In order to reduce Lithuania’s dependence on energy supplies from a single source, a number of energy projects have been implemented in recent years. Only a few years ago, Lithuania had no alternative gas supply or electricity interconnectivity with European Union countries, except limited interconnections with Latvia. The liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal in Klaipeda was completed at the end of 2014, while at the end of 2015, the electricity interconnections between Sweden and Lithuania (NordBalt) and between Poland and Lithuania (LitPol Link) became operational.

Since 31 December 2009, owing to the permanent shutdown of the state owned Ignalina nuclear power plant (NPP), Lithuania’s electricity generation structure changed significantly, and Lithuania changed from being a net exporter of electricity to a net importer of electricity.

The energy sector is particularly important to the Lithuanian economy and energy security is a strategic priority for the Government. It is being ensured by breaking Lithuania’s energy isolation by establishing alternative ways to import energy resources and by seeking to secure sufficient and competitive internal capacities of energy production.

The shutdown of Ignalina NPP at the end of 2009 required a clear strategy regarding replacement of the capacity generated by Ignalina NPP by other electricity generation capacities.

In June 2010, the Government approved the National Renewable Energy Sources Development Strategy, which aims to achieve at least a 30-45% share in the gross final energy consumption to be produced from renewables by 2030 and 80% by 2050. The biggest potential is foreseen in wind energy, hydropower and biomass (mostly for heat production).

On 21 June 2018, the Parliament of the Republic of Lithuania (Seimas) approved the revised National Energy Independence Strategy. The Strategy of 2018 provides four main directions for Lithuanian energy policy — energy security, the development of green energy, efficient energy consumption, competitiveness and innovation. Importantly, the strategy does not foresee development of nuclear power in Lithuania.

Lithuania has taken steps to liberalize its electricity market and to ensure a consumer’s right to choose his or her electricity supplier and to purchase electricity for a real market price. Lithuania’s regulated tariffs benefit only household consumers, but these tariffs are planned to be abolished by 2020. On 1 January 2010, the electricity market was officially started in Lithuania (the first among the Baltic States) — a crucial step towards the common Baltic electricity market. A restatement of the Law on Electricity, which entered into force in February 2012, created legal preconditions for the integration of Lithuania’s electricity market into the Nordic market. This integration has led to the launch of a bidding area (which is a network area in which market participants in energy trading submit their bids) in June 2012 in Lithuania by Nord Pool Spot AS, Europe’s leading Nordic power exchange. The Nord Pool Spot intraday market (ELBAS) in Lithuania was launched in 2013. This completed the Baltic Energy Market Interconnection Plan (BEMIP) long term goal of creating a modern and integrated Baltic power market connected to the Nordic region.

Primary energy resources, in particular fossil fuels, in Lithuania are rather scarce. In order to meet energy requirements, local oil, peat, wood, geothermal, wind, solar and hydropower, as well as energy from chemical processes could be used. In 2018, the share of these local energy sources in the country’s primary energy balance was 24.5%. Since 2001, renewable energy sources have played a more important role. In 2018, the share of renewables in the balance of indigenous energy resources was 81.76%. Currently, the main renewable energy resource is biomass (including wood waste, boughs, wood chips, pellets, sawdust and waste from agriculture). The contribution of hydropower in absolute value fluctuates depending on climatic conditions, with small changes. The contribution of biofuels, used as a motor fuel for road transport, as well as that of wind energy is increasing.

Over the past few years, support for renewable energy has grown continuously both at the national and European levels. Therefore, in 2018, renewable energy sources accounted for 25.3% of gross final energy consumption and 16.8% of gross electricity consumption in Lithuania, with wind, hydropower and biomass being the largest contributors. At the end of 2018, wind power was the biggest single technology, accounting for 65.2% of installed capacity, while hydropower and solar are the other major sources of renewable power, accounting for 14.3% and 10.0%, respectively, in the current mix of renewable electricity generation capacity.

In 2018, renewable energy sources accounted for 25.26% of gross final energy consumption and 18.41% of gross electricity consumption in Lithuania, with wind, hydropower and biomass being the largest contributors. Table 1 shows estimated available energy by source.

TABLE 1. ESTIMATED AVAILABLE ENERGY SOURCES

	Estimated available energy sources
	Fossil fuels			Nuclear	Renewables
	Solid (peat)	Liquid	Gas	Uranium	Hydro	Wind	Solar	Biofuel
Total amount in specific units*	15	64	N.A.	N.A.	141	840	100	390
Total amount in exajoules (EJ)	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.

*Solid, liquid: million tonnes; gas: billion m³; uranium: metric tonnes; hydro, renewable: MW.

N.A. – not applicable

The development of the total primary energy consumption in petajoule (PJ) is shown in Table 2. Oil and oil products were the most important fuels in Lithuania for several decades. However, since 1990, its share in the primary energy balance fluctuated in a comparatively large range with a reduced role owing to decreasing consumption of heavy fuel oil to produce electricity and district heat. After the closure of the Ignalina NPP, the share of oil products increased to 39.5% in 2018. At present, natural gas is one of the most important fuels in Lithuania. In 2018, its share in the Lithuanian primary energy balance was 23.0%.

