In line with the most recent European Union (EU) gas and electricity market directives, all electricity and gas customers have the ability to select their supplier freely as of 1 July 2007. In the same year, the act on electricity (Act No. 86 of 2007) was adopted by the Hungarian Parliament, supporting full liberalization of the electricity market in order to enhance economic competitiveness and to provide sustainable security of supply. The act is also harmonized with the requirements of the EU. Most provisions of the act entered into force in 2007. In the beginning of 2008, the electricity market was fully liberalized. The year 2008 was considered a transition period for the energy market, as players in the market adapted to new rules. Non-residential electricity consumers in Hungary pay for substantial subsidies to renewable sectors through levies on their tariffs. The new premium based renewable support scheme (METÁR) was approved by the Hungarian Parliament in 2016, and it was introduced in 2017.

In February 2008, the National Climate Change Strategy for 2008–2025 was adopted by the Hungarian Parliament. The strategy emphasized the need for increasing energy efficiency, energy savings and the use of renewable energies (including wind, solar, geothermic and biomass). It did not mention nuclear energy. In April 2008, a resolution on a new energy policy for 2008–2020 was adopted by the Parliament, aiming to maintain a balance between security of supply, cost effectiveness, energy efficiency and protection of the environment. According to the resolution, the Government would start preparing the decision on new nuclear capacity for the replacement of existing units. The resolution also stated that the Government should create the necessary conditions for implementation of the programmes aimed at the final disposal of radioactive waste, and that the Government should inform the Parliament on the implementation of the energy policy at least every two years and, in case of need, propose review of the policy.

As a major step in the strategic framework, the National Energy Strategy of 2011 provided a roadmap until 2030 and proposed a vision until 2050. Its main priorities were security of supply, competitiveness and sustainability. The most important strategic measures included progress in renewable energy integration, preservation of nuclear generation capacity by lifetime extension and potential new generation capacity, infrastructure and institutional development, and promotion of energy efficiency.

Following a longer period of strategic planning and consultation, the Government of Hungary approved the new National Energy Strategy and National Energy and Climate Plan (through 2030, with an outlook up to 2040) in January 2020. The revised strategic framework is organized on three strategic pillars: clean, smart and affordable energy. While focusing on energy consumers, the most important strategic objectives include the climate friendly transformation of the energy sector, the further strengthening of security of supply and the promotion of innovation and economic development. The new strategy includes more than 40 strategic measures and foresees a reduction of 95% in greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 (from the 1990 level). Nuclear energy continues to be considered essential to sector integration and to the goal of reaching a climate neutral economy. The preservation of the nuclear generation capacity by the replacement of the existing units at the Paks NPP before the end of their lifetime is one of the key strategic measures, aiming for further decarbonization of the electricity sector.

According to the National Policy for the Management of Spent Fuel and Radioactive Waste adopted in April 2015 and revised in 2020 by the Parliament and the National Programme on the Management of Spent Fuel and Radioactive Waste approved by the Government in 2016, national development goals and objectives relating to spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste include development of a national strategy for the back end of the fuel cycle, with due consideration to be given to various options; continuous extension of the spent fuel interim storage facility in Paks; phased implementation of the geological investigation programme of the Boda Claystone Formation aiming at a future deep geological repository; ongoing implementation of the safety enhancement programme at the Radioactive Waste Treatment and Disposal Facility in Püspökszilágy as well as the extension of the National Radioactive Waste Repository (NRWR) in Bátaapáti and optimization of its disposal concept.

Following the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi NPP, all European countries operating NPPs performed a targeted safety reassessment (TSR) — the so called stress test — to meet the request of the European Council. The TSR of the Paks NPP focused on topics specified by the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG, www.ensreg.eu), which included issues corresponding to earthquakes, flooding and other external natural hazard factors; the loss of electric power supply and of ultimate heat sink or a combination of those; and severe accident management. In relation to the hazard factors, it was assessed whether the design basis of the plant was duly determined and whether there were sufficient reserves beyond design basis before severe damage occurred. Based on the final report of the Paks NPP submitted to the Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority (HAEA) for regulatory review, the HAEA agreed that the proposed tasks in the report be carried out in order to further improve plant safety and also identified a few additional options. Along with the detailed coverage of the topics specified by ENSREG, the HAEA also established that the national legal requirements for the safety of NPPs are in line with international standards and best practices. The HAEA submitted the national report with the results of the review to the European Commission at the end of 2011 and published it on its web site. Based on the results of the regulatory review of the TSR, the HAEA concluded that the design basis of the Paks NPP is adequate and complies with legal requirements and international practice. The safety systems and safety functions satisfy requirements of the design basis. After the last periodic safety review of the Paks NPP, specific safety enhancement measures were implemented, mainly in order to improve the plant’s beyond design basis capabilities. These measures are fully in line with expectations of the TSR as well. It can be concluded that the Paks NPP is safe and no deficiency has occurred. The measures initiated by the last periodic safety review provide robust capabilities for the plant for successful management of severe situations as well. In addition to the positive findings, the TSR identified a number of options and measures to enhance plant safety even further. The HAEA ordered the operator of the plant to develop a detailed programme by the end of the first half of 2012 in order to realize these options.

The National Action Plan of Hungary on the implementation of actions based upon the lessons learned from the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi NPP was adopted in December 2012. The National Action Plan was prepared in accordance with the recommendations of ENSREG. The implementation of the National Action Plan is currently in progress.

As of 31 December 2020, the status of the implementation of the National Action Plan at the Paks NPP is the following: out of 46 tasks, 41 were completed and 5 were rescheduled by the HAEA in the framework of the periodic safety review.

Table 1 shows Hungary’s estimated available energy by source.

