Only a few years ago, Lithuania had no alternative gas supply or electricity interconnectivity with EU Member States, except limited interconnections with Latvia. In order to reduce Lithuania’s dependence on energy supplies from a single source, a number of energy projects were implemented. The liquefied natural gas terminal in Klaipeda was completed at the end of 2014; and at the end of 2015, the electricity interconnections between Sweden and Lithuania (NordBalt) and between Poland and Lithuania (LitPol Link) became operational.

Since 31 December 2009, owing to the permanent shutdown of the state owned Ignalina NPP, Lithuania’s electricity generation structure has changed significantly, and Lithuania changed from being a net exporter of electricity to a net importer of electricity.

The energy sector is particularly important to the Lithuanian economy and energy security is a strategic priority for the Government. It is being ensured by breaking Lithuania’s energy isolation (alternative ways to import energy resources are established) and by seeking to secure sufficient and competitive internal capacities of energy production.

The shutdown of the Ignalina NPP at the end of 2009 required a clear strategy regarding replacement of the capacity generated by the Ignalina NPP by other generation capacities.

In June 2010, the Government approved the National Renewable Energy Sources Development Strategy, which aims to achieve at least a 23% share in the gross final energy consumption to be produced from renewables by 2020. The biggest potential is foreseen in wind energy, hydropower and biomass (mostly for heat production).

On 21 June 2018, Parliament, known as the Seimas, approved the revised National Energy Independence Strategy. The Strategy of 2018 provides four main directions of Lithuanian energy policy: energy security, the development of green energy, efficient energy consumption, competitiveness and innovation, but importantly does not foresee development of nuclear power in Lithuania.

Lithuania has taken steps to liberalize its electricity market and has ensured a consumer’s right to choose his or her electricity supplier and to purchase electricity for a real market price. Lithuania’s regulated tariffs benefit only household consumers, but these tariffs are planned to be abolished by 2020. On 1 January 2010, the electricity market was officially started in Lithuania (the first among the Baltic States) — a crucial step towards the common Baltic electricity market. A restatement of the Law on Electricity, which entered into force in February 2012, created legal preconditions for the integration of Lithuania’s electricity market into the Nordic market. This integration has led to the launch of a bidding area (which is a network area in which market participants in energy trading submit their bids) in June 2012 in Lithuania by Nord Pool Spot, Europe’s leading Nordic power exchange. The Nord Pool Spot intraday market (ELBAS) in Lithuania was launched in 2013. This completed the Baltic Energy Market Interconnection Plan’s (BEMIP) long term goal of creating a modern and integrated Baltic power market connected to the Nordic region.

Fossil primary energy resources in Lithuania are rather scarce. In order to meet energy requirements, local oil, peat, wood, geothermal, wind, solar and hydropower, as well as energy from chemical processes could be used. In 2016, the share of these local energy sources in the country’s primary energy balance was 24.7%. Since 2001, renewable energy sources have played a more important role. In 2016, the share of renewables in the balance of indigenous energy resources was 80.6%. Currently, the main renewable energy resource is biomass (including wood waste, boughs, wood chips, pellets, sawdust and waste from agriculture). The contribution of hydropower in absolute value fluctuates depending on climatic conditions, with small changes. The contribution of biofuels, used as a motor fuel for road transport, as well as that of wind energy is increasing.

Over the past few years, support for renewable energy has been growing continuously both at the national and European levels. Therefore, in 2016, renewable energy sources accounted for 25.6% of gross final energy consumption and 16.7% of gross electricity consumption in Lithuania, with wind, hydropower and biomass being the largest contributors. At the end of 2016, wind power was the biggest single technology, accounting for over 63% of installed capacity, while hydro and solar are the other major sources of renewable power, accounting for 15.8% and 9%, respectively, in the current mix of renewable electricity generation capacity.

In 2016, Lithuania’s import of the primary energy resources was 74.8%.

TABLE 1. ESTIMATED AVAILABLE ENERGY SOURCES

* Solid, liquid: million tonnes; gas: billion m³; uranium: tonnes; hydro, renewable: MW.

** n.a.: not applicable

The development of the total primary energy consumption in petajoule (PJ) is shown in Table 2. Oil and oil products were the most important fuels in Lithuania for several decades. However, since 1990 their share in the primary energy balance has fluctuated in a comparatively large range, with a reduced role due to decreasing consumption of heavy fuel oil to produce electricity and district heat. After the closure of the Ignalina NPP, the share of oil products increased to 38.2% in 2017. At present, natural gas is one of the most important fuels in Lithuania. In 2017, its share in the Lithuanian primary energy balance was 25.0%.

Between 1990 and 2009, the share of nuclear — the cheapest imported fuel — was high. The role of nuclear was very important because being comparatively cheap, nuclear fuel helped to relieve certain burdens of balance of payments and therefore softened social problems. Nuclear fuel helped to increase the security of the primary energy supply, especially in the power sector. The share of nuclear energy in the primary energy balance in the year 2009 (year of final closure of the Ignalina NPP) was 29.6%. Until 2009, Lithuania had been a net electricity exporter. From 2010 to 2017 (owing to the closure of the main electricity generation source), more than 50% of the electricity required to meet the country’s gross electricity demand was imported from neighbouring countries; in 2017, the share of electricity import in the primary energy balance was 9.7%.

Final electricity consumption and demand decreased from 12 TW·h in 1990 to 6.2 TW·h in 2000 but increased by 4.8% per annum during 2000–2008. Electricity consumption increased in all sectors of the national economy. In 2009, owing to an economic recession, the total final electricity demand decreased by 7.4%. Between 2009 and 2017, final electricity demand increased on average by 2.3% per year.

TABLE 2. ENERGY STATISTICS

Source: Latest available data are from Statistics Lithuania.

^a Energy consumption = Primary energy consumption + net imports (imports - exports) of secondary energy.

^b Solid fuels include coal, lignite, peat and non-renewable waste.

^c —: data not available.

^d Other sources include energy from chemical processes.

In January 2009, the Ministry of Energy was re-established for the purpose of reforming the energy sector. Since then, a number of reforms have been undertaken in the energy sector.