During the period 1990–2009, the share of nuclear — the cheapest imported fuel — was high. The role of nuclear is critical because it is comparatively cheap, and nuclear fuel helped to relieve certain burdens related to balance of payments. Nuclear fuel also increased the security of the primary energy supply, especially in the power sector. The share of nuclear energy in the primary energy balance in the year 2009 (year of final closure of the NPP) was 29.6%. Until 2009, Lithuania was a net electricity exporter. Over the period 2010–2018 (owing to the closure of the main electricity generation source), more than 50% of the electricity required to meet the country’s gross electricity demand was imported from neighbouring countries; in 2018, the share of electricity import in the primary energy balance was equal to 10.7%.

Final electricity consumption and demand decreased from 12 TW?h in 1990 to 6.2 TW?h in 2000 but increased by 4.8% per annum during the period 2000–2008. Electricity consumption increased in all sectors of the national economy. In 2009, owing to economic recession, the total final electricity demand decreased by 7.4%. Over the period 2009–2018, final electricity demand increased on average by 2.4% per year.

TABLE 2. ENERGY STATISTICS

									Average annual growth rate (%)
	1980	1990	2000	2005	2010	2015	2017	2018	2000–2018
Energy consumption**
- Total	508.1	675.7	301.8	370.0	294.9	299.6	321.2	322.6	0.4
- Solids***	47.7	33.4	3.9	7.7	8.7	8.6	9.7	10.3	5.5
- Liquids	335.7	286.7	90.7	112.5	106.9	109.5	122.7	127.4	1.9
- Gases	106.8	195.9	86.4	103.7	104.3	86.6	80.5	74.4	-0.8
- Nuclear	N.A.	185.8	91.9	112.8	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
- Hydro	1.7	1.5	1.2	1.6	1.9	1.3	2.2	1.6	1.4
- Other RES	13.6	11.9	27.0	35.3	42.7	58.1	63.2	63.1	4.8
- Other sources	N.A.	3.6	5.5	7.0	8.8	9.6	11.8	11.3	4.1
- Electricity	N.A.	-43.1	-4.8	-10.7	21.6	25.9	31.2	34.7	N.A.
Energy production
- Total	24.5	203.9	139.9	167.5	63.8	76.0	85.2	81.9	-2.9
- Solids***	6.1	0.6	0.5	0.8	0.4	1.8	1.7	1.8	7.4
- Liquids	0.0	0.5	13.5	9.2	4.9	3.1	2.4	1.9	-10.3
- Gases	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
- Nuclear	N.A.	185.8	91.9	112.8	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
- Hydro	1.7	1.5	1.2	1.6	1.9	1.3	2.2	1.6	1.4
- Other RES	13.6	11.9	27.3	36.1	47.8	60.2	67.2	65.4	5.0
- Other sources	N.A.	3.6	5.5	7.0	8.8	9.6	11.8	11.3	4.1
Net import (Import-Export)	483.7	471.8	161.9	202.5	231.1	230.0	236.0	240.7	2.2
- Total

* Latest available data.

** Energy consumption = Primary energy consumption + Net import (Import–Export) of secondary energy.

*** Solid fuels include coal, lignite, peat and non-renewable waste.

—: Data not available.

Note: RES: Renewal energy sources. Other sources include energy from chemical processes.

Source: Statistics Lithuania.

In January 2009, the Ministry of Energy of the Republic of Lithuania was reestablished for the purpose of reforming the Lithuanian energy sector. Since then, a number of reforms have been undertaken in the energy sector.

In 2009, the European Union adopted the Third Energy Package, a package of legislative measures aimed at liberalizing European Union energy markets. Based on the ownership unbundling requirements of the Third Energy Package, Lithuania successfully reformed the electricity sector by separating transmission from generation and supply activities. In 2010, four blocks of energy companies were established (consisting of energy transmission, production, distribution and maintenance activities). Ownership unbundling was aimed at increasing the overall efficiency of the electricity system, preventing discrimination against new market participants connecting to the grid, optimizing the use and development of infrastructure, incentivizing economic investment and ensuring competitive prices for electricity consumers. Owing to historical factors, Lithuania’s high voltage electricity transmission grid is directly interconnected with the high voltage grids of Latvia, Belarus and the Russian Federation. These interconnections allow extensive exchanges of power with such neighbouring systems. However, a core objective of Lithuania’s energy strategy is integration of its power system into the common European electricity market as well as synchronous interconnection with the European Continental Power Network of the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E). Seeking integration into European Union energy systems, a number of energy projects are under way.

A marine underwater high voltage cable (Estlink I) was completed in 2006 as a result of a joint venture between power companies in Finland and the Baltic States. Estlink I allows the transfer of electricity between Finland and Estonia, but in a limited capacity (350 MW). After a successful trial operation period, Estlink II, the interconnection between Estonia and Finland with a capacity of 650 MW, commenced commercial operations at the beginning of February 2014. The electricity is then transferred through Estonia to the electricity transmission grids of Latvia and Lithuania. As constituent parts of the integration of the Baltic electricity market into the common European electricity market, new interconnection lines between Lithuania and Sweden (NordBalt) and Lithuania and Poland (LitPol Link) were installed at the end of 2015.