TABLE 1. ESTIMATED AVAILABLE ENERGY SOURCES

*Solid (coal), liquid — million tonnes; gas — billion m³; uranium ore — million tonnes.

** Data from 1 Jan. 2019.

Source: Fossil Fuels and Nuclear, 1 Jan. 2020: Mining and Geological Survey of Hungary.

In 2020, liquid (both crude oil and condensate) production was 0.85 million t. Hydrocarbon gas amounted to 1.89 billion m³. As of 1 January 2020, Hungary’s estimated coal resources were nearly 10.5 billion t. The bulk of this resource is lignite, with 5.7 billion t, followed by 3.2 billion t of brown coal and 1.6 billion t of hard coal. Hungary produced about 6.09 million t of coal in 2020. Generally, the coal found in Hungary has low calorific value with high ash and sulphur content. The vast share of coal is used for power generation. In 1997, the uranium mine was closed and production ceased. Remediation activities at the site began the following year and were completed in 2008. Ongoing treatment of contaminated water from the mine and tailings ponds results in the collection of about 1–3 tU per year.

Table 2 contains energy statistics for Hungary.

TABLE 2. ENERGY CONSUMPTION

*Latest available data, please note that compound annual growth rate may not be representative of actual average growth.

**Total energy derived from primary and secondary generation sources. Figures do not reflect potential heat output that may result from electricity co-generation.

—: data not available.

Source(s): United Nations Statistical Division, OECD/IEA and IAEA RDS-1

The liberalization of Hungary’s electricity market was completed in 2008. Today, the free choice of energy supplier applies to every consumer, although prices in some segments are still regulated within the ‘universal service’. The Directive (EU) 2019/944 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on common rules for the internal market for electricity and amending Directive 2012/27/EU establish common rules for the generation, transmission, distribution, energy storage and supply of electricity, together with consumer protection provisions, with a view to creating truly integrated competitive, consumer centred, flexible, fair and transparent electricity markets in the European Union.

The installed capacity of domestic power plants on 31 December 2020 was 10 566 MW(e) (preliminary data). The peak load of Hungary’s electricity system was 7 095 MW in 2020, a slight decrease of 10 MW compared with 2019 (7 105 MW). Although the increase in energy efficiency may help to reduce the rate of increase of primary energy consumption, it is still expected that overall electricity demand will increase. Taking into account the necessary shutdown of old fossil fuel power plants in the near future, new generation capacities may be required in the coming decade, despite the solar photovoltaic boom currently taking place in Hungary, with more than 3 000 MW of expected capacity to be installed within the next 2–3 years.

The electricity generation mix of the Hungarian electricity system is presently well balanced, with about 26% generated from gas, 46% from nuclear, 11% from coal and lignite and an increasing ratio of renewables (from 14% to 16%). The electricity production from renewable energy sources is growing in accordance with the EU directive on green electricity. In 2020, renewable based electricity production made up a share of 16% of gross electricity production, and it is expected to rise steeply in the next few years owing to the various forms of support for renewable energy sources of electricity.

Hungary’s energy supply is around 57% import dependent (based on 2020 data); therefore, its security is a crucial priority of the National Energy Strategy. The safe, successful and profitable operation of the state-owned Paks NPP greatly contributes to meeting this challenge. The obligatory stockpiling of nuclear fuel for two years is also an essential element in ensuring the stability of supply in case of any disturbances in imports.

In Hungary, the only transmission system operator is MAVIR (Magyar Villamosenergia-Ipari Atviteli Rendszeriranyito Zrt.), which operates as an independent member of the state-owned MVM Group (Magyar Villamos Muvek Zártköruen muködo Részvénytársaság, literally: Hungarian Electrical Works Private Limited Company) in accordance with the independent transmission operator model. Thus, being a company independent of any other participants of the energy industry, MAVIR ensures the operation of the whole electricity transmission system in a way that each of its players may deploy their services on an equal basis. In addition, there are six distribution system operator companies in Hungary, all of them according to the strict unbundling rules of the former Third Energy Package of the European Union. Although almost all residential customers are supplied within universal service, intense competition can be observed on the non-household electricity market.

In Hungary, the Government and the national regulatory authority, the Hungarian Energy and Public Utility Regulatory Authority (HEA), shape the legislative environment for electricity. The energy policy belongs to the Government, where currently the Ministry of Innovation and Technology is responsible for the country’s energy strategy and the development of policies relating to renewable energy, energy efficiency and decarbonization.

The HEA regulates and supervises the activities of electricity, natural gas, district heating and water public utility companies, leading national competence regarding price regulation of waste management, energy statistics and consumer protection. However, the most important responsibilities of the HEA include the following:

1. Issuing decrees (determining the network access and network usage fees for both the electricity and gas transmission and distribution systems, determining the conditions and rules for the application of such fees);

2. Issuing, amending or withdrawing the authorizations required for performing activities regarding electricity, gas, district heating and water public utility;

3. Approving commercial codes, operational network codes (transmission system operator, distribution system operator), network development plan (transmission system operator), business codes (traders, generators) and market rules of the exchanges;

4. Monitoring compliance with the obligations of the licensees, the execution of cross-border transmission of electricity and gas, competition in the electricity and gas markets (including the balancing market) in the course of market surveillance activities, and performance of market analysis and regulatory inspections;

5. Making preliminary proposals for the regulations relating to the pricing mechanisms of universal services;

6. Resolving complaints lodged against authorized operators (shared competence with the Authority for Consumer Protection).