In 2009, the European Union adopted the Third Energy Package, a package of legislative measures aimed at liberalizing EU energy markets. Based on the ownership unbundling requirements of the Third Energy Package, Lithuania successfully reformed the electricity sector by separating transmission from generation and supply activities. In 2010, four blocks of energy companies were established (consisting of energy transmission, production, distribution and maintenance activities). Ownership unbundling was aimed at increasing the overall efficiency of the electricity system, preventing discrimination against new market participants connecting to the grid, optimizing the use and development of infrastructure, incentivizing economic investment and ensuring competitive prices for electricity consumers. Due to historical factors, Lithuania’s high voltage electricity transmission grid is directly interconnected with the high voltage grids of Belarus, Latvia and the Russian Federation. These interconnections allow extensive exchanges of power with such neighbouring systems. However, a core objective of Lithuania’s energy strategy is integration of its power system into the common European electricity market as well as synchronous interconnection with the European Continental Power Network of the European Network of Transmission System operators (ENTSO-E). Seeking integration into EU energy systems, a number of energy projects are being carried out.

A marine underwater high voltage cable (Estlink I) was completed in 2006 as a result of a joint venture between power companies in Finland and the Baltic States. Estlink I allows the transfer of electricity between Estonia and Finland, but in a limited capacity (350 MW). After a successful trial operation period, Estlink II, the interconnection between Estonia and Finland with a capacity of 650 MW, commenced commercial operations at the beginning of February 2014. The electricity is then transferred through Estonia to the electricity transmission grids of Latvia and Lithuania. As constituent parts of the integration of the Baltic electricity market into the common European electricity market, new interconnection lines between Lithuania and Sweden (NordBalt) and Lithuania and Poland (LitPol Link) were installed at the end of 2015.

NordBalt is a 700 MW submarine power cable between Lithuania and Sweden. This electricity bridge enables Lithuania to exchange electricity with countries situated in northern Europe and diversifies sources of electricity supply.

LitPol Link is a 500 MW electricity link between Lithuania and Poland which connects the three Baltic States — Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia — to the EU energy market and system. This interconnection is a crucial step towards integration of the Baltic States’ electricity grids with those of continental Europe.

The Baltic States also share the view that their electricity system must operate synchronously with the continental European network. This goal was confirmed jointly by the prime ministers of the Baltic States in 2014, when they stated that synchronization should be fulfilled by 2025. The importance of such synchronization is also recognized in the framework of EU energy policy. This project is included within the European Energy Security Strategy and the EU energy union as a project of common interest and of critical importance to EU energy security. The goal of implementing the Baltic States’ synchronization with the continental European networks by 2025 is also included in a reinforced BEMIP.

The revised National Energy Independence Strategy does not foresee development of nuclear power in Lithuania. The new National Energy Strategy is focused on the renewable sources of energy and efficiency.

Electricity in Lithuania is produced from thermal, hydro and other renewable sources, with installed capacities of 1932 MW, 1028 MW and 705 MW, respectively. The main generators are Elektrenai (condensing), Vilnius combined heat and power plant (CHP), Kaunas CHP, Kaunas hydroelectric power plant and Kruonis pumped storage plant, in addition to other small scale hydroelectric, wind, solar, biomass, biogas, waste and other renewable sources.

Energijos Skirstymo Operatorius (ESO) is the Lithuanian distribution network operator. It distributes and transmits electrical power throughout the entire country and is a distribution network operator. The grid is made up of low and medium voltage lines and equipment. The electrical power provided through ESO’s distribution grid reaches more than 1577 million clients.

Litgrid, the Lithuanian electricity transmission system operator, maintains stable operation of the national power system, controls electricity flows and enables competition in an open domestic electricity market. It is responsible for integrating the national power system into the European power infrastructure and electricity market. The company also operates strategic crossborder electricity links, namely, NordBalt and LitPol.

TABLE 3. ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION, CONSUMPTION AND CAPACITY

Source: www.litgrid.eu. Latest available data.

* Electricity transmission losses are not deducted.

TABLE 4. ENERGY RELATED RATIOS

Note: Latest available data.

^a n.a.: not applicable.

^b Net import/Total energy consumption.

The decision to build an NPP in the Baltic region for electricity supply to the Baltic States, Belarus and Kaliningrad was made by the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) at the beginning of the 1970s. A site on the shore of Lake Drukšiai in Lithuania, near the borders with Latvia and Belarus was selected. Construction of the first unit of the Ignalina NPP commenced in April 1978; the second unit followed in April 1980, and the third unit in 1985. The town of Visaginas (formerly Snieckus) was built for the workers of the Ignalina NPP. The first unit was commissioned in December 1983 and the second in August 1987. In August 1988, the former USSR Council of Ministers suspended the construction of the third unit. In November 1993, the Government of Lithuania decided to abandon the construction of Unit 3 and dismantled the existing structure. The development of the Ignalina NPP design was carried out by the East European Leading Research and Design Institute of Energy Technologies (Leading Institute VNIPIET) of the Russian Federation. The development of the accident localization system was carried out by the Sverdlovsk branch of the Leading Institute VNIPIET. Metal structures of the main building were designed by the main design office of Leningrad Steel Design. The turbine hall, the open distributive system and the auxiliary facilities were developed by the Atomic Energy Design Organization of Ukraine. The Ignalina NPP was intended to be the pilot NPP for the RBMK-1500 (high-power channel-type reactor). The scientific supervisor of the RBMK-1500 project was the I.V. Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy. The principal designer of the nuclear steam supply system was the Research and Development Institute of Power Engineering (NIKIET) in Moscow. These two institutes prepared and published the technical safety justification of the RBMK-1500 in 1987. These institutes, together with the Research and Development Institute for Energy Technology, prepared the technical safety justification of the Ignalina NPP in 1988. This safety report came closer to Western standards in comparison with the technical safety justification of the RBMK-1500. However, the technical safety justification of the Ignalina NPP was not officially approved.

In 1999, the decision was made to shut down Unit 1 of the Ignalina NPP before 2005, and in 2002 it was decided to shut down Unit 2 in 2009.

The following state institutions and bodies are involved in nuclear power related activities:

• Ministry of Energy;

• State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate (VATESI);

• Ministry of Health;

• Radiation Protection Centre (RPC);

• Ministry of Environment;

• Environmental Protection Agency;

• Lithuanian Geological Survey;

• Ministry of Economy and Innovation;

• Ministry of Social Security and Labour;

• Ministry of Transport and Communications;

• Ministry of National Defence;

• Ministry of the Interior;

• Ministry of Education, Science and Sport;

• State Security Department;

• Governmental Emergencies Commission;

• Local authorities.

The Ministry of Energy is responsible for the implementation of state policy and organizes bilateral and multilateral international cooperation in the sphere of nuclear energy; it is also the responsible authority for promotion and ownership of nuclear facilities. The Ministry of Energy is the owner of the Ignalina NPP and is responsible for a broad range of activities: tariffs, the pricing system, organization and financial audits. The Ministry supervises the nuclear power sector and is responsible for the preparation of regulatory acts governing nuclear power and for coordination of assistance for nuclear safety improvements.

