

Post-Fukushima development of operating severe accident management and ERO




CO₂

Vienna (Autriche) 19/03/2014




CHANGER L'ÉNERGIE ENSEMBLE



SEVERE ACCIDENT DEVELOPMENT IN THE LIGHT OF POST-FUKUSHIMA

SEVERE ACCIDENT GUIDELINES



Priorities of SAM

Two categories of actions
↓
Immediate actions delayed actions


- Containment :
Avoid or limit releases
- Delayed releases
To perform public actions
- Don't make worse the plant state
- Bring the plant in a stable situation



Beginning SAM actions early enough to guarantee SAM objectives (confinement protection and radioactive releases limitations)

Operational tools (SAMG) for:

- NTCC (National technical emergency center)
- LTC (Local technical emergency center)
- MCR (control room)
- ED (plant directors)



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POST-FUKUSHIMA :

Better preparation for unusual or new situations

- ➔ Implementation of new scenarios focused on these situations
- ➔ Reinforcing the Emergency Organization (FARN)
- ➔ Communications tools improvements
- ➔ **Severe accident management procedures**

EPR SAMG :

under construction

- ➔ SAMG construction process implies Human Factors (HF) tests to verify the ability of

SAMG HF Evaluation

- ▶ First HF evaluation: 1st SAMG version,
« static evaluation » in 2012 with the end
users
 - Usability and utility of the procedures under construction
 - → HF recommendations
- ▶ 2nd HF evaluation: 2nd SAMG version,
dynamic evaluation:
 - in a full scale simulator piloted by an instructor,
 - 3 scenarios performed by 1 operation team and the
Emergency Preparedness (EP) personnel
- ▶ This HF evaluation involved
 - In the preparation phase HF experts, technical experts as
instructors and others and designers in order to have a
transverse view of the situation
 - In the realization phase HF & technical experts, different
end users (team operation, EP personnel) that is 25
persons




Some relevant points of the HF evaluation

- ▶ Feedback enabled,
- to validate the SAMG evolution between the 1st and the 2nd evaluation:
 - Each actor is able to apply their procedures
 - Procedures guide the actors, support the decision making process and the coordination between actors and different entities
- To help the operation team and EP personnel to extend their knowledge of a severe accident and to test the continuity between emergency operating procedures and SAMG and to appreciate the differences and subtleties in the procedures
- To make recommendations improving the decision making process, & supporting communication (identification of some key communication points)
 - ↳ Research program: “rebuilding communications network on damaged site”

Demander à PCL 1 (Chef d'Exploitation) la réalisation de ces actions différences via le RFAG
fiche N° AG FM01 EC (Actions différences Gestion 1 file EDE, EBA, DCL)


Organization followed to perform a delayed action (analysis) has been reinforced by using papers forms/ MQH S.A. to communicate with the plant



Feedback

- to check the ability to implement actions identified in SAG, in a dynamic configuration

- instructions and actions in SAMG need to be clearly defined (pump n°, steps)




- attention is payed to doses rates.

↳ Research program: “how to acquire knowledge from the field to protect plant operators”

Feedback

- ▶ Prioritize and re-prioritize rules for actions should be clearly defined before the accident. Indicate this prioritize in a support document.
- Priority rules have been defined and the traceability has been reinforced for EPR.



- The message form message to communicate from NTCC to the plant is currently under evolution to incorporate the priority

Priority of this action
regarding another one,
to help NPP.

This is a screenshot of a message form used for communication between NTCC and the plant. It includes fields for date, time, signatures, and recipient information. A large red box highlights the text "Priority of this action regarding another one, to help NPP." A blue arrow points from this text box to the "Priority of this action regarding another one, to help NPP." section in the message form.

Demande ELC - ETC-N

CETTE ACTION EST AUTORISÉE PAR PCD 1

GESTION 2 FILES EDE DEFALANTES

GESTION EVU

GESTION DE L'INJECTION DE SOUDÉ VIA EVU

In conclusion, HF evaluation is an iterative process which aims are to:

- Take into account ergonomics guidelines: facilitate structuring of the information, guidance, contents, understanding
- Test procedures applicability in their context of use: team operation communication, interaction with EP personnel
- Test the coordination and synchronization adequacy of the severe accident operating actions (communication, decision making, information transmission....)

AND WHAT NEXT...

A training program for severe accident management using the simulator will be developed for the EPR

A 3rd HF evaluation is planned with the final version of the SAMG for an ultimate verification & validation of the evolution

Implement new scenarios focused on severe accident situations on other PWR in France

Use this feedback and the feedback from other scenarios to continue to improve our SAMG



EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN TO FUKUSHIMA

EDF post Fukushima Action plan : 3 phases of deployment & ASN requirements

| 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | ... 2018 | 2019 ... | ~ 2030 |
|------|------|------|------|----------|----------|--------|
| Jan | Jun | Dec | Jan | Jun | Dec | Jan |

Phase 1: 2012/2015 : Mobile & Temporary Equipment Emergency Response , FARN, 1st

ECS 16 & 18: On site mobile & temporary equipment deployment

Plug & Play connections enhancement

ECS 32 & 35: Emergency Response plan reinforcement (multi units events, communication tools, VSAT, etc)

ECS 36: FARN & off site mobile equipment : rescue capability:
1 unit (end 2012) 4 units (end 2014) 6 units (end 2015)

1st modifications licensing and implementation:

ECS 16 : Ultimate water supply (first step)

ECS 13: Automatic reactor shutdown in case of earthquake (study)