In addition to classic regulatory tasks mentioned above, the HEA is also responsible for managing applications for different renewable energy source electricity supporting regimes, as well as for the controlling of implementing energy efficiency measures in case of organizations concerned by relevant legislation. The HEA is a legal entity with a separate and independent budget, reporting on an annual basis to the Parliament on its activities. Its president is appointed by the Prime Minister for seven years, which may be extended once for an additional seven years.

Today, the power industry is restructured and partly privatized. Figure 1 shows the simplified model of Hungary’s electricity industry.

FIG. 1. Hungarian electricity industry as of 2020.

1.2.2.1. MVM Group

1.2.2.2. Transmission operator

1.2.2.3. Electricity distribution

Table 5 contains information about electricity production, consumption and capacity, and Table 6 shows energy related ratios.

TABLE 3. ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION

*Latest available data, please note that compound annual growth rate may not be representative of actual average growth.

**Electricity transmission losses are not deducted.

—: data not available.

Source: United Nations Statistical Division, OECD/IEA and IAEA RDS-1

TABLE 4. ENERGY RELATED RATIOS

*Latest available data.

Source: RDS-1 and RDS-2

—: data not available.

Hungary’s first reactor was built for research purposes in 1959 at Csillebérc, on the outskirts of Budapest. The reactor, of Soviet origin and refurbished by experts in Hungary after 30 years of operation, was again put into operation by the Atomic Energy Research Institute in 1993. The Budapest Research Reactor is a tank type reactor with 10 MW(th) capacity and is operated by the Centre for Energy Research, functioning in the framework of the Eötvös Loránd Research Network.

The Training Reactor of the Institute of Nuclear Techniques of the Budapest University of Technology and Economics (BME NTI) was put into operation in 1971. Since then, the training reactor has been used mainly for the purposes of education in the nuclear field. It is a pool type reactor with 100 kW(th) capacity.

The Paks NPP has four WWER-440/213 second generation units. Owing to successful upgrades in the past, the nominal electrical power output of the units are 508.6 MW, 506 MW, 506 MW and 506 MW, respectively. The plant is located 5 km south of the town Paks. Since 1980, the four units have played a key role in Hungary’s power system.

Hungary’s national policy concerning the application of atomic energy is regulated by law. The basic purposes of the Act on Atomic Energy are those of protecting the health and safety of the population and protecting the environment. The provisions of the act state that the use of atomic energy is allowed only in a manner stipulated in law and under the permanent control of the competent authority. Regardless of what aspect of atomic energy is being considered, safety is a prevailing priority.

2.1.2.1. Governmental organizations in the nuclear field

2.1.2.2. Regulatory body

2.1.2.3. Licensees

2.1.2.4. Research institutions

Table 7 shows the status and performance of the nuclear power plants in Hungary.

TABLE 5. STATUS AND PERFORMANCE OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

The Paks NPP generated 16 055 GW·h of electric energy in 2020, which represents 46.4% of the gross domestic electricity production of Hungary. This amount was generated by Units 1–4, respectively, as follows: 3 929 GW·h; 4 043 GW·h; 4 089 GW·h; 3 994 GW·h. The amount of electricity that has been generated by the Paks NPP since the date of the first connection of Unit 1 to the grid was higher than 509.677 TW·h at the end of 2020.

The Paks NPP consists of four WWER-440/213 type reactor units, originally designed to produce 1375 MW(th) and 440 MW(e) each. Earlier upgrades of the secondary circuit and turbine increased the electrical output to about 470 MW(e) in each unit, with no change to thermal capacity. An upgrade of the primary side was completed that increased the nominal power by 8% to 1485 MW(th), resulting in about 500 MW(e) of power generation by each unit. By the end of 2009, the uprating process was completed successfully on all four units, and 2010 was the first year the units operated at the increased power level. A recent upgrade of the turbines enables the units to reach over 500 MW(e); owing to turbine reconstruction, with stage installations added in the high pressure cylinders of the turbines on all units, the nominal outputs of the units are now 508.6 MW, 506 MW, 506 MW and 506 MW, respectively.

At the end of 2008, the Paks NPP submitted a lifetime extension programme to the HAEA to justify the establishment of the operating conditions and safe operation beyond the design lifetime. The HAEA evaluated the programme and ordered the licensee to implement the programme with certain conditions. The HAEA regularly reviews and evaluates the progress reports of the lifetime extension programme. The HAEA granted an operating licence for all units for an additional 20 years, subject to the periodic safety assessment of the units. The validity of the new operation licences was requested to be the same as licences during lifetime extension, that is: Unit 1 until 31 December 2032; Unit 2 until 31 December 2034; Unit 3 until 31 December 2036; and Unit 4 until 31 December 2037.

The HAEA issued a licence to introduce a 15 month operation interval at Units 1–4 of the Paks NPP, and as a preliminary measure, to implement a new type of fuel assembly with a mean enrichment of 4.7%. The modification of the licence regarding the new 15 month operating cycle was issued by the HAEA on 14 October 2019.

TABLE 6. STATUS OF DECOMMISSIONING PROCESS OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

The construction of new units at the Paks site was proposed in order to meet future electricity demand. The recently adopted National Energy Strategy and National Energy and Climate Plan through 2030, yet with an outlook up to 2040, foresee the long term preservation of nuclear power in the energy mix.

Under Hungary’s Act on Atomic Energy, the Government would need to obtain a decision in principle from the Parliament in order to start any preparatory activity that could lead to the construction of a new nuclear installation. On 30 March 2009, members of the Hungarian Parliament gave their decision in principle, with more than 90% of the votes in support of it.

After this, preparation for the construction of the new units commenced. The activities included preparations for obtaining environmental and site licences. A survey was also initiated to determine possible suppliers for the construction of the new units and demand for the necessary labour.

