

• To participate in emergency preparedness activities, such as regulation and supervision of on-site emergency preparedness, or notification of international organizations and neighbouring countries in case of a nuclear accident;

• To set requirements for physical security of sources of ionizing radiation used in the area of nuclear energy and supervise their implementation;

• To set requirements in the nuclear energy area for obligatory radiation safety training, instruction and evaluation of knowledge of persons responsible for radiation safety, and supervise their implementation;

• To set requirements for certification of persons seeking to obtain the right to train persons responsible for radiation safety, and perform the certification.

VATESI is empowered to impose the following administrative enforcement measures:

To issue a written order to an economic entity to eliminate insignificant violations of requirements of legal acts;

• To issue a warning from the Head of VATESI to the licence or permit holder before issuing the mandatory requirement;

• To provide mandatory requirements to all licence or permit holders requiring them to eliminate the detected violations in nuclear safety, to suspend the work within the time limits set by the Head of VATESI and/or to shut down the nuclear reactor, to decrease its capacity, or to discontinue operation of other equipment or activities according to the Law on Nuclear Safety;

• To warn the legal entity about suspension of the licence or permit (temporary permit), to suspend the license or permit (temporary permit), or to revoke the license or permit (temporary permit);

• To warn natural persons possessing an attestation certificate to train persons responsible for radiation protection about potential suspension of the attestation certificate, to suspend an attestation certificate, to warn about termination of the validity of an attestation certificate and to terminate the validity of an attestation certificate;

• To impose administrative fines on natural persons according to the Code of Administrative Offences of the Republic of Lithuania;

• To impose fines on legal entities according to the Law on Nuclear Safety (otherwise known as economic sanctions).

The Law on Nuclear Energy and the Law on Nuclear Safety, together with the regulations made under the laws, establish the authorization system for activities related to nuclear materials or nuclear fuel cycle materials, as well as for nuclear facilities during the following life stages: site evaluation, design, construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning as well as release from control. The supervision of closed radioactive waste repositories and acquisition, keeping, use and transportation of nuclear or nuclear fuel cycle materials is also executed according to the laws mentioned above.

Some of the steps of the licensing process are divided into several substeps. Licences, permits and approvals of the documents are used as authorization steps and substeps.

The Law on Nuclear Safety establishes the following types of licences and permits issued by VATESI:

Licence for construction of a nuclear facility (or facilities);

• Licence for operation of a nuclear facility (or facilities);

• Licence for construction and operation of a nuclear facility (or facilities) (an alternative authorization replacing two separate licences for construction and operation);

• Licence for decommissioning of a nuclear facility (or facilities);

• Licence for supervision of a closed radioactive waste repository (or repositories);

• Licence for transportation of nuclear fuel cycle materials, nuclear materials and other fissile materials with the exception of small amounts as described in the Law;

• Licence for acquisition, keeping and use of nuclear materials and other fissile materials with the exception of small amounts as prescribed in the Law;

• Permit for first carry-in of nuclear fuel to the site of a nuclear power plant, unit or non-power nuclear reactor;

• Permit for the first carry-in and testing of the nuclear facility using nuclear and/or nuclear fuel cycle materials (can be issued if a common licence for construction and operation was issued previously);

• Permit for first start-up of a unit of a nuclear power plant or non-power nuclear reactor;

• Permit for industrial operation of the nuclear facility;

• Permit for start-up of the nuclear reactor after its short-term shutdown;

• Permit for shipment of radioactive waste generated in nuclear fuel cycle;

• Permit for shipment of spent nuclear fuel.

The concepts “nuclear facility”, “nuclear material”, and “spent nuclear fuel” are established in the Law on Nuclear Energy. The concept of nuclear facility includes:

Nuclear power plants;

• Units of nuclear power plants;

• Non-power nuclear reactors;

• Storage facilities for nuclear materials;

• Storage facilities for radioactive waste;

• Radioactive waste processing facilities;

• Radioactive waste disposal facilities.

“Nuclear material“ covers plutonium, uranium (natural, enriched with isotopes of uranium-235 or uranium-233 or depleted) and thorium found in the form of metal alloy, chemical compounds or concentrates or in a mixture with other materials; “spent nuclear fuel” covers nuclear fuel that was subjected to exposure in the core of a nuclear reactor and was permanently removed from it. Spent nuclear fuel may be reprocessed with the aim of reusing it or managed as radioactive waste and placed in a waste disposal facility.