In 2018, the Law on the Management of Radioactive Waste was amended. Through amendments of the Law, the State Enterprise Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant was assigned as the sole responsible entity for safe management of the all Lithuanian radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel including disposal. Radioactive Waste Management Agency was reorganized and merged with the State Enterprise Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant.

The Ministry of Economy and Innovation is responsible for issuing licences for the export, import and transit of strategic goods — defined as goods, materials, equipment, technologies, software and services which are subject to export, import and transit control.

VATESI is the main regulatory and supervisory institution of nuclear safety and physical security. It sets safety and security requirements, issues licences and permits, and performs supervisory activities, safety assessments, regulatory inspections and other functions. The mission of VATESI is the state regulation and supervision of safety and security of nuclear facilities, activities with nuclear and nuclear fuel cycle materials, and activities with sources of ionizing radiation used in the nuclear power sector in order to protect the public and the environment from the harmful effects of ionizing radiation. VATESI is a state institution, established in 1991. The head of VATESI reports directly to the president and the Government. The main tasks of VATESI are:

• State regulation and supervision of nuclear safety at the Ignalina NPP and radioactive waste management facilities;

• Supervision of use of nuclear materials and technologies for peaceful purposes (application of the IAEA and Euratom safeguards, import/export control);

• State regulation and supervision of physical security of nuclear facilities, nuclear material and nuclear fuel cycle materials and sources of ionizing radiation used in the nuclear power sector;

• State regulation and supervision of transport of nuclear fuel cycle materials, nuclear and fissile material;

• State regulation and supervision of radiation protection of workers at nuclear facilities;

• State regulation and supervision of emergency preparedness at nuclear facilities.

The Ministry of Health:

• Prepares and approves standard acts and rules on the health of the personnel of nuclear facilities and the population residing in the monitored zones of the facility;

• Undertakes environmental health studies of radiation impact on people and the environment and establishes health protection requirements;

• Agrees on the siting for nuclear facilities and undertakes state environmental health analysis of their construction;

• Takes part in the authorization of the constructed or reconstructed nuclear facilities, and issues environmental health passports for work with radioactive materials and other sources of ionizing radiation;

• Establishes the standards for medical examination for personnel working with radioactive materials and sources of ionizing radiation, the frequency of the examination and contraindications, and controls compliance with the standards;

• Monitors the health of nuclear facility personnel and the residents of the monitored zone of the facility;

• Ensures the preparedness of medical institutions to mitigate the consequences of a nuclear or radiological accident;

• Establishes radiation protection norms for the population and controls compliance with them;

• Organizes medical examination of the containment forces of a nuclear accident and the population affected by radiation exposure and submits findings and proposals for the reduction of radiation exposure;

• Determines occupational diseases for personnel in the sphere of nuclear energy and studies the causes of the diseases;

• Carries out education on radiation protection of the population.

Most of these functions are delegated to the RPC, which is the regulatory body that coordinates the activities of the executive and other bodies of public administration and local government in the field of radiation protection, monitoring and expert examination of public exposure. Among other responsibilities, the RPC is responsible for supervising the fulfilment of the requirements regarding radiation protection of workers (excluding in nuclear facilities) and the general public from negative impacts caused by ionizing radiation. In case of a nuclear accident at the Ignalina NPP, the RPC presents recommendations to the State Emergency Commission, all levels of Emergency Management Centres and executive and other bodies of public administration for the reduction of exposure doses and prevention of deterministic and stochastic effects of radiation on the public and emergency workers. The RPC performs analysis of foods, drinking water and other samples contaminated by radionuclides, and presents suggestions to the Ministry of Health to approve foods and their raw materials, drinking water and temporary maximum permissible levels of radioactive contamination for the emergency consequences liquidation period. It also organizes supervision and control of their compliance. The RPC also presents suggestions to the Ministry of Health about the necessity of applying iodine prophylaxis and provides information to the public, within the limits of its competence, about protective actions. In order to continually ensure emergency preparedness, the RPC has approved an emergency preparedness plan and established an internal emergency preparedness office.

The Ministry of Environment or its authorized institution, according to the manner set out by law, supervises the building of nuclear installations, prepares and approves methodology to assess damage caused by ionizing radiation to the environment and its compensation, and periodically informs the general public and the state and municipal authorities on the radiation situation in the Lithuania.

The Ministry of Social Security and Labour is responsible for compliance with the requirements of labour, safety at work and related statutory acts.

The Ministry of Transport and Communications participates in the drafting of laws and subordinate legislation and the training and certification of personnel who transport nuclear and radioactive materials.

The Fire and Rescue Department is the coordinating institution with respect to the preparation of emergency plans and their implementation in the event of an accident at the Ignalina NPP. The Department organizes the training sessions for population protection in the event of a nuclear accident.

The Ministry of the Interior ensures fire protection of the NPP and other nuclear facilities. It also ensures physical protection of the NPP, other nuclear facilities located close to borders and nuclear materials during transport across the country. The Ministry is responsible for the preparation, coordination and implementation of the interdepartmental antiterrorist and antipenetration action plans and the investigation of cases of theft and illegal possession of nuclear and radioactive materials and dual use items.

The State Security Department exercises prevention of subversive, sabotage and terrorist acts, as well as other offences aimed at damaging the interests of state security at nuclear facilities, in their environment, and on transport routes for nuclear and radioactive materials. It checks the trustworthiness of personnel of nuclear facilities and personnel involved in the transport of nuclear material.

The Governmental Emergencies Commission is responsible for coordinating the activities of all the bodies and forces taking part in the containment of a nuclear accident and its consequences.

The local authorities, based on the Government approved state plan for protection of the population in the event of a nuclear accident, are to develop preparedness for nuclear and/or radiological accidents as well as the preventive measures envisaged in the municipality’s plan for control of emergency situations. In the event of a nuclear or radiological accident, local authorities are to inform the population about the radiation situation on the sites of nuclear installations and about the measures undertaken for civil protection.