In order to prepare the planned new units, the MVM Group established its new project company, MVM Paks II Nuclear Power Plant Development Ltd (MVM Paks II Ltd) in 2012. Since November 2014, owing to a change in ownership, the project company no longer belongs to MVM Group and is named Paks II Ltd. It came under direct State control when the Prime Minister’s office obtained the owner’s rights in 2014. Since 3 May 2017, the project company’s ownership rights and obligations have been exercised by the minister without portfolio responsible for the planning, construction and commissioning of the two new units at the Paks NPP.

2.3.1.1. Update of the Nuclear Safety Regulation

2.3.1.2. Establishment of the contractual and legal framework of the new build project

2.3.1.3. Ongoing licensing and pre-construction work

The delivery of the new nuclear power plant units will be a turnkey project. The preparations for construction of the new units are being coordinated by Paks II Ltd and the minister without portfolio responsible for the planning, construction and commissioning of the two new blocks at the Paks NPP.

According to the FIGA, the Russian Federation grants Hungary a maximum of €10 billion credit, which will finance 80% of the contract price of the EPC. Hungary will finance 20% of the contract price. It is also on the agenda to amend the FIGA of the Paks II investment to align the agreement with the new target dates. Paks II Ltd and the Russian Federation are also considering additional technical solutions owing to the water status of the Danube, climate change considerations and the rise of summer water temperatures.

Conditions of the credit line available to the Hungarian State as set out in the FIGA are as follows:

1. Credit amount: 80% of the agreed amount of the EPC, maximum €10 billion.

2. Repayment period: 21 years:

• Years 1–7: 25% of the whole amount;

• Years 8–14: 35% of the whole amount;

• Years 15–21: 40% of the whole amount.

3. Interest rate:

• During the investment period: 3.95%;

• First seven years of repayment: 4.50%;

• Second seven years of repayment: 4.80%;

• Third seven years of repayment: 4.95%.

4. Commitment fee: 0.25% of the undisbursed amount from the preliminarily agreed annual credit line.

A new high voltage substation and a new double circuit overhead line of 400 kV are planned to be constructed. In order to provide increased reliability, the new substation and the substation of the existing nuclear power plant will be connected by means of two coupling lines of 400 kV.

The planned installation site of the new Paks II NPP units is situated in the area neighbouring the Paks NPP. The site is located in Tolna County, about 118 km south of Budapest. The construction area lies 5 km south of the centre of Paks, 1 km west of the River Danube and 1.5 km east of Main Road No. 6.

Hungary has 20 000 t of exploitable uranium resources and 10 000 t of additional reserves. There are three areas in Hungary where uranium occurrences are known, but only one region in the Mecsek Mountains has been exploited. Hungary mined uranium ore, which was processed into yellowcake at Mecsek and then shipped to the Russian Federation. Fuel cycle services were guaranteed by the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) when Hungary purchased Soviet reactors, including the fabrication and shipping of the fabricated fuel assemblies to Hungary, and the return of the spent fuel to the former USSR. Hungary does not have other fuel cycle capabilities such as fuel conversion, enrichment or fabrication capacities.

There are no reprocessing capabilities in Hungary, and no plans to develop any.

A new type of fuel assembly with improved parameters has been introduced at the Paks NPP a few times. The enrichment of the new fuel has increased and it contains burnable poison (gadolinium isotope). The increased enrichment enhances the economic efficiency of the fuel cycles, while the application of the burnable poison compensates for the potential negative effects of the increased enrichment on the safety features of the reactors and the transport and storage devices, with the change matching a worldwide trend. In 2010, test operation of 18 assemblies was completed following licensing in 2009. The preliminary use of the test assemblies was necessary for the validation of the design computer codes. When the test programme was finished successfully, the HAEA issued a licence for the general use of the new fuel. On this basis, the first batch of the new fuel assemblies was loaded at Unit 4 in 2010. The results of a special inspection programme showed that the behaviour of the fuel assemblies is in harmony with the preliminary estimates and design requirements. The transition to the new fuel has been finished, and its aim was to make possible the power uprate of the units. Implementing similar processes, improved fuel was introduced to extend refuelling outage intervals from 12 to 15 months.

To improve the efficiency of fuel utilization, fuel assemblies containing the so-called SLIM fuel pins have been licensed and are gradually being installed in the reactors. This new fuel type has thinner cladding and pellets without central holes (except for rods containing burnable absorber, which still have a central hole), and the spacer grids are equipped with mixing vanes in order to enhance the mixing of the coolant. This new concept allows for more economical fuel usage as the lack of the central hole increases the amount of uranium in the fuel rod and the thinner cladding results in bigger utilization of fissile materials. Therefore, less fresh fuel will be necessary per fuel cycle and thus the number of spent fuel assemblies will be reduced.

The licensing of the SLIM fuel will proceed in two stages. For each introduction of a new fuel type in the Paks NPP, a test programme was used during which a small number of lead test assemblies were placed in one of the reactors. This is also how SLIM fuel is introduced. The MVM Paks NPP has requested a licence for the use of 18 SLIM fuel assemblies in the 35th fuel cycle of Unit 3 in December 2020. The HAEA issued the licence under resolution number HA7191.

The Paks NPP evaluates the experiences from the test programme. In case of a positive operating experience, the second stage of licensing can take place, during which the Paks NPP submits a licence application for the general use of SLIM fuel assemblies. This licence application is expected to be submitted (by Paks NPP to the HAEA) in 2022, after the successful completion of the test programme.

