

# Safety from the Operator's Perspective: *We are All in this Together*



**Jim Ellis**  
*President and CEO*  
*Institute of Nuclear Power Operations*


**INPO<sup>®</sup>**




**Rain does not fall on one rooftop alone.**  
*...proverb from Cameroon*

# Our Roots

- March 28, 1979
- Three Mile Island -- a catalyst for industry improvement
- INPO's unique role
  - Self-regulation through peer review



# President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island

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- Set and police standards of excellence
  - Systematic gathering and analysis of operating experience
  - Accredited training
  - Operator training and plant simulators



# INPO Mission


*...to promote the highest levels of safety and reliability — to promote excellence — in the operation of nuclear electric generating plants.*

# Safety Culture In All We Do

Evaluations



Analysis and  
Information  
Exchange



Assistance



Training &  
Accreditation





# INPO Safety Culture Principles

*Building on the Principles  
for Enhancing Professionalism*


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## Principles for a Strong Nuclear Safety Culture

November 2004

**INPO®**

# INPO Safety Culture Definition

A background image of a nuclear power plant with several large containment domes and a cooling tower, set against a blue-tinted sky and water.

An organization's values and behaviors—modeled by its leaders and internalized by its members—that serve to make nuclear safety the overriding priority



# INPO Safety Culture Principles


1. Everyone is personally responsible for nuclear safety.
2. Leaders demonstrate commitment to safety.
3. Trust permeates the organization.
4. Decision-making reflects safety first.
5. Nuclear technology is recognized as special and unique.
6. A questioning attitude is cultivated.
7. Organizational learning is embraced.
8. Nuclear safety undergoes constant examination.

# Chernobyl





# INSAG-4





# INSAG-15

INSAG-15

## Key Practical Issues in Strengthening Safety Culture

INSAG-15

A REPORT BY THE  
INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR SAFETY ADVISORY GROUP

# INSAG




# Davis-Besse





# Davis-Besse Responses

- Recognize and address issues that detract from safety culture
- Improve our ability to identify organizational factors that can cause performance to decline





# Conclusions

- It is not possible to develop a comprehensive safety culture indicator.



*Don't argue about the difficulties.  
The difficulties will argue for themselves.*

**...Sir Winston Churchill**



# Conclusions

- It is not possible to develop a comprehensive safety culture indicator.
- Safety culture is not a broad umbrella under which all things fall.



# Conclusions


- It is not possible to develop a comprehensive safety culture indicator.
- Safety culture is not a broad umbrella under which all things fall.
- Nuclear safety is the responsibility of those who own and operate the plants.

*An organization is strongly influenced by  
and is very responsive to  
perceived expectations from the top.*

*And these perceived expectations can  
and often do have a profound impact  
on the behavior of individuals in the  
organization.*

**...Zack T. Pate**





*There really are simple answers...  
There are just no easy answers.*

**...Ronald Reagan**



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