The Ignalina NPP is the only nuclear power plant in Lithuania. It contains two RBMK-1500s, belonging to the category of boiling water channel graphite moderated type reactors. The Ignalina NPP is located in north-east Lithuania, near the borders with Latvia and Belarus. The power plant was built as part of the USSR’s North-West Unified Power System. Ignalina NPP Unit 1 was connected to the grid at the end of 1983, and Unit 2 in August 1987. The design lifetime of the units was projected to be 2014 and 2017, respectively. In total, four units were originally planned to be built on the Ignalina NPP site. Construction of the third unit was suspended in 1988 owing to political reasons, and construction of the fourth never started. Ignalina NPP Unit 1 was shut down on 31 December 2004 and Unit 2 on 31 December 2009 in compliance with the protocol for Lithuania’s accession to the European Union.

Defuelling of Unit 1 began in 2006 and was completed in December 2009. Some of the removed spent fuel assemblies (in total 978) were transported to Unit 2 for after-burning and the remaining assemblies were put into spent fuel storage pools. Unit 1 is maintained in the post-operation state, based on the VATESI operation licence and in accordance with the requirements of the Technical Specification for Unit 1 Operation during the Fuel Removal from the Spent Fuel Storage Pools.

After shutdown, Unit 2 was maintained in the post-operation state based on the VATESI operation licence and in accordance with the requirements of the Technical Specification for Operation of Unit 2. Defuelling of the Unit 2 reactor started in 2010 but was suspended because of the lack of free space in the existing storage facility and spent fuel pools and while waiting for the new interim spent nuclear fuel storage facility to be put into operation. The defuelling was restarted in September 2016 after VATESI issued a licence for operation of the interim spent nuclear fuel storage facility. Fuel removal from the Unit 2 reactor was completed in February 2018. Defuelling of the spent fuel pools in the units is planned to be completed by 2022.

Decommissioning of various Unit 1 and Unit 2 facilities is under way. These activities are performed in accordance with the Ignalina NPP final decommissioning plan (FDP) and in line with the Unit 1 and Unit 2 decommissioning projects.

Projects are currently being implemented related to dismantling and decontamination (D&D) of the Ignalina NPP systems and equipment that has totally lost it functions, is isolated or has no impact on the safe handling of spent nuclear fuel and safe operation of other safety systems and equipment remaining in operation. Each Ignalina NPP D&D project is implemented only after approval of the technological design and corresponding safety analysis report (SAR) by the regulatory body, including development of an environmental impact assessment for each D&D project and issuance of an affirmative decision by the competent authority on the admissibility to perform the D&D activities under consideration. The projects are implemented in compliance with the technological solutions and the sequence developed and accepted in the technological design documents and within the very clearly defined equipment dismantling boundaries.

TABLE 5. STATUS AND PERFORMANCE OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

Source: www.iaea.org/pris. Latest available data.

Note: Constr. — construction; LWGR — light water cooled, graphite moderated reactor; UCF (unit capability factor) for the latest available year (only applicable to reactors in operation).

^a Date, when first major placing of concrete, usually for the base mat of the reactor building is done.

^b Date of the first connection to the grid.

2.2.2.1. Decommissioning: Information and plans

2.2.2.2. The final decommissioning plan

2.2.2.3. Decommissioning project for Ignalina NPP Unit 1 and Unit 2 final shutdown and defuelling phase

2.2.3.1. Historical enhancement of Ignalina NPP performance

Historically, public acceptance of nuclear power in Lithuania was quite high. On accession to the European Union, Lithuania committed itself to close down the Ignalina NPP, and the popular initiative brought the issue to a referendum on 12 October 2008 on extending the operation of the Ignalina NPP. In the referendum, 88.58% of the votes (a total of 1 156 738) were in support of the extension. However, the referendum was announced invalid due to low turnout, which stood at 48.44% and was lower than the required 50%.

After the nuclear accident at the Fukushima NPP and with two new NPP projects under development near Lithuania’s borders (Ostrovets NPP in Belarus and Kaliningrad NPP), public acceptance of nuclear power in Lithuania declined. The advisory referendum on supporting the new Visaginas NPP construction in Lithuania was held in the middle of October 2012. The results of the referendum revealed the prevailing negative public opinion on the construction of a new NPP. Just 34% of the voters (463 966) supported the construction of a new NPP, while 63% of the voters (853 163) were against it.

The Lithuanian Energy Institute (LEI), Centre for Physical Sciences and Technology, Kaunas University of Technology, and Vilnius Gediminas Technical University are involved in nuclear or nuclear related activities, mainly as technical support organizations (TSOs). These entities provide expertise and necessary technical/scientific support during preparation of safety submittals and safety reviews, and verification of safety justifications. Some of the TSOs are also involved in international projects implemented through international and bilateral cooperation.

The LEI performs a wide range of nuclear related activities, including:

• Safety assessment of NPPs;

• Research related to the construction of a new NPP in Lithuania;

• Thermohydraulic analysis of accident and transient processes;

• Assessment of thermohydraulic parameters in NPPs;

• Simulation of radionuclide and aerosol transport in the compartments;

• Assessment of nuclear reactor core modifications and analysis of postulated reactivity accidents;

• Safety analysis of thermonuclear fusion reactors;

• Analysis of new generation NPPs;

• Reliability estimation and control of energy systems;

• Level 1 and level 2 probabilistic safety assessment of NPPs;

• Strength analysis of construction, piping and components in complex technical systems.

The activities of the Nuclear and Environmental Radioactivity Research Laboratory of the Centre for Physical Sciences and Technology include development and application of nuclear spectroscopy methods, radionuclide metrology and standardization, investigations in environmental radioactivity, radionuclide tracer studies, radioecological monitoring and dose assessment.

The Centre for Non-Destructive Testing at Kaunas University of Technology and the Laboratory of Welding and Material Analysis at Vilnius Gediminas Technical University are highly qualified in the indicated areas. They are equipped with modern instrumentation and also play an important role as TSOs.

With the aid of the European Commission, these facilities were equipped with modern instrumentation.

Lithuania has or had sustained multilateral and bilateral projects, mostly concerning the safety of NPPs and radioactive waste management with Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States of America.

The main multilateral projects were the TACIS founded International RBMK Safety Review Consortium, which was founded by the Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS), Lord Marshall’s Users Group for Soviet Designed Reactors and the IAEA extrabudgetary programme on RBMK reactors. One of the most important projects for Lithuania was the international project Safety of Design Solutions and Operation of NPPs with RBMK Reactors, which covers a broad range of safety related topics, with Unit 2 of the Ignalina NPP used as a reference plant.

In the BARSELINA project (1992–2001), level 1 and 2 probabilistic safety assessment of the Ignalina NPP was conducted by Lithuania, the Russian Federation and Sweden. This project provides a unified basis for the assessment of severe accident risks for RBMK type reactors and the preparation of remedial measures. Some of the improvements highlighted by the PSA have already been implemented at the Ignalina NPP.