NordBalt is a 700 MW submarine power cable between Lithuania and Sweden. This electricity bridge enables Lithuania to exchange electricity with countries situated in northern Europe and diversifies sources of electricity supply.

LitPol Link is a 500 MW electricity link between Lithuania and Poland which connects the three Baltic States, namely Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, to the European Union energy market and system. This interconnection is a crucial step towards integration of the Baltic States’ electricity grids with those of continental Europe.

The Baltic States also share the view that their electricity system must operate synchronously with the continental European network. This goal was confirmed jointly by the prime ministers of the Baltic States in 2014, when they stated that synchronization should be fulfilled by 2025. The importance of such synchronization is also recognized in the framework of European Union energy policy. This project is included within the European Energy Security Strategy and the European Union Energy Union as a project of common interest and of critical importance to European Union energy security. The goal of implementing the Baltic States’ synchronization with the continental European networks by 2025 is also included in a reinforced BEMIP.

The National Integrated Energy and Climate Plan of the Republic of Lithuania and the revised National Energy Independence Strategy does not foresee development of nuclear power in Lithuania. These strategic documents are focused on renewable energy sources and energy efficiency. By 2030 Lithuania has committed to achieve a 45% share of renewable energy in total final energy consumption and cumulative end use energy savings at least equivalent to 27.279 TW?h.

Electricity in Lithuania is produced from thermal, hydropower and other renewable sources, with installed capacities of 1914 MW, 1028 MW and 717 MW, respectively. The main generators are Elektrenai (condensing), Vilnius combined heat and power plant (CHP), Kaunas CHP, Kaunas hydroelectric power plant (HPP) and Kruonis pumped storage plant (PSPP), in addition to other small scale hydroelectric, wind, solar, biomass, biogas, waste and other renewable sources.

AB ESO is the Lithuanian distribution network operator. ESO distributes and transmits electrical power throughout the entire country and is a distribution network operator. The grid is made up of low and medium voltage lines and equipment.

The electrical power provided through ESO’s distribution grid reaches more than 1.577 million clients.

Litgrid AB, the Lithuanian electricity transmission system operator, maintains stable operation of the national power system, controls electricity flows and enables competition in an open domestic electricity market. Litgrid is responsible for integrating the national power system into the European power infrastructure and electricity market. The company also operates strategic cross-border electricity links, namely, NordBalt and LitPol.

Table 3 contains data on electricity production, consumption and capacity, and Table 4 shows energy related ratios.

TABLE 3. ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION, CONSUMPTION AND CAPACITY

									Average annual growth rate (%)
	1980	1990	2000	2010	2015	2016	2017	2018	2000–2018
Capacity of electrical plants (GW(e))
- Thermal	2,308	2,646	2,644	2,574	2,532	1,850	1.932	1.914	-1.8
- Hydro	0,107	0,106	0,914	1,028	1,028	1,028	1.028	1.028	0.7
- Nuclear	N.A.	2,600	2,600	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
- Wind	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	0,161	0,438	0,509	0,521	0.533
- Geothermal	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
- Other renewable	N.A.	N.A.	0,001	0,032	0,158	0,202	0,184	0.184	33.6
- Total	2,415	5,352	6,159	3,795	4,156	3,589	3,665	3.659	-2.9
Electricity production (TWh)
- Thermal	11,200	10,959	2,361	3,979	2,761	1,750	1,324	1.089	-4.2
- Hydro	0,466	0,414	0,643	1,295	1,024	1,044	1,181	0.960	2.3
- Nuclear	N.A.	17,033	8,419	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
- Wind	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	0,224	0,810	1,136	1,364	1.144
- Geothermal	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
- Other renewable	N.A.	N.A.	0,001	0,250	0,520	0,506	0,572	0.630	43.1
- Total1	11,666	28,406	11,425	5,748	4,933	4,266	4,187	3.511	-6.3
Total Electricity consumption (TWh)	11,559	16,430	10,088	11,738	12,141	12,540	12,864	13144	1.5

¹ Electricity transmission losses are not deducted.

* Latest available data.

Source: www.litgrid.eu.

TABLE 4. ENERGY RELATED RATIOS

	1980	1990	2000	2005	2010	2015	2016	2017	2018
Energy consumption per capita (GJ/capita)	148.3	182.7	87.6	114.6	95	103,1	107,0	114.7	115.5
Electricity consumption per capita (kW h/capita)	2973.0	4023.5	2516.7	3187	3470	3907	4056	4265	4373
Electricity production/Energy production (%)	171.7	50.2	29.5	32	32.4	23,4	19,9	17,7	15.4
Nuclear/Total electricity (%)	N.A.	60.0	73.7	69.9	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Ratio of external dependency (%)1	95.2	69.8	52.9	53.5	81	74.6	74.8	73,5	74.6

¹ Net import/Total energy consumption.

* Latest available data.

The decision to build a nuclear power plant in the Baltic region for electricity supply to the Baltic States, Belarus and Kaliningrad was made by the former Government of the Soviet Union at the beginning of the 1970s. A site on the shore of Drukšiai Lake in Lithuania, near the borders with Latvia and Belarus was selected. Construction of the first unit of the Ignalina NPP commenced in April 1978; the second unit followed in April 1980, and the third unit in 1985. The town of Visaginas (formerly Snieckus) was built for the workers of the Ignalina NPP. The first unit was commissioned in December 1983 and the second in August 1987. In August 1988, the former USSR Council of Ministers suspended the construction of the third unit. In November 1993 the Government of Lithuania decided to abandon the construction of Unit 3 and dismantled the existing structure. The development of the Ignalina NPP design was carried out by the Research and Development Institute for Energy Technology (VNIPIET) of the Russian Federation. The development of the Accident Localization System was carried out by the Sverdlovsk branch of the VNIPIET. Metal structures of the main building were designed by the main design office of Leningrad Steel Design. The turbine hall, the open distributive system and the auxiliary facilities were developed by the Atomic Energy Design Organization of Ukraine. Ignalina NPP was intended to be the pilot NPP for the RBMK-1500 reactor type. The scientific supervisor of the RBMK-1500 project was the Kurchatov Atomic Energy Institute of Russia. The principal designer of the nuclear steam supply system was the Research and Development Institute of Power Engineering (RDIPE — Russian abbreviation NIKIET) in Moscow. These two institutes prepared and published the technical safety justification of the RBMK-1500 reactor in 1987. These institutes, together with the Research and Development Institute for Energy Technology, prepared the technical safety justification of the Ignalina NPP in 1988. This safety report came closer to Western standards in comparison with the technical safety justification of the RBMK-1500 reactor. However, the technical safety justification of the Ignalina NPP was not officially approved.

In 1999, the decision was made to shut down Unit 1 of the Ignalina NPP before 2005, and in 2002 it was decided to shut down Unit 2 in 2009.

The following state institutions and bodies are involved in nuclear power related activities:

Ministry of Energy;

• State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate (VATESI);

• Ministry of Health;

• Radiation Protection Centre;

• Ministry of Environment;

• Environmental Protection Agency;

• Lithuanian Geological Survey;

• Ministry of Economy and Innovation;

• Ministry of Social Security and Labour;

• Ministry of Transport and Communications;

• Ministry of National Defence;

• Ministry of the Interior;

• Ministry of Education, Science and Sport;

• State Security Department;

• Governmental Emergencies Commission;

• Local authorities.

The Ministry of Energy is responsible for the implementation of state policy and organizes bilateral and multilateral international cooperation in the sphere of nuclear energy; it is also the responsible authority for promotion and ownership of nuclear facilities. The Ministry of Energy is the owner of the Ignalina NPP and is responsible for a broad range of activities: tariffs, the pricing system, organization and financial audits. The Ministry supervises the nuclear power sector and is responsible for the preparation of regulatory acts governing nuclear power and for coordination of assistance for nuclear safety improvements.

In 2018 the Law on the Management of Radioactive Waste was amended. Through amendments of the Law, the state enterprise Ignalina NPP was assigned as the sole responsible entity for safe management of all of Lithuania’s radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel including disposal. The Radioactive Waste Management Agency was reorganized and merged with the state enterprise Ignalina NPP.

The Ministry of Economy and Innovation is responsible for issuing licences for the export, import and transit of strategic goods. “Strategic goods” are defined as goods, materials, equipment, technologies, software and services which are subject to export, import and transit control.

VATESI is the main regulatory and supervisory institution of nuclear safety and physical security. It sets safety and security requirements, issues licences and permits, and performs supervisory activities, safety assessments, regulatory inspections and other functions. The mission of VATESI is the state regulation and supervision of safety and security of nuclear facilities, activities with nuclear and nuclear fuel cycle materials, and activities with sources of ionizing radiation used in the nuclear power sector in order to protect the public and the environment from the harmful effects of ionizing radiation. VATESI is a state institution, established in 1991. The head of VATESI reports directly to the President and the Government. The main tasks of VATESI are the following:

State regulation and supervision of nuclear safety at the Ignalina NPP and radioactive waste management facilities;

• Supervision of use of nuclear materials and technologies for peaceful purposes (application of the IAEA and EURATOM safeguards, import/export control);

• State regulation and supervision of physical security of nuclear facilities, nuclear material and nuclear fuel cycle materials and sources of ionizing radiation used in the nuclear power sector;

• State regulation and supervision of transportation of nuclear fuel cycle materials, nuclear and fissile material;

• State regulation and supervision of radiation protection of workers at nuclear facilities;

• State regulation and supervision of emergency preparedness at nuclear facilities.

The Ministry of Health does the following:

Prepares and approves standard acts and rules on the health of the personnel of nuclear facilities and the population residing in the monitored zones of the facility;

• Undertakes environmental health studies of radiation impact on people and the environment and establishes health protection requirements;

• Agrees on the siting for nuclear facilities and undertakes state environmental health analysis of their construction;

• Takes part in the authorization of the constructed or reconstructed nuclear facilities, and issues environmental health passports for work with radioactive materials and other sources of ionizing radiation;

• Establishes the standards for medical examination for personnel working with radioactive materials and sources of ionizing radiation, the frequency of the examination and contraindications, and controls compliance with the standards;

• Monitors the health of nuclear facility personnel and the residents of the monitored zone of the facility;

• Ensures the preparedness of medical institutions to mitigate the consequences of a nuclear or radiological accident;

• Establishes radiation protection norms for the population and controls compliance with them;

• Organizes medical examination of the containment forces of a nuclear accident and the population affected by radiation exposure and submits findings and proposals for the reduction of radiation exposure;

• Determines occupational diseases for personnel in the sphere of nuclear energy and studies the causes of the diseases;

• Carries out education on radiation protection of the population.

Most of these functions are delegated to the Radiation Protection Centre (RPC), which is the regulatory body that coordinates the activities of the executive and other bodies of public administration and local government in the field of radiation protection, monitoring and expert examination of public exposure. Among other responsibilities, the RPC is responsible for supervising the fulfilment of the requirements regarding radiation protection of workers (excluding in nuclear facilities) and the general public from negative impacts caused by ionizing radiation. In case of a nuclear accident at the Ignalina NPP, RPC presents recommendations to the State Emergency Commission, all levels of Emergency Management Centres and executive and other bodies of public administration for the reduction of exposure doses and prevention of deterministic and stochastic effects of radiation on the public and emergency workers. RPC performs analysis of foods, drinking water and other samples contaminated by radionuclides, and presents suggestions to the Ministry of Health to approve foods and their raw materials, drinking water and temporary maximum permissible levels of radioactive contamination for the emergency consequences liquidation period. It also organizes supervision and control of their compliance. Also, RPC presents suggestions to the Ministry of Health about the necessity of applying iodine prophylaxis and provides information to the public, within the limits of its competence, about protective actions. In order to continually ensure emergency preparedness, RPC has approved an emergency preparedness plan and established an internal emergency preparedness office (EPO).

The Ministry of Environment or its authorized institution, according to the manner set out by legal acts, supervises the building of nuclear installations, prepares and approves methodology to assess damage caused by ionizing radiation to the environment and its compensation, and periodically informs the general public and the state and municipal authorities on the radiation situation in the country.

The Ministry of Social Security and Labour is responsible for compliance with the requirements of labour, safety at work and related statutory acts.

The Ministry of Transport and Communications participates in the drafting of laws and subordinate legislation and the training and certification of personnel who transport nuclear and radioactive materials.

The Fire and Rescue Department is the coordinating institution with respect to the preparation of emergency plans and their implementation in the event of an accident at the Ignalina NPP. The department organizes the training sessions for population protection in the event of a nuclear accident.

The Ministry of the Interior ensures fire protection of the NPP and other nuclear facilities. It also ensures physical protection of the NPP, other nuclear facilities located close to State borders and nuclear materials during transport across the country. The Ministry of the Interior is responsible for the preparation, coordination and implementation of the interdepartmental antiterrorist and antipenetration action plans and the investigation of cases of theft and illegal possession of nuclear and radioactive materials and dual use items. It implements a system that gauges the trustworthiness of personnel of nuclear facilities and personnel involved in the transportation of nuclear material.

The State Security Department exercises prevention of subversive, sabotage and terrorist acts, as well as other offences aimed at damaging the interests of state security at nuclear facilities, in their environment, and on transportation routes for nuclear and radioactive materials. Together with the Ministry of the Interior it gauges the trustworthiness of personnel of nuclear facilities and personnel involved in the transportation of nuclear material.

The Governmental Emergencies Commission is responsible for coordinating the activities of all the bodies and forces taking part in the containment of a nuclear accident and its consequences.

The local authorities, based on the Government approved state plan for protection of the population in the event of a nuclear accident, shall develop preparedness for nuclear and radiological accidents as well as the preventive measures envisaged in the municipality’s plan for control of emergency situations. In the event of a nuclear or radiological accident, local authorities shall inform the population about the radiation situation on the sites of nuclear installations and about the measures undertaken for civil protection.

The Ignalina NPP is the only nuclear power plant in Lithuania and is not operational (Table 5). It contains two RBMK-1500 reactors, belonging to the category of boiling water channel graphite moderated type reactors. The Ignalina NPP is located in the northeastern part of Lithuania. The power plant was built as part of the then Soviet Union’s North-West Unified Power System. Ignalina NPP Unit 1 was connected to the grid at the end of 1983, and Unit 2 in August 1987. The design lifetime of the units was projected to be until 2014 and 2017, respectively. In total, four units were originally planned to be built on the Ignalina NPP site. Construction of the third unit was suspended in 1988 for political reasons, and construction of the fourth unit never started. Ignalina NPP Unit 1 was shut down on 31 December 2004 and Unit 2 on 31 December 2009 in compliance with the protocol for Lithuania’s accession to the European Union.

Defuelling of the Unit 1 reactor was started in 2006 and was completed in December 2009. Some of the removed spent fuel assemblies (in total 978) were transported to Unit 2 for after-burning and the remaining assemblies were put into spent fuel storage pools. Unit 1 is maintained in the post-operation state, based on the VATESI operation licence and in accordance with the requirements of the technical specification for Unit 1 operation during the fuel removal from the spent fuel storage pools.

After shutdown, Unit 2 was maintained in the post-operation state based on the VATESI operation licence and in accordance with the requirements of the technical specification for operation of Unit 2. Defuelling of Unit 2 was started in 2010 but suspended because of the lack of free space in the existing storage facility and spent fuel pools and while waiting for the new Interim Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage Facility to be put into operation. The defuelling was restarted in September 2016 after VATESI issued a licence for operation of the Interim Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage Facility. Fuel removal from the Unit 2 reactor was completed in February 2018. Defuelling of the spent fuel pools in the units is planned to be completed by 2022.

Decommissioning of various Unit 1 and Unit 2 facilities is under way. These activities are performed in accordance with the Ignalina NPP final decommissioning plan and in line with the Unit 1 and Unit 2 decommissioning projects.

Projects that are currently being implemented are related to dismantling and decontamination (D&D) of the Ignalina NPP systems and equipment. Each Ignalina NPP D&D project is implemented only after approval of the technological design and corresponding safety analysis report by the regulatory body, including development of an environmental impact assessment for each D&D project and issuance of an affirmative decision by the competent authority on the admissibility to perform the D&D activities under consideration. The projects are implemented in compliance with the technological solutions and the sequence developed and accepted in the technological design documents and within clearly defined equipment dismantling boundaries.

TABLE 5. STATUS AND PERFORMANCE OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS**

Reactor Unit	Type	Net Capacity [MW(e)]	Status	Operator	Reactor Supplier	Construction Date	First Criticality Date	First Grid Date	Commercial Date	Shutdown Date	UCF for 2019
IGNALINA-1	LWGR	1185	Permanent Shutdown	INPP	MAEP	1977-05-01	1983-10-04	1983-12-31	1985-05-01	2004-12-31
IGNALINA-2	LWGR	1185	Permanent Shutdown	INPP	MAEP	1978-01-01	1986-12-01	1987-08-20	1987-12-01	2009-12-31
IGNALINA-3	LWGR	1380	Cancelled Constr.	INPP	MAEP	1985-06-01				1988-08-30

Data source: IAEA - Power Reactor Information System (PRIS).

Note: Table is completely generated from PRIS data to reflect the latest available information and may be more up to date than the text of the report.

** Latest available data.

+ Date, when first major placing of concrete, usually for the base mat of the reactor building is done.

++ Date of the first connection to the grid.

Note: UCF (unit capability factor) for the latest available year (only applicable to reactors in operation).

Decommissioning: Information and Plans

On 5 October 1999, the Seimas approved the National Energy Strategy, in accordance with which Unit 1 at the Ignalina NPP was to be shut down by 2005, given the long term substantial financial support from the European Union, G7 and other countries and international financial institutions. On 31 December 2004, Unit 1 was shut down in compliance with Protocol No. 4 of Lithuania’s European Union Accession Agreement; Unit 2 operated until the end of 2009.

On 19 February 2001, the Government approved the decommissioning programme for Ignalina NPP Unit 1, envisaging measures to be considered from 2001 to 2004. On 2 February 2005, the Government of Lithuania approved the new decommissioning programme for both units of the Ignalina NPP. The main objectives of the programme are the following:

To ensure safe operation of the Ignalina NPP during the preparation for decommissioning and during the actual decommissioning activities.

• To develop, modify and add to the legal acts related to the Ignalina NPP decommissioning.

• To ensure the work of the Ignalina NPP Decommissioning Service and Unit 1 Surveillance Service.

• To evaluate (in the order defined by the legal acts) both the projects undertaken in preparation for decommissioning and the decommissioning projects with respect to nuclear safety, radiation protection and physical security, as well as to license them.

• To mitigate negative social and economic effects. It also specifies necessary organizational, technical, economic and social measures to achieve the above mentioned objectives.

On 25 February 2005, the Minister of Economy approved the plan on implementation of measures of the decommissioning programme for Ignalina NPP Units 1 and 2, envisaging measures for addressing environmental, social and economic problems, as well as consequences of premature decommissioning. The plan was reissued once a year. In 2014, it was replaced by the Interinstitutional Action Plan, covering a three year period, with annual updates.

The main objectives set established the action plan include the following:

To ensure a safe and fluent Ignalina NPP decommissioning process by using allocated funds in a transparent and efficient manner;

• To mitigate the negative social and economic consequences within the Ignalina NPP region as a result of the Ignalina NPP decommissioning.

In order to reach the first objective, several tasks must be fulfilled, including the following:

To ensure a safe and efficient Ignalina NPP decommissioning process and its supervision;

• To develop a radioactive waste management infrastructure based on state of the art technologies, and ensure safe and effective Ignalina NPP operational and decommissioning radioactive waste management.

The following tasks are set for reaching the second objective:

To provide for the possibility for Ignalina NPP employees who have already been dismissed or are to be dismissed to integrate into the labour market and mitigate dismissal consequences;

• To reduce energy consumption in public facilities and multistory buildings within the Ignalina NPP region.

As appendices, the action plan contains Measures for Implementation of the Ignalina NPP Decommissioning Interdepartmental Action Plan objectives and tasks for the period of 2016–2018 (amended), and the assessment criteria for reaching the above mentioned objectives.

The Final Decommissioning Plan

Pursuant to the provisions of the Law on Nuclear Energy and General Requirements for Decommissioning of the Ignalina NPP, VD-EN-01-99, which were in force at the time of preparation for decommissioning of the Ignalina NPP, the Ignalina NPP prepared a final decommissioning plan (FDP), which was approved by the Ministry of Economy in July 2005, with the latest update in August 2014. In compliance with the Nuclear Safety Requirements, BSR-1.5.1-2015, Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities, the FDP shall be reviewed at least once every five years and should consider the experience gained during the implementation of the decommissioning process, changes in the decommissioning strategy, decommissioning performance schedule, financing, etc.

Though the final date of termination of the overall decommissioning process has shifted over time, the adopted decommissioning strategy remains unchanged and is further implemented as a strategy of immediate dismantling.

The last version of the FDP was updated and approved by the Minister of Energy on 25 August 2014. In the course of 2018–2019, the FDP will be updated and take into consideration goals and activities for the near future and the long term:

• Complete defueling of both units;

• Further modification and isolation of systems not important to safety;

• Obtaining of the decommissioning licence;

• Dismantling of separate installations, systems and equipment no longer needed to ensure the safe operation and maintenance of the Ignalina NPP;

• Procurement of engineering services for optioneering of D&D of Unit 1 and Unit 2 reactor structures, systems and components together with the graphite stacks (denoted as the Reactor Zone R3);

• Processing of radioactive waste retrieved from the operational waste storage facilities;

• Construction and commissioning of radioactive waste disposal facilities (landfill disposal modules and the near surface repository);

• Start of demolition of some of the auxiliary emptied buildings on the Ignalina NPP site;

• Other considerations.

This is also based on the Ignalina NPP decommissioning megaproject schedule and the allocated funds until the final status of the Ignalina NPP site is reached (i.e. allocated the status of the “green field”, but with some buildings to be allocated the status of the “brown field”, including radioactive waste storage and disposal facilities remaining in operation after the decommissioning). Approvals from all the relevant state institutions (VATESI, Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Social Security and Labour) have already been obtained, and approval by the Ministry of Energy is expected by the end of 2020.

Decommissioning Project for Ignalina NPP Unit 1 and Unit 2 Final Shutdown and Defueling Phase

The decommissioning projects for the Ignalina NPP Unit 1 and Unit 2 final shutdown and defuelling phase, including the safety analysis reports and environmental impact assessments, were prepared and approved by the competent state authorities in 2006 and 2010, respectively.

The decommissioning projects cover work which has to be performed within the frame of prolonged operational licences for Ignalina NPP Unit 1 and Unit 2. Decommissioning projects provide descriptions of the Ignalina NPP Unit 1 and Unit 2 systems that may be modified and isolated at each defuelling stage as a consequence of losing their functions to ensure safe operation of other safety systems remaining in operation and normal operation functions.

The projects do not cover dismantling work, since they are performed within the frame of separate process equipment D&D projects for Ignalina NPP Unit 1 and Unit 2.

The following D&D projects have already been successfully implemented:

Dismantling of equipment located in Bld. 117/1,2 (hydro vessels, valves and pipes of the fast acting subsystem of the emergency core cooling system (ECCS), which lost functionality after the reactor final shutdown owing to the absence of conditions requiring actuation of this subsystem of the ECCS);

Dismantling of Unit 1 Bld. 119 (boiler house) equipment;

• Dismantling of Unit 1 turbine hall (Bld. G1) systems and equipment;

• Dismantling of systems and equipment of Unit 1 reactor gas circuit (Bld. V1) (1st stage);

• Dismantling of Unit 1 control, electrics and de-aerator equipment (Bld. D-0,1).

D&D projects in progress:

Dismantling of Unit 2 turbine hall (Bld. G2) systems and equipment (with the major part of equipment being already dismantled);

• Dismantling of Unit 2 control, electrics and de-aerator equipment (Bld. D-2);

• Dismantling of monitored area equipment (Bld. 111, Bld. 137…);

• Organization of primary waste treatment area in Unit A-1;

• Organization of metallic waste treatment facility in Bld. 130/2.

Historical Enhancement of Ignalina NPP Performance

The safety analysis report (SAR) of 1995–1996 was the first safety analysis done on a Soviet-design NPP by non-former Soviet Union countries. Specialists from the Ignalina NPP, Canada, Russian Federation (main RBMK designer RDIPE), Sweden, United Kingdom and United States of America participated in the project. The SAR team supported the Ignalina NPP management, showing that (i) an adequate safety case for continuing operation had been demonstrated; (ii) the safety case would be adequate to the point of first gap closure, which will be the lifetime limiting factor; and (iii) the plant’s safety standards and practices had been assessed and recommendations for improvement had been made and accepted by the Ignalina NPP. A significant conclusion stated in the SAR is that none of the analysed safety concerns required immediate shutdown of the plant.

The review of the safety analysis report (RSR) of 1995–1997 was an independent review of the SAR, performed by experts from France, Germany, Italy, Lithuania, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, and United States of America. The RSR team agreed with almost all of the SAR team’s recommendations for improvement and made some additional recommendations. They, however, were not able to agree that a fully adequate safety case had been demonstrated and gave a set of recommendations both on additional analyses and on safety improvement measures to be implemented. These recommendations formed a basis for the Ignalina NPP’s Second Safety Improvement Programme (SIP-2), approved in 1997.

Lithuania, Russian Federation, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States of America and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development participated in the performance of the SIP-2, which started in 1997. The objective of the SIP-2 was to improve the safety of the Ignalina NPP with reference to equipment, operating procedures and management to a level of international good standards.

The safety of Ignalina NPP Unit 2 operation was based upon Safety Analysis Report 2 (SAR-2). SAR-2 was prepared in 2000 and after review by VATESI in September 2004, the Ignalina NPP received an indefinitely valid licence for operation of Unit 2.

From 2006 to 2008, the Ignalina NPP updated the SAR for Unit 2. The update was implemented taking into account the results of modifications, analytical work and changes to the Ignalina NPP safety management system carried out between 2001 and 2007. Based on the review report of SAR-2 (RSR-2), VATESI requirements, as well as on the Ignalina NPP’s own initiative as part of the process of updating SAR-2, 127 modifications of Unit 2’s main equipment and 50 analytical work projects were carried out. The results of the analytical work were used as a basis for implementation of a number of modifications at Unit 2, such as the use of uranium–erbium fuel with 2.8% enrichment, commissioning of a diverse shutdown system (DSS) and use of cluster control rods. Implementation of these modifications allowed for a significant increase in nuclear safety of Ignalina NPP Unit 2.

The main modification at Ignalina NPP Unit 2 was installation of the DSS. In October 2004, the DSS was put into trial industrial operation. The regulation requirement on having two independent shutdown systems available was implemented. The DSS implementation was fully completed in 2008, including training of operating and maintenance staff.

In 2001, the Ignalina NPP made an important step towards the management of beyond design basis accidents — in addition to emergency procedures, symptom based emergency operating instructions were introduced. These instructions are easy to handle in accidents for which it is difficult to correctly diagnose the cause. In order to prevent the evolution of design basis accidents into beyond design basis accidents and to mitigate the consequences of beyond design basis accidents, the Guidelines on the Management of Beyond Design Accidents were developed at the Ignalina NPP for Unit 2 in 2006. In order to implement these strategies, the existing Ignalina NPP equipment was modified and Ignalina NPP personnel involved in emergency response activities were trained from 2007 to 2008.

To increase the safety of Unit 2, allowing detection of small coolant leaks at early stages of accidents, a leak before break concept was implemented at the Ignalina NPP in 2007.

After the permanent shutdown of the Ignalina NPP units, the emergency operating procedures, including severe accident management guidelines, were revised and applied to the current state of the Ignalina NPP units.

Pursuant to the Law on Nuclear Safety, the licence holder (for Ignalina NPP — state enterprise Ignalina NPP) shall prepare a periodic safety evaluation report for a nuclear facility not less than every 10 years and shall submit it to the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate for review. The periodic safety analysis report for Unit 1 was developed and submitted to the regulatory body in March 2017 for review. Such a report for Ignalina NPP Unit 2 is expected to be prepared in 2020.

In response to the event at Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi NPP, the European Union’s stress tests were carried out at the Ignalina NPP in 2011–2012. In accordance with the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG) specification, the stress tests were carried out for the two permanently shutdown Ignalina NPP units, the operating dry spent fuel storage facility and the new interim spent fuel storage facility, which was under construction at that point. Taking into account the results and conclusions of the Ignalina NPP stress tests as well as suggestions and recommendations provided by peer review experts, the Ignalina NPP action plan was developed and approved by VATESI. Continuing the participation in follow-up activities for the stress tests, VATESI developed the Plan of Strengthening Nuclear Safety in Lithuania (National Action Plan). This plan is associated with post-Fukushima lessons learned and stress test peer review recommendations and suggestions as well as the results of the IAEA mission on emergency preparedness review that was conducted in Lithuania in 2012. The National Action Plan was prepared in accordance with ENSREG requirements and was presented during the National Action Plan workshops in 2013 and 2015, which were organized by ENSREG. All 14 measures of Lithuania’s National Action Plan have been completed (the last two measures were completed in March 2018). All safety improvement measures related to nuclear safety of the Ignalina NPP units and the operating dry spent fuel storage facility and the new interim spent fuel storage facility were completed in 2015. More details on Lithuania’s participation in European stress tests and follow-up activity are provided on the ENSREG web site.

The revised National Energy Independence Strategy does not foresee development of nuclear power in Lithuania.

Not applicable.

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Historically, public acceptance of nuclear power in Lithuania was quite high. Under the treaty of accession to the European Union where Lithuania committed itself to close the Ignalina NPP, popular initiative brought the issue to a referendum on 12 October 2008 regarding the extension of the operation of the Ignalina NPP. In that referendum, 88.58% of