Earthquake and flood protection reinforcements

- Temporary storage location (Design basis criteria)
- Op procedures, Op and ERO staff Training
- On-site Mobile equipment Maintenance, Test (DI 115)

- FARN progressive implementation and training : + 320 people
- Off-site mobile equipment Maintenance and test

Phase 2 : 2015/2019: Hardened Safety Core deployment (first part) Equipment and organization

Licensing process

ECS 18: Ultimate Diesel Generator
ECS16: Ultimate Water supply (end)
ECS 31: New Emergency Control Center
ECS1: Hardened Emergency Response
ECS20: Spent Fuel Pond level
Other modifications (Earthquake AAR, SFP, Fuel handling,, etc)

→ + 900 people (Extreme situation Operation shift teams) recruitment & training

Phase 3 : 2019/~2030: Hardened Safety Core completion (link with LTO)


Draft planning:
EDF proposal to ASN

Licensing process

Diverse SG residual heat removal (ASG u)
Ultimate primary circuit injection pump
Ultimate I&C and control panel
Extreme Natural hazards protection (end)
Containment residual heat removal
Reactor cavity pit flooding system

ORGANIZATION OF THE NUCLEAR RAPID RESPONSE FORCE (FARN)

1. two-level organization → national and regional



1 national FARN headquarters

(reconnaissance team, about 30 people in 5 on-call teams, country-wide intervention)



1 national equipment base

(long-term equipment, rear bases modules)



4 regional FARN Human Resources bases with regional equipment bases nearby

hosted by 4 NPPs (Civaux, Dampierre, Paluel, Bugey)



(about 4 x 70 people in 5 teams of 14 on-call people each, country wide intervention)

4 local rear bases

predefined for each of the 19 NPPs



(one to be chosen in case of severe situation at a NPP)

Intervention of the FARN in case of external severe situation

► Objectives of the FARN

- To arrive on a site in accident conditions within 12h in order to :
 - Bring skilled operators on site in order to help the local shift, and possibly take-over.
 - If existing on site equipment is no more available, supply additional electricity, water and compressed air with own mobile equipment (stored and transported by the FARN) : connect, start and operate it , to ensure permanent core and spent fuel pool cooling
 - Ensure supply chain and technical support (with own logistic means stored and transported by the FARN)
- To be fully operational on a site in accident conditions within 24h.
- Avoid releases in the environment
- Avoid, as much as possible, any core melt

Intervention of the FARN in case of external severe situation

► Functions that FARN will re-supply with

- Water (i.e. Emergency Feed-water Tank, Spent Fuel Pool, Reactor Water Storage Tank) → **Mobile autonomous Pumps**
- Electricity (i.e. I&C, lighting) → **Mobile autonomous EDG's**
- Air (i.e. Atmosphere Steam Generators discharge valves, Emergency Feed-water Turbine-driven pump) → **Mobile autonomous air compressors**
- **Fuel oil + all logistic**

► Progressive plugging points deployment plan :

- from end 2012 to end 2014, use off the existing plugging points located on existing installations to **feed** the safety functions with mobile equipment :
- for end of 2014 : installation of new standardized plugging points on each site.
- From 2014 to end of 2018 : definitive plugging points consistent with « hard core» safety equipment extreme hazards resilience criteria (Ultimate Diesel Generators, Ultimate Heat Sink)

Intervention of the FARN in case of external severe situation

- The site and the FARN will assure an autonomy at least of 72 hours and the durability of the safe situation after 72 hours

- for $t < 24\text{h}$ after the event : the safety has to be guaranteed by the local teams and the local means

Utilization of the existing site fixed equipment remained available, and implementation on each unit of the site of local mobile or temporary equipment (Local Crisis Means = MLC), to be deployed by the teams of the site and allowing them, **to guarantee a site autonomy of at least 24 hours**

- for $t > 24\text{h}$ after the mobilization of the FARN, till 72h: the safety is guaranteed by the local teams and the FARN in total autonomy:

The FARN (Rapid Nuclear Response Force, with its own dedicated human resources and dedicated mobile equipment, available at the regional level (Regional Crisis Means = MRC) or at the national level (National Crisis Means = MNC), will supply the site **to guarantee a site + FARN autonomy of at least 72 hours**

- for $t > 72\text{h}$ after the mobilization of the FARN: the durability of a safe situation is guaranteed by the site and the FARN organisation helped by the EDF Group additional resources


The site and the FARN will be supplied by additional resources of the EDF Group, and if necessary, with mobile equipment shared between the French Nuclear Operators (AREVA, CEA, EDF) (GIE Intra), **to guarantee the durability of the safe situation**

Decide the training depending on the actors and their missions

- ▶ Study is ongoing with technical experts from different entities
- ▶ A personnel mapping is under construction in order to:
 - Identify the actors involved in stressful situations
 - Characterize their eventual stressful activity and the means and resources available to perform their missions
 - Identify the actors needing a specific training
 - Choose an adapted training and develop the program
- ▶ Train people to face unknown situations, train to manage unexpected situations
 - Combine simulation and Story telling: exchange practices, ideas and imagine new solutions
 - Use relaxation techniques help to take stock of the critical situation and be able to rebuild again & again, to have a better view..
 - → That is to change the philosophy of training previously based on applying procedures, and add the point of view of the “adaptation” by the workers to the uncertainty....

Preparing the operation team and other populations to deal with stressful situations

- ◆ A study in collaboration with the HF services of the army in order to identify a range of tools that can be used to prepare populations to deal with stressful situations
- ◆ Develop a model of understanding, with the human reliability experts, taking into account the stressful activity from a cognitive point of view, and the individual and team performance interacting with the control means and local and national emergency operation



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