Another project of the Lithuanian–Swedish bilateral programme was the application of modern non-destructive testing systems for in-service inspection of the pressure boundary system. Another project is the preparation of an overall plan for radioactive waste management in Lithuania by Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company (SKB). The project on fire and flooding protection helped to improve the entire fire protection system at the Ignalina NPP.

Good examples of multilateral collaboration in the field include the performance of: the SAR (1995–1996); the RSR (1995–1997); the review of SAR-2 (2001–2003); safety analyses recommended by SAR, RSR and the Ignalina Safety Panel (1997–1999); and SIP-2, which was started in 1997.

Furthermore, the IAEA offers many courses for training nuclear specialists. One of the most important national technical cooperation projects is the systematic approach to training for NPP personnel, completed in 2000, which has helped to strengthen the safety and reliability of the Ignalina NPP.

There have been a number of projects in cooperation with the United States of America, financed by the Department of Energy and USAID in the framework of a nuclear safety assistance programme for Lithuania. Cooperation in nuclear safety improvement at the Ignalina NPP with Japanese specialists also started in 1994. Under the framework of the Agreement of Cooperation for Safety Improvement at the Ignalina NPP, signed in 1996, the Japan Science and Technology Agency launched two big projects: Cooperation on Plant Operation Management and Cooperation on Fuel Channel Integrity.

Gesellschaft für Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS), Germany, and the LEI are involved in the cooperative project Analysis of Safety Aspects of the Ignalina NPP, which includes studies of neutron dynamics and thermohydraulics. The LEI and the American Nuclear Society signed a memorandum of cooperation in February 2007, which was prolonged for another five year period in February 2011.

In 2009, the LEI was accepted to the European Technical Support Organisations Network (ETSON), with members (at that time) including Bel V (Belgium), the Nuclear Research Institute Rež — ÚJV (Czech Republic), the Technical Research Centre — VTT (Finland), the Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety — IRSN (France) and GRS (Germany). In 2009, members of ETSON decided to create the European Nuclear Safety Training and Tutoring Institute (ENSTTI). The LEI has actively participated in the following international collaborative projects:

2.6.2.1. Sixth Framework Programme

2.6.2.2. Seventh Framework Programme

2.6.2.3. Horizon 2020 Programme

VATESI, established in 1991, is an independent state institution exercising state regulation and supervision of nuclear safety, physical security, activities involving nuclear materials and other activities in the area of nuclear energy involving sources of ionizing radiation. VATESI acts in accordance with the Law on Nuclear Energy, Law on Nuclear Safety, other laws and the Statute of the VATESI. VATESI reports to the president and the Government.

The main responsibilities of VATESI are:

• To exercise the functions of state regulation and supervision of nuclear safety; physical security of nuclear facilities, nuclear fuel cycle materials and other nuclear materials; accounting for and control of the nuclear materials; radiation protection in nuclear facilities; and oversight of the use of sources of ionizing radiation within nuclear facilities.

• To draft and approve by the order of the head of VATESI the requirements and rules for nuclear safety; physical security of nuclear facilities, nuclear fuel cycle materials and other nuclear materials of the defined quantity; accounting for and control of the nuclear materials; and radiation safety in the area of nuclear energy, mandatory to all the state and municipal authorities and to all persons engaged in nuclear energy related activities.

• To set requirements for physical security of sources of ionizing radiation used in the area of nuclear energy and supervise their implementation.

• To set requirements in the nuclear energy area for obligatory radiation safety training, instruction and evaluation of knowledge of persons responsible for radiation safety, and supervise their implementation.

• To set requirements for certification of persons seeking to obtain the right to train persons responsible for radiation safety and perform the certification.

• To analyse and assess the documents submitted by applicants for obtaining a licence or a permit as well as the documents submitted by licence holders or permit holders or other persons, to adopt relevant decisions regarding such documents, and to review and evaluate nuclear safety.

• To supervise and inspect applicants, licence and permit holders or the persons rendering services, supplying goods or performing works for them or other persons engaged in activities pertaining to nuclear materials and nuclear fuel cycle materials.

• To issue or suspend licences and permits, other authorization decisions, revoke suspension of licences and permits, other authorization decisions, or revoke licences and permits, other authorization decisions; and to supervise authorized activities.

• To cooperate with foreign institutions exercising state regulation and supervision in the nuclear energy sector, within its competence to participate in activities of international organizations and institutions, committees and groups of the European Union.

• Within its competence and in the manner laid down by the legal acts, to prepare and/or submit to the Government the draft laws and legal acts of Lithuania on the issues of nuclear safety; physical security of nuclear facilities, nuclear materials and nuclear fuel cycle materials; accounting for and control of nuclear materials; and radiation safety in carrying out nuclear energy related activities involving sources of ionizing radiation.

• To prepare and submit to the Government or its authorized institutions proposals regarding improvements of the system ensuring nuclear safety; physical security of nuclear facilities, nuclear materials and other nuclear fuel cycle materials; accounting for and control of nuclear materials; and radiation safety in the area of nuclear energy.

• In the event of a nuclear or radiological accident, to provide the interested state and municipal authorities with time critical information about the radiation situation in the nuclear installation, estimated threats of the nuclear or radiological accident and other related information.

• To participate in emergency preparedness activities, such as regulation and supervision of on-site emergency preparedness, or notification of international organizations and neighbouring countries in case of a nuclear accident.

• In cooperation with State Security Department, Ministry of Interior and Ministry of National Defence, to conduct national threat assessments and develop design basis threats for nuclear material and nuclear facilities.

VATESI is empowered to impose the following administrative enforcement measures:

1. Pursuant to the Law on Public Administration and Order No. 22.3-106, 24 October 2011, approved by the Head of State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the Approval of Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-1.1.4-2017 “Rules of Procedure for Applying the Enforcement Measures Set by the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate”, VATESI is empowered to issue an economic entity, individual stated in the art. 8 para 1 of the Law on Radiation Protection, radiation protection officer, dosimetry service with mandatory requirement to eliminate insignificant violations of legal acts.

2. Pursuant to the Law on Nuclear Safety VATESI is empowered to impose the following administrative enforcement measures:

1. To issue mandatory requirement to licence or permit holders, committing them to eliminate detected violations in nuclear safety and physical security, to suspend the works within the time limits set by the head of VATESI and/or to shut down the nuclear reactor, to decrease its capacity, to discontinue operation of other equipment or activities.