The basis for creating the National Programme was Parliamentary Resolution No. 21 of 2015 (V. 4) on the adoption of the National Policy on the Management of Spent Fuel and Radioactive Waste in line with the provisions of Council Directive 2011/70/Euratom of 19 July 2011 establishing a Community framework for the responsible and safe management of spent fuel and radioactive waste. The national policy defines the basic principles of the management of all radioactive waste and spent fuel produced in Hungary upon which the national programme was developed and adopted by the Government in 2016.

An important feature of Hungary’s national programme is that the decision maker has not yet found it necessary to make a final decision on the back end of the fuel cycle. Although spent fuel has never been reprocessed in Hungary, the option of future reprocessing (only abroad) is worth reserving.

Nevertheless, it is clear that a domestic deep geological repository is necessary for Hungary, regardless of any decision on the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle. In addition to the reprocessing of spent fuel, operation and decommissioning activities will also inevitably lead to some amount of high level waste.

Being aware of this, the national policy requires a flexible (reversible) yet active approach: the so called ‘DO and SEE’ policy. It means that instead of allowing delay in real actions (for instance, until the final political decision on the back end is known), a real and ongoing research programme for a deep geological repository is required.

While a final decision on reprocessing (only abroad) is not yet available, research and other planning activities for implementing the national programme should be based on a reference scenario, which is currently the direct disposal of spent fuel in a domestic deep geological repository, together with other high level waste arising from operation and decommissioning.

Naturally, the flexible nature of the ‘DO and SEE’ policy cannot be sustained forever. Eventually, when research and repository development activities require that the waste packages be characterized, it will become necessary to make a clear and final decision on the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle.

According to the Hungarian–Soviet Intergovernmental Agreement on Cooperation in the Construction of the Paks NPP, signed on 28 December 1966, and the Protocol signed on 1 April 1994 attached to this agreement, the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation undertook to accept spent fuel assemblies from the Paks NPP in such a manner that the radioactive waste and other by-products arising from the reprocessing of such fuel would not be returned to Hungary. Until 1992, the return of the spent fuel assemblies was conducted without problems, under conditions which were very favourable for Hungary, but which nevertheless deviated from normal international practice. In the interest of ensuring undisturbed operation of the NPP, it became necessary to find an interim solution (50 years) for the storage of spent fuel assemblies.

The Spent Fuel Interim Storage Facility (designed by GEC Alsthom UK) at the Paks site is a modular vault dry storage type spent fuel storage facility which has been receiving irradiated fuel assemblies from the Paks NPP since 1997. The increase of storage capacity is in line with the demands of the Paks NPP. The 33 planned vaults are assumed to be capable of storing all spent fuel until the end of the extended service life of the plant. At present, 24 vaults are ready, allowing for storage of 11 416 spent fuel assemblies. Beginning with vault number 17, a square arrangement is applied for the storage tubes instead of the triangular arrangement that is used in vaults 1–16; consequently, 527 spent fuel assemblies can be stored instead of the original 450.

According to a recently elaborated concept, it is possible to further increase the capacity per vault. By the new storage concepts licensed for vaults 25–33 in 2017, a single vault will be able to store 703 spent fuel assemblies in the future. The construction work for vaults 25–28 was started in 2020 and will be finished in 2024. When the storage facility reaches its maximum planned capacity, it will be able to store a total of 17 743 fuel assemblies in the 33 vaults. At the end of 2020, 9 937 fuel assemblies were stored in the Spent Fuel Interim Storage Facility.

The basic regulation in force at present, the Act on Atomic Energy, expresses Hungary’s national policy in the application of atomic energy. Among other aspects, it regulates the management of radioactive waste and authorizes the Government and the ministers responsible to issue government decrees specifying the most important requirements in this field. The Parliament approved the Act on Atomic Energy in December 1996; the Act entered into force on 1 June 1997. In accordance with this Act, from July 2014, the HAEA took over the responsibility of regulatory oversight of the repositories.

The Act on Atomic Energy states that radioactive waste management shall not impose any undue burden on future generations. To satisfy this requirement, the long term costs of waste disposal and of decommissioning the NPP shall be paid by the generations that enjoy the benefits of nuclear energy production and applications of isotopes. Accordingly, by the Act and its executive orders, a Central Nuclear Financial Fund was established on 1 January 1998 to finance radioactive waste disposal, interim storage of spent fuel, the closure of the nuclear fuel cycle as well as the decommissioning of nuclear facilities. The Government authorized the director general of the HAEA to establish the Public Agency for Radioactive Waste Management; this agency has been in operation since 2 June 1998. In line with the corporate forms used in the European Union, the Public Agency for Radioactive Waste Management was transformed on 7 January 2008 into PURAM.

On the basis of the Act on Atomic Energy, PURAM is to design and carry out radioactive waste management in such a way that it is to be safe during the whole duration of the activity and it does not affect human health and the environment abroad to a greater extent than the accepted value within the country.

In the field of radioactive waste management, the following projects are under way.

2.7.4.1. Disposal of high level and long lived radioactive waste

2.7.4.2. Disposal of low and intermediate level radioactive waste from the Paks NPP: National Radioactive Waste Repository in Bátaapáti

2.7.4.3. Radioactive Waste Treatment and Disposal Facility in Püspökszilágy

The Act on Atomic Energy stipulates that the safe use of nuclear energy must be aided by the development of science and technology, harmonized organization of research, practical implementation of domestic and international research results, and training of professionals. The coordination and assessment of R&D activities in the field of nuclear safety and security is the responsibility of the HAEA. In addition, the HAEA also finances activities aimed at supporting the regulatory oversight of the safe use of nuclear energy.

