Credible Assurance to the International Community

Special Symposium for the IAEA 50th Anniversary Global Challenges for the Future of Nuclear Energy and the IAEA 11 April 2007

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IAEA Safeguards

Purpose

- Objectives
- To provide assurance about the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear material and facilities
- Timely detection of diversion and deterrence through risk of early detection
- Task

 To verify correctness and completeness of declarations made by States




IAEA Safeguards


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Nuclear Material Accountancy



Inspectors counting and identifying fresh fuel at a power reactor



Verification of UF₆ cylinders



Containment and Surveillance





Surveillance cameras being serviced




Sealing of a spent fuel rack











Advanced Technologies







State Level Approach to Safeguards

- Use of all information about a State's nuclear programme to plan, implement and evaluate safeguards activities in a State ("information driven").
- A comprehensive State evaluation, conducted to provide as complete a picture as possible of a State's nuclear programme, used as basis for drawing safeguards conclusions.
- For a State with a comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) and an additional protocol (AP) in force, the objective is to draw the broader safeguards conclusion.
- With a broader conclusion, it is possible to optimize safeguards implementation under CSAs and APs *Integrated Safeguards*.



Challenges to Safeguards Implementation

- Implementing additional protocols in more States
- Drawing the broader safeguards conclusion and moving to integrated safeguards
- Safeguarding complicated and different types of facilities



Major Safeguards Implementation Efforts

- Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant
- JMOX Project
- Chernobyl
- Enrichment plants in U.S. and France
- India
- DPRK




Development of New Approaches

Decommissioning



Fig. 13: First segment of RPV closure head onto its temporary position on the biologic





Geological Repository

Pebble bed reactors



Further Strengthening of Safeguards

- Conclusion and full implementation of existing safeguards instruments
 - All NNWS NPT parties to conclude CSAs
 - States to fulfill all legal obligations under safeguards agreements and APs
 - All States to conclude APs
- Expanding technical capabilities (expanding the NWAL; broadening satellite imagery; use of novel technologies)
- Broader information



Some Implementation Statistics for 2005	
 Number of facilities under safeguards 	925 (in 72 States)
 Nuclear material under safeguards 	140 000
SQs (90 t Pu; 845 t Pu in spent fuel; 30 t HEU; 57 t L	EU)
 Number of Inspections 	2 150
 Number of complementary accesses 	160
 Metal seals (detached and verified) 	17 500
 Other seals (verified in situ) 	9 700
 Nuclear material samples 	800
• Environmental samples Regular Budget: \$109 M; Extrabudge (IAEA Norms for Peace: The First Half Century 1957-2007	800 etary: \$13M