2. To impose fines on legal entities according to the art. 47 paras 1 and 2 of the Law on Nuclear Safety (known as economic sanctions).

3. To issue the licence or permit holder with a warning regarding the possible licence or permit suspension, to suspend the licence or permit, to revoke the licence or permit.

4. Pursuant to the Law on Radiation Protection, VATESI is empowered to impose the following administrative enforcement measures:

• To issue an individual stated in art. 8 para. 1 of the Law on Radiation Protection with mandatory requirement to eliminate violations of legal acts governing radiation safety and/or physical security of ionizing radiation sources, to issue a warning to suspend activities with ionizing radiation sources, to suspend activities with ionizing radiation sources.

• To issue a warning regarding the possible revocation of activity registration, revocation of activity registration.

• To issue the licence or temporary permit holder with a warning regarding the possible licence or temporary permit suspension, to suspend the licence or temporary permit, to revoke the licence or temporary permit.

• To issue person who provides radiation trainings with mandatory requirement to eliminate violations of legal acts governing radiation and/or physical protection training.

• To issue natural person holding radiation protection attestation certificate with a warning about possible suspension of radiation protection attestation certificate, to suspend radiation protection attestation certificate, to revoke radiation protection attestation certificate.

• To issue nuclear facility dosimetry service or other individuals responsible for measurement and/or evaluation of exposure dose with a mandatory requirement to eliminate violations of legal acts governing recognition requirements, to issue a warning about possible suspension of recognition certificate, to suspend validity of recognition certificate, to revoke validity of recognition certificate;

• To issue radiation protection expert with a warning about possible suspension of validity of radiation protection expert certificate, to suspend validity of radiation protection expert certificate, to revoke validity of radiation protection expert certificate.

• To revoke permission to transport radioactive material or validity of standard document to transport radioactive material.

5. Pursuant to the Code of Administrative Offences of the Republic of Lithuania VATESI is empowered to impose administrative fines and other administrative sanctions on natural persons.

The Law on Nuclear Energy and the Law on Nuclear Safety, together with the regulations derived from them, establish the authorization system for activities relating to nuclear materials or nuclear fuel cycle materials, as well as for nuclear facilities during the following life stages: site evaluation, design, construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning, as well as release from control. The supervision of closed radioactive waste repositories and the acquisition, keeping, use and transport of nuclear or nuclear fuel cycle materials is also executed according to these laws.

Some of the steps of the authorization process are divided into several steps. Licences, permits and approvals of the documents are used as separate authorization steps.

The Law on Nuclear Safety establishes the following types of licence and permit issued by VATESI:

• Licence for construction of a nuclear facility (or facilities);

• Licence for operation of a nuclear facility (or facilities);

• Licence for construction and operation of a nuclear facility (or facilities) (an alternative authorization replacing two separate licences for construction and operation);

• Licence for decommissioning of a nuclear facility (or facilities);

• Licence for supervision of a closed radioactive waste repository (or repositories);

• Licence for transport of nuclear fuel cycle materials, nuclear materials and other fissile materials with the exception of small amounts as described in the Law;

• Licence for acquisition, keeping and use of nuclear materials and other fissile materials with the exception of small amounts as prescribed in the Law;

• Permit for first carry-in of nuclear fuel to the site of an NPP, unit or non-power nuclear reactor;

• Permit for the first carry-in and testing of the nuclear facility using nuclear and/or nuclear fuel cycle materials (can be issued if a common licence for construction and operation was issued previously);

• Permit for first startup of a unit of an NPP or non-power nuclear reactor;

• Permit for industrial operation of the nuclear facility;

• Permit for startup of the nuclear reactor after its short term shutdown;

• Permit for shipment of radioactive waste generated in the nuclear fuel cycle;

• Permit for shipment of spent nuclear fuel.

The concepts ‘nuclear facility’, ‘nuclear material’, and ‘spent nuclear fuel’ are established in the Law on Nuclear Energy. The concept of nuclear facility includes:

• NPPs;

• NPP units;

• Non-power nuclear reactors;

• Storage facilities for nuclear materials;

• Storage facilities for radioactive waste;

• Radioactive waste processing facilities;

• Radioactive waste disposal facilities.

‘Nuclear material’ covers plutonium, uranium (natural, enriched with isotopes of ²³⁵U or ²³³U or depleted) and thorium found in the form of metal alloys, chemical compounds or concentrates or in a mixture with other materials; ‘spent nuclear fuel’ covers nuclear fuel that was subjected to exposure in the core of a nuclear reactor and was permanently removed from it. Spent nuclear fuel may be reprocessed with the aim of reusing it or managed as radioactive waste and placed in a waste disposal facility.

It also should be mentioned that some activities (hold points) during various stages in the lifetime of a nuclear facility require separate authorizations that have to be supported by a safety review and assessment:

• During the stage of site evaluation of a nuclear facility, VATESI is to review and assess the site evaluation report. In order for the site evaluation report of an NPP to be approved, positive conclusions with respect to it are to be presented by the following institutions: the Ministry of Health, the Civil Aviation Administration, the Lithuanian Geology Service, the Lithuanian Hydro Meteorological Service, and the Fire Prevention and Rescue Department.

• Before the design activities start, the technical specifications for the design have to be approved by VATESI.

• The design of a nuclear facility has to be performed and assessed according to the requirements established by the competent institutions, including VATESI, the Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Health, Ministry of the Interior and other institutions involved, according to the Law on Construction, the Law on Nuclear Energy and the regulations made under the laws.

• Commissioning can be performed according to a commissioning programme. VATESI’s agreement on the commissioning programme is necessary before commissioning starts.

• The legislation obligates the licence holder to conduct a periodic safety analysis. VATESI’s agreement on the periodic SAR is necessary. The Law on Nuclear Safety defines cases when the SAR has to be updated and agreement from VATESI obtained.

• VATESI’s agreement is necessary on documentation of modifications and testing that was not foreseen in the design, or documentation of other divergences from a nuclear facility design, prior to the start of modifications.

• VATESI’s agreement is necessary on physical security plans and plans for radioactive discharges into the environment.

The Law on Nuclear Safety together with the Regulations on the Issuance of Licences and Permits Necessary to Engage in Nuclear Energy Activities, approved by the Government, and the Rules on Import, Export, Transit and Transport of Radioactive Material, Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel, approved by a decree of the minister of health and the head of VATESI, regulate the issuance, amendment and suspension of licences and permits listed in the Law on Nuclear Safety; the maintenance of the list of documents which have to be submitted for issuance of every type of licence and permit or amendment of a licence or permit; and instructions for providing documents which must be provided in order to revoke or suspend a licence or permit. Detailed requirements for safety documents are determined in the respective nuclear safety requirements and rules issued by VATESI. Some requirements for the content of the documents that the applicant is required to provide for the issuance or amendment of an appropriate licence or permit are established by the aforementioned regulation as well.

According to the procedure set in the legislation, the applicant has to submit an application to VATESI to obtain a licence or permit or its amendment.

Together with the application to issue a licence or permit, a schedule of submission of application documents has to be prepared and agreed with VATESI. The Law on Nuclear Safety sets requirements and conditions for acceptance of an application or of a schedule of application documents, as well as time limits for the acceptance of an application and agreement on schedule.

The Law on Nuclear Safety also determines conditions for refusal of the application for a licence or permit.

VATESI makes decisions on authorizations according to its competence after review and assessment of safety submittals that are required by legal acts. According to VATESI’s internal management system Procedure Document on Review and Assessment of Safety Justifying Documents and Procedure Document for Licensing, specialists of VATESI have to prepare review and assessment reports as well as safety evaluation reports in support of VATESI decisions on the issue of authorization. According to recent practice, safety evaluation reports are usually available to applicants (licence holders) and their summaries are available to the public on the VATESI web site. The list of the documents under which a licence or permit is issued is also prepared.

The Law on Nuclear Safety sets requirements and conditions and time limits for issuance of licences and permits. Some additional conditions (e.g. necessary authorizations by other national regulatory bodies) are also established by the Law on Nuclear Safety as well as the Law on Nuclear Energy. A licence or permit has to be issued for an unlimited period of time until official decision of the regulatory body in this regard (with an exception for permits to transport radioactive materials or spent nuclear fuel). The permits to transport radioactive materials or spent nuclear fuel are issued for a three year period.

The Law on Nuclear Safety also determines the conditions for making decisions not to issue a licence or permit specifying the reasons based on provisions of the law.

Pursuant to the Law on Nuclear Safety, VATESI issues certificates for approval of package design and shipment of radioactive material under conditions specified in the Law on Nuclear Safety.

Following the provisions of the Law on Radiation Protection, VATESI registers activities, issues licences and permits for nuclear energy area activities involving sources of ionizing radiation, which mainly include either a licence or a temporary permit to carry out activities under ionizing radiation at a nuclear facility and a licence or a temporary permit to store or maintain sources of ionizing radiation at a nuclear facility. VATESI also issues certificates to natural persons seeking to obtain the right to train persons responsible for radiation safety or to preform activities as radiation protection experts.

• Law on Nuclear Energy;

• Law on Nuclear Safety;

• Law on the Management of Radioactive Waste;

• Law on Radiation Protection;

• Law on Environmental Protection;

• Law on Environmental Monitoring;

• Law on Waste Management;

• Law on Civil Protection;

• Law on Energy;

• Law on Electricity;

• Law on Metrology;

• Law on Environmental Impact Assessment of the Proposed Economic Activity;

• Law on Charges;

• Law on Construction;

• Law on Control of Strategic Goods;

• Law on Health System;

• Law on Decommissioning of Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant;

• Law on Nuclear Power Plant;

• Law on the State Enterprise Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant Decommissioning Fund;

• Law on Water;

• Law on Depths of Land;

• Law on Safety and Health of Employees;

• Law on Fire Safety;

• Law on Additional Employment and Social Guarantees for the Employees of the State Enterprise Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant;

• Law on Granting the Concession and Assuming the Essential Property Obligations of the Republic of Lithuania in the Visaginas NPP Project;

• Law on the Enforcement of the Application of the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage of 21 May 1963 and the Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention of 21 September 1988;

• Law on Corporate Income Tax;

• Law on State and Official Secrets;

• Law on Klaipeda Sea Port.

• Resolution No. 1406, 21 November 2012, of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania on the approval of the Statute on the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate;

• Resolution No. 722, 20 June 2012, of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania on the approval of the Regulations on the Issue of Licences and Permits Necessary to Engage in Nuclear Energy Activities;

• Resolution No. 918, 12 September 2018, of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania on the Implementation of the Law on Radiation Protection of the Republic of Lithuania;

• Order No. 22.3-58, 15 June 2009, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-1.1.1-2014, Rules of Procedure for Drafting of Nuclear Safety Requirements and Nuclear Safety Rules;

• Order No. 22.3-192, 22 August 2018, approved the Head of State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate “On Consulting Economic Entities in State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate”;

• Order No. 22.3-82, 25 August 2011, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-1.1.3-2016, Inspections Conducted by the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate;

• Order No. 22.3-106, 24 October 2011, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-1.1.4-2017, Rules of Procedure for Applying the Enforcement Measures Set by the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate.

• Resolution No. 83, 25 January 2012, of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania on the approval of Rules of Procedure of the Assessment of the Nuclear Facilities’ Site Evaluation Report;

• Order No. 22.3-58, 20 July 2010, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-2.1.3-2010, General Requirements on Site Evaluation for Nuclear Power Plants.

• Order No. 663, 21 December 2001, approved by the Minister of Health on the approval of Hygiene Standard HN 73:2018, Basic Standard of Radiation Protection;

• Order No. 389, 17 July 2001, approved by the Minister of Health on the approval of Hygiene Standard HN 112:2001, Requirements for Monitoring of Internal Exposure (last amended in 2009);

• Order No. V-928, 10 October 2012, approved by the Minister of Health on the approval of Hygiene Standard HN 52:2012, Radiation Protection in Industrial Radiography;

• Order No. V-678, 1 September 2005, approved by the Minister of Health on the approval of Hygiene Standard HN 88:2005, Radiation Safety of the Open Ionizing Radiation Sources of Non-medical Purpose;

• Order No. 22.3-89, 27 September 2011, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-1.9.1-2017, Standards of Release of Radionuclides from Nuclear Installations and Requirements for the Plan on Release of Radionuclides;

• Order No. 22.3-90, 27 September 2011, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-1.9.2-2018, Derivation and Use of Clearance Levels of Radionuclides for Materials and Waste Generated during Activities in the Area of Nuclear Energy;

• Order No. 22.3-95, 6 October 2011, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-1.9.3-2016, Radiation Protection at Nuclear Facilities;

• Order No. 22.3-73, 29 April 2016, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-1.9.4-2016, On Procedure of Obligatory Radiation Protection Training, Examination, Briefing of Radiation Workers and Radiation Protection Officers Involved in Activities with Sources of Ionizing Radiation in the Nuclear Energy Area and of Certification of Natural Persons Seeking to Obtain the Right to Teach Radiation Protection.

• Order No. 22.3-169, 25 July 2018, approved by the Head of State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-1.8.4-2018, Ageing Management of Structures, Systems and Components Important to Safety of Nuclear Facility;

• Order No. 22.3-72, 30 December 2005, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Requirements for Analysis of Explosion and Aircraft Crash Impact for Nuclear Facilities;

• Order No. 22.3-33, 30 June 2006, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Requirements for Analysis of Seismic Impact for Nuclear Facilities;

• Order No. 22.3-60, 30 July 2010, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-1.8.1-2010, Notification on Unusual Events in Nuclear Power Plants;

• Order No. 69, 24 July 1997, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Nuclear Safety Rules on Reactor Installations of Nuclear Power Plants;

• Order No. 22.3-16, 5 February 2010, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-2.1.2-2010, General Requirements on the Assurance of Safety of Nuclear Power Plants with RBMK-1500 Type Reactors;

• Order No. 56, 21 December 2002, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Safety Requirements for Accident Localization Systems;

• Order No. 22.3-91, 26 November 2010, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Nuclear Safety Rules BST-2.1.1-2010, Design, Construction and Operation of Electric Power Supply Systems;

• Order No. 22.3-118, 23 November 2009, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-2.1.1-2009, Requirements for Deterministic Safety Analysis of Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant;

• Order No. 22.3-117, 25 November 2011, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-2.1.4-2011, Preparation and Use of the Nuclear Power Plant’s Safety Analysis Report;

• Order No. 22.3-57, 10 April 2014, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-1.7.1-2014, Fire Safety of Safety Related Structures, Systems and Components;

• Order No. 22.3-49, 26 May 2009, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Requirements for Use of the Operational Experience in the Field of Nuclear Energy;

• Order No. 22.3-56, 21 June 2010, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-1.4.1-2016, Management System;

• Order No. 22.3-99, 7 October 2011, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the Approval of Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-1.8.2-2015, Categories of Modifications of Nuclear Facility and Procedure for Performing the Modifications;

• Order No. 22.3-22, 29 January 2014, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-1.4.2-2014, Management of Construction of a Nuclear Facility;

• Order No. 22.3-295, 4 December 2018, approved by the Head of State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate On the Approval of Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-1.8.5-2018, Commissioning of Nuclear Facility;

• Order No. 22.3-160, 20 September 2017, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the Approval of Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-1.4.3-2017, Managing Human Resources in the Field of Nuclear Power;

• Order No. 22.3-222, 24 November 2017, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-1.8.3-2017, Technical Specification of a Nuclear Facility;

• Order No. 22.3-87, 27 March 2018, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-2.1.6-2018, Design of a Nuclear Power Plant.

• Resolution No. 1427, 23 December 2015, of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania on the approval of a Development Programme on Radioactive Waste Management;

• Resolution No. 1872, 3 December 2002, of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania on the approval of the Rules of Procedure for Submission of Data on Activities Involving Radioactive Waste Disposal to the European Commission;

• Order No. 22.3-188, 30 November 2016, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-3.2.2-2016, Radioactive Waste Repositories;

• Order No. 22.3-103, 27 May 2015, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-3.2.1-2015, Radioactive Waste Acceptance Criteria for a Near Surface Repository;

• Order No. 22.3-59, 21 July 2010, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-3.1.1-2016, Management of Spent Nuclear Fuel in a Storage Facility of the Dry Type;

• Order No. 22.3-120, 31 December 2010, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-3.1.2-2017, Pre-disposal Management of Radioactive Waste at Nuclear Facilities.

• Resolution No. 117, 2 February 2005, of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania on the approval of a Decommissioning Programme of First and Second Units of State Enterprise Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant;

• Resolution No. 1491, 25 November 2004, of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania on the approval of the Date of Shutdown of the First Unit of State Enterprise Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant;

• Resolution No. 974, 13 October 1994, of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania on the approval of the Date of Shutdown of the Second Unit of State Enterprise Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant;

• Order No. 22.3-216, 30 November 2015, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-1.5.1-2019, Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities;

• Order No. 22.3-206, 20 December 2016, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Nuclear Safety Rules BST-1.5.1-2016, The Evaluation of Compliance with Free Release Criteria of Buildings and Site of Nuclear Facilities.

• Resolution No. 99, 18 January 2012, of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania on the approval of the National Plan for Protection of the Population in Case of a Nuclear and Radiological Accident;

• Order No. D1-136/22.3-15, 10 February 2012, approved by the Minister of Environment of the Republic of Lithuania and Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Rules of Procedure on the Exchange of Information in Case of Extreme Radiological Situations;

• Order No. 22.3-107, 24 October 2008, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Emergency Preparedness Requirements for the Operator of a Nuclear Facility.

• Order No. V-1271/22.3-139, 24 December 2008, approved by the Minister of Health and the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Rules of Radioactive Material, Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel Import, Export, Transportation in Transit and inside the Republic of Lithuania;

• Order No. 22.3-133, 31 July 2017, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-4.1.1-2017, Rules on the Issuance of Certificates for Transport of Nuclear Fuel Cycle, Nuclear and Fissionable Materials.

• Resolution No. 127, 2 February 2012, of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania on the approval of Rules of Procedure of the Development and Review of the Design Basis Threat and Submission of Information to the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate;

• Resolution No. 932, 22 July 2004, of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania on the approval of Rules of the Licensing Rules for Export, Import, Transit, Brokering and Intra-EU Transfer of Strategic Goods, the Rules on the Implementation of Control of Strategic Goods and the Rules on the Certification of Recipient Undertakings Manufacturing Military Equipment;

• Order No. 22.3-85, 30 May 2014, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the Approval of Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-1.2.1-2014, Rules of Procedure of Nuclear Material Accounting and Control, and Provision of Information about Research and Development Activities, and repeal of some orders approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate;

• Order No. 22.3-104, 4 September 2012, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Nuclear Safety Rules BST-1.6.1-2012, Preparation of the Security Plan;

• Order No. 22.3-37, 4 April 2012, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-1.6.1-2012, Physical Security of Nuclear Facilities, Nuclear Material and Nuclear Fuel Cycle Material;

• Order No. 22.3-109, 10 June 2016, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-1.6.2-2016, Physical Security of Sources of Ionizing Radiation used in Activities in the Area of Nuclear Energy Involving Sources of Ionizing Radiation.