To maintain the quality of such a complex programme, the HAEA defined its basic principles and requirements for performing technical support activities. Scientific technical support is provided by a group of scientific technical institutions and other engineering organizations (TSOs). While details of the technical support activities are defined on a contractual basis, strategic partner agreements provide the opportunity to obtain quick, high level expert work free of charge. The HAEA has strategic partnership agreements with the Centre for Energy Research, the Nuclear Safety Research Institute (NUBIKI) and the BME NTI. The system of TSO partner agreements ensures that the HAEA has the appropriate engineering and scientific reserve capacities to handle situations which need fast and technically correct decisions.

To efficiently harmonize TSO cooperation, the HAEA developed a medium term R&D concept, which is regularly updated and which determines the main areas of work for the upcoming period. The most important R&D areas for 2021–2024 include: support and modernization of the regulatory work; decommissioning and radioactive waste management; development of operational safety; nuclear emergency preparedness; and physical protection of nuclear facilities and radioactive waste storage facilities.

Fast reactors are especially important from the point of view of sustainability of nuclear energy as a tool for closing the fuel cycle. The gas cooled fast reactor (GFR) also has potential to deliver high temperature heat for industrial processes and is considered as an alternative reactor type to the sodium cooled fast reactor. The main R&D areas for GFR technology were identified in the Strategic Research Agenda of the Sustainable Nuclear Energy Technology Platform and the Concept Paper of the European Sustainable Nuclear Industrial Initiative.

The four respective nuclear research organizations of the Visegrad 4 region (ÚJV Rež, Czech Republic; Centre for Energy Research, Hungary; National Centre for Nuclear Research — NCBJ, Poland; and VUJE, Slovakia) established the V4G4 Centre of Excellence in 2013 for the coordination of technical, experimental and other issues related to the preparation of the construction of the GFR demonstrator ALLEGRO. In January 2017, the French Alternative Energies and Atomic Energy Commission (CEA) joined the consortium as an associated member. A second Czech company, CV REZ joined the consortium as an associated member in January 2019. V4G4 launched the ALLEGRO project in July 2015. The first phase of the project aims to develop the conceptual design of the ALLEGRO reactor, addressing all safety related and other technical issues. The corresponding roadmap of the design work and safety analysis is under realization and the conceptual design has to be completed by 2025. To support these activities, a research, development and qualification roadmap is under preparation, providing a framework of the experimental work needed by the design and safety activities.

In Hungary, both the licensees and the HAEA maintain wide ranging relations with various international organizations and other international forums, with other countries and institutions involved in the design, manufacture, installation and operation of nuclear facilities and with research institutes.

These relations serve as a means of exchanging knowledge and experience. The fact that Hungarian experts are held in high esteem internationally is demonstrated by their active role on different committees, with many of them being board members of international organizations or invited as experts.

Hungary has been a Member of the IAEA since 1957 and the Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD/NEA) since 1996.

Hungary has bilateral international agreements with Australia, Austria, Canada, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Germany, the Republic of Korea, Romania, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine, the United States of America and Viet Nam.

The HAEA has concluded memoranda of understanding on cooperation and mutual information exchange with regulatory authorities in Belarus, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Finland, Morocco, Poland, Romania, the Russian Federation, Slovakia, Turkey, Ukraine and the United States of America.

Regional programmes organized by the European Union and the IAEA play an important role in cooperation between the regulatory authorities of neighbouring countries. Moreover, the HAEA is taking part in quadrilateral cooperation with the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia.

The HAEA takes part in several international cooperative activities, including the following:

• International organizations:

• IAEA;

• OECD/NEA;

• European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom);

• Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization.

• Multilateral cooperation:

• Nuclear Suppliers Group;

• Zangger Committee.

• Nuclear forums:

• ENSREG;

• WENRA;

• European Safeguards Research and Development Association;

• European Nuclear Security Regulators’ Association;

• Heads of the European Radiological Protection Competent Authorities;

• European Association of Competent Authorities;

• Forum of the State Nuclear Safety Authorities of the Countries Operating WWER Type Reactors.

The Paks NPP is a member of several international bodies of major importance, including the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO), the WWER-440 operators’ club, the WWER users’ group, the International Nuclear Safety Programme (the so called Lisbon Initiative) and the Nuclear Maintenance Experience Exchange (NUMEX). Paks II Ltd is also a member of WANO.

PURAM takes part in activities of relevant international organizations (IAEA, OECD/NEA, etc.) and maintains bilateral contacts with other companies involved in radioactive waste management in other countries.

The Hungarian Nuclear Society is a member of the European Nuclear Society, and the Health Physics Section of the Eötvös Loránd Physical Society is a member of the International Radiation Protection Association.

The TSOs of the HAEA take part in international activities, including the working groups of the OECD/NEA.

The Paks NPP has its own training organization, which operates a state of the art training infrastructure. The training organization provides initial and refresher training both for its own employees and contractor staff. The training system is operated on the basis of the IAEA systematic approach to training systems. Job specific training programmes and training materials are available for all the job positions related to nuclear safety. As part of the training infrastructure, there is a full scope replica simulator for operator training. For training the maintenance and technical support staff, a unique maintenance training centre is available, equipped with real primary circuit equipment such as a reactor vessel and its internals. The training organization cooperates broadly with national and international institutes and universities in the human resource development area.

At the HAEA, inspectors take part in a predefined training programme, which is reviewed annually. The training plan is divided into three parts: the training of newcomers, refresher training and specific training. The training plan also utilizes the results of R&D projects.

Newcomers to the HAEA also complete a special training course. It includes all important fields related to the HAEA’s areas of responsibility, in addition to special training courses at the Paks NPP and at the other licensees. After having fulfilled the predefined training programme, the newcomers have to pass the inspector exam, in which they analyse real events regarding the licensing, supervision and investigation process of the HAEA.

The longer term training programme contains training directions based on the knowledge profile survey and on the future projects and strategy of the HAEA, such as bigger systems for the Paks NPP, lifetime extension at the Paks NPP, decommissioning, R&D projects and legal environment.

At the initiation of the director general of the HAEA following thorough negotiations conducted in 2009, the representatives of Hungary’s leading nuclear organizations established the Hungarian Nuclear Knowledge Management Database System on 22 June 2010 by signing a joint cooperation agreement at the HAEA headquarters. The main objective of the system is to collect and maintain the Hungarian documentation of the expertise accumulated during the application of atomic energy for future generations. This continually updated common database facilitates the sharing of knowledge and information within the nuclear community.

The code of conduct developed by the editorial committee was signed on 15 December 2010, and established the administrative conditions and the technical provisions for the operation of the knowledge management database. Consequently, the ordinary use of the ‘common electronic repository’ of the Hungarian nuclear community started in 2010. The uploading of documents is ongoing; the database currently consists of approximately 9 000 documents.

It is important for the Paks II project to employ a highly qualified workforce; the Paks II Ltd established the Paks II Academy to support this goal. The educational offerings aim to provide different training for various levels of education. Within the framework of the Paks II Academy, a high quality post-graduate course is offered for engineers. Paks II Ltd compiled the curriculum and developed the training materials in cooperation with the Budapest University of Technology and Economics, the University of Pécs, the University of Debrecen, the University of Pannonia, the University of Miskolc and the University of Dunaújváros. Together, these six universities launched the “Engineer of Nuclear Power Plant Operations” post-graduate course and since 2020, further training for NPP specialists is also available. With the financial support of Paks II Ltd (with an increased student limit beginning in 2020), the course is free of charge for participating students.

MVM Paks NPP Ltd frequently informs the public of events at the power plant via press releases. The press releases are also uploaded, together with other information materials, to the Hungarian and English web site of the NPP (www.atomeromu.hu and www.atomeromu.hu/en).

MVM Paks NPP Ltd has a Visitor Centre and a Nuclear Energetics Museum. Thanks to their programmes, the NPP remains a popular tourist destination. The Visitor Centre was established in 1995 and received over 30 000 visitors annually before the pandemic. The number of visitors in the Nuclear Energetics Museum, open since 2012, exceeded 25 000 per year prior to the pandemic. Because of the pandemic,both facilities have been closed.

The number of followers of the Paks NPP Facebook page is increasing year by year.

The Paks NPP organizes an annual ‘open day’ with various activities, which is popular with participants.

As a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, in 2020 Paks II Ltd shifted the focus of communication from personal contact to online communication. The Paks II Ltd’s website was completely renewed in February 2020 and photo and video content was expanded.

Communication in 2020 focused on the construction licence, in connection with which Paks II Ltd not only held a press conference and provided information to the mayors of the nearby municipalities, but also sent out a 12-page information brochure to everyone in the surrounding 47 settlements. Both the 12-page brochure and the 100-page comprehensible summary are available in three languages on the Paks II Ltd’s website, which deals with the construction licence in a separate menu.

The population next to the NPP site receives updated information about developments in the Paks II project. Among the local and regional media content, there has always been information about the project company’s press conferences and the latest events regarding the project.

To inform the public, the project company’s informative advertisements and public relations articles have been published in the county daily newspapers and local media, presenting the importance of nuclear energy and the Paks II project.

In the Paks NPP’s Visitor Centre, an information corner for the new NPP units was set up in September 2016.

Through the so-called ‘What’s new, Paks II?’, an A3 sized poster which addressed almost 70 settlements in the region in October 2020, the local population could learn about the most important events in the implementation of the two new NPP units from their settlement’s billboards.

The primary purpose of the communication work of PURAM is to obtain, retain and reinforce the confidence and acceptance of the public to ensure that existing or planned facilities can safely serve, for many decades, the benefit of the country.

PURAM’s regional communication task is to keep contact with and inform the stakeholders who live near the facilities. Thanks to the successful cooperation between PURAM and the local associations of the municipalities, PURAM receives help in organizing public events and school competitions, and publishing in local newspapers.

The other part of the communication strategy focuses on national and international relationships. PURAM has a showroom in Paks, next to the Spent Fuel Interim Storage Facility, and a Visitor Centre in Bátaapáti, on the site of the NRWR, where PURAM also hosts civil and expert visitors.

PURAM has several brochures, publications and web site news stories, which also provide information about PURAM’s activities. Additionally, PURAM conducts public opinion polls every two years, which can help to generate useful feedback about the general attitudes of the Hungarian public. Because of the pandemic, the 2021 opinion poll was delayed to next year.In addition, several events were cancelled or held online. Site visits were also limited in 2020.

Act No. 128 of 2011 on disaster management, and on the amendment of the related acts and its implementation laws, Govt. Decree 234/2011 (XI. 10) and Govt. Resolution 1150/2012 (V. 15) on the establishment, rules of organization and operation of the Disaster Management Interministerial Coordination Committee (DMCC) regulate the structure of the national disaster management system. This includes the prevention, preparation and response related tasks of the ministers and State organizations as well as the tasks of the disaster management coordination organization of the Government.

The structure and tasks of the Hungarian Nuclear Emergency Response System (HNERS) are outlined in Govt. Decree 167/2010 (V. 11) on the national nuclear emergency response system. Under normal circumstances, organizations of the HNERS are in a state of readiness and carry out preparatory work and training. The concerned organizations perform ongoing tasks related to measurement data acquisition, information acquisition, radiological data exchange and planning, information or cooperation. In a potential nuclear emergency, it is the task of the Nuclear Emergency Response Working Committee of the DMCC to provide professional decision support. Within the affected installation, the person responsible for implementing tasks related to the response to a nuclear emergency is the chief executive of the installation; at the national level, it is the chairperson of the DMCC; while in the counties and in the capital, it is the chairperson of the regionally competent County (Capital) Defence Committees. The chairperson of the County (Capital) Defence Committee is the Government’s commissioner, whose deputy is, as far as response to disasters is concerned, the management of the regional office of the professional disaster management organization. Among other tasks, the National Radiation Monitoring, Early Warning and Surveillance System (NRMEWS) is responsible for monitoring the radiation situation in Hungary, and it provides the information required for the decision support and decision making activities of the DMCC. The central body of the NRMEWS is the Nuclear Emergency Information and Analysis Centre working at the National Directorate General for Disaster Management of the Ministry of Interior. The tasks of the NRMEWS include the continuous monitoring, warning and verification of the national radiation situation, as well as supporting warnings and notifications according to the operating status of the HNERS by maintaining the early notification conditions of the national nuclear emergency response. In a nuclear emergency, it is the task of the HAEA to evaluate the nuclear safety and radiation conditions. Data and information for evaluation are provided by the Centre for Emergency Response, Training and Analysis (CERTA) operating within the organization of the HAEA and by the Nuclear Emergency Information and Analysis Centre operated by the National Directorate General for Disaster Management. Early detection tasks on the basis of monitoring of the national radiological conditions are fulfilled by the National Directorate General for Disaster Management. The nuclear emergency response related Real-time On-line Decision Support System for Nuclear Emergency Management (RODOS) also operates there, as well as the Hungarian Centre for the European Radiological Data Exchange Platform.

The HAEA operates a high level working group consisting of the State administration organizations concerned for the regular review of the Hungarian Nuclear Emergency Response Plan. The plan is approved by the DMCC. Currently, the most up-to-date version of the National Nuclear Emergency Response Plan is version 3.1, which was developed and finalized in the High Level Working Group at the end of 2019 and was submitted for approval to the chair of the Government Coordination Body in March 2020.

The HAEA’s scope of competence comprises the regulatory oversight of nuclear installations, radioactive waste repositories and the safety and security of radioactive material in order to guarantee the peaceful and safe use of atomic energy all while serving the interests of the public as stipulated in laws, safety regulations and resolutions of HAEA.

Radiation protection (such as the oversight of X ray machines), general building authority and general building oversight in the safety zone of nuclear installations and radioactive waste repositories also fall within the scope and competences of the HAEA.

In the framework of its licensing activities, the HAEA confirms through licensing whether safety requirements are met by the licensees and the HAEA authorizes the licensee to carry out activities in relation to the use of atomic energy.

During its inspection activities, the HAEA examines compliance with all regulations contained in laws and licences, the implementation of measures imposed by the HAEA and whether nuclear energy is used for peaceful purposes. The HAEA regularly analyses and evaluates the activities of the licensees and the safety and security of nuclear facilities, and performs analysis of events that have occurred. In case of an irregularity, the HAEA takes immediate measures for remediation.

The most important oversight tasks related to safeguards also fall within the scope of the competences of the HAEA, as the aim of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons includes the early detection of potential for misuse of nuclear material or technology; hence, its tasks include verifying that nuclear facilities are not misused and the production of nuclear material is not diverted from peaceful purposes.

The basic principles of licensing procedures for NPPs, and the authorities taking part in licensing procedures, are regulated by Chapter 3 of the Act on Atomic Energy. To establish a new NPP or a new NPP unit, the preliminary consent in principle of the Parliament is required for starting preparatory work. To establish ownership of an NPP that is in operation or to transfer the right of operation, the decision in principle of the Government is required. According to the regulations in force, a licence is to be obtained from the authorities for all phases of operation (siting, construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning) during the lifetime of an NPP. Moreover, a separate licence is to be obtained for all plant level or safety related equipment level modifications. Within the licensing procedures, technical aspects are enforced by legally delegated authorities. The authority takes account of opinions of legally delegated special authorities. When the installation of a new NPP is being considered, the precondition for launching the licensing procedure is the existence of an environmental protection licence. During the licensing procedure, the licensee prepares a preliminary environmental impact study. The environmental protection authority then sends the preliminary impact study to the relevant authorities to seek the opinion of authorities of potentially affected areas who in turn expose it to public view. The environmental protection authority, if it does not reject the detailed environmental impact study that has been submitted, subsequently holds a public hearing. Based on the detailed environmental impact study and on the responses received, the environmental protection authority may issue an environmental protection licence for the construction and operation of the plant.

The safety related licensing of a nuclear installation takes place after the environmental licensing. The environmental protection authority plays the role of special authority in the course of licensing a nuclear installation. During the licensing of installations and equipment and of their modifications, the contributing procedure of the environmental protection special authority provides the possibility for civil organizations to act as clients. The decisions of the nuclear safety authority are made public. Those licences to be issued based on Act No. 110 of 2001 on Electric Energy are also required for establishing and operating a nuclear plant. Licences are valid for fixed periods; on request and provided that the necessary requirements are fulfilled, they may be extended. A licensee can appeal the decisions of the authority. It has the right to appeal in court.

Every ten years, a periodic safety review of the NPP is performed. Any decision on the further validity and conditions of the operating licence is made within the framework of the safety review.

For certain facilities, the Act on Atomic Energy requires higher approval beyond the regulatory licensing procedure. Preliminary consent of the Government shall be required to acquire ownership of a nuclear facility and radioactive waste repository, or to transfer the right of its use. Preliminary consent of the Parliament shall be required before starting preparatory actions in the construction of a new nuclear facility or radioactive waste repository, or for the expansion of an existing NPP with additional units.