It also should be mentioned that some activities (hold points) during various stages in the lifetime of a nuclear facility require separate authorizations that have to be supported by safety review and assessment:

During the stage of site evaluation of a nuclear facility, VATESI shall review and assess the site evaluation report. In order for the site evaluation report of a nuclear power plant to be approved, positive conclusions with respect to it shall be presented by the following institutions: the Ministry of Health, the Civil Aviation Administration, the Lithuanian Geology Service, the Lithuanian Hydro Meteorological Service and the Fire Prevention and Rescue Department.

• Before the design activities start, technical specification for design has to be approved by VATESI.

• Design of a nuclear facility has to be performed and assessed according to the requirements established by the competent institutions, including VATESI, Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Interior and other institutions involved according to the Law on Construction, the Law on Nuclear Energy and the regulations made under the laws.

• Commissioning can be performed according to a Commissioning Programme that has to be agreed with VATESI in advance.

• The legislation obligates the licence holder for periodic safety analysis, to be agreed with VATESI. Nuclear Safety defines cases when the safety analysis report has to be updated and agreed with VATESI.

• Documentation of modifications and testing that was not foreseen in the design, or other divergences from a nuclear facility design shall be agreed with VATESI prior the modifications being started.

• Physical security plans and plans for radioactive discharges into the environment have to be agreed with VATESI.

The Law on Nuclear Safety together with the Regulations on the Issue of Licences and Permits Necessary to Engage in Nuclear Energy Activities, approved by the Government of the Republic of Lithuania, and the Rules on Import, Export, Transit and Transport of Radioactive Material, Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel, approved by a decree of the Minister of Health and Head of VATESI, regulate issuance, amendment and suspension of licences and permits listed in the Law on Nuclear Safety, maintenance of a list of documents which have to be submitted for issuance of every type of licence and permit or amendment of a licence or permit, and instructions for providing documents which must be provided in order to get a revocation of suspension of a licence or permit. Detailed requirements for safety documents are determined in respective nuclear safety requirements and rules issued by VATESI. Some requirements for content of the documents that the applicant is required to provide for the issuance or amendment of an appropriate licence or permit are established by the aforementioned regulation as well.

According to the procedure set in the legislation, the applicant has to submit an application to VATESI in order to issue or amend a licence or permit.

Together with the application to issue a licence or permit, a schedule of application documents has to be prepared and agreed with VATESI. The Law on Nuclear Safety sets requirements and conditions for acceptance of an application or of a schedule of application documents, as well as time limits for the acceptance of an application and agreement on schedule.

The Law on Nuclear Safety also determines conditions for refusal of the application for a licence or permit.

VATESI makes decisions on authorizations according to its competence after review and assessment of safety submittals that are required by legal acts. According to VATESI internal management system documents “Procedure Document on Review and Assessment of Safety Justifying Documents” and “Procedure Document for Licensing”, specialists of VATESI have to prepare review and assessment reports as well as safety evaluation reports in support of VATESI decisions on the issue of authorization. According to recent practice, safety evaluation reports are usually available to applicants (licence holders) and their summaries are available to the public on the VATESI web site. The list of the documents under which a licence or permit is issued is required to be added to the licence or permit.

The Law on Nuclear Safety sets requirements and conditions and time limits for issuance of a licences and permits. Some additional conditions (e.g. necessary authorizations by other national regulatory bodies) are also established by the Law on Nuclear Safety as well as the Law on Nuclear Energy. A licence or permit has to be issued for an unlimited period of time until official decision of the regulatory body in this regard (with an exception for permits to transport radioactive materials or spent nuclear fuel). The permits to transport radioactive materials or spent nuclear fuel are issued for a 3 year period.

The Law on Nuclear Safety also determines conditions for making decisions not to issue a licence or permit specifying the reasons based on provisions of the Law.

The Law on Nuclear safety determines the right of VATESI to set licence or permit conditions necessary for the purposes of the laws; conditions can be amended in a prescribed manner by VATESI.

Pursuant to the Law on Nuclear Safety, VATESI issues certificates for approval of package design and shipment of radioactive material under conditions specified in the Law on Nuclear Safety.

Following the provisions of the Law on Radiation Protection, VATESI issues licences and permits for the nuclear energy area activities involving sources of ionizing radiation, which mainly are either a licence or a temporary permit to carry out activities under ionizing radiation at a nuclear facility and a licence or a temporary permit to store or maintain sources of ionizing radiation at a nuclear facility. VATESI also issues certificates to persons seeking to obtain the right to train persons responsible for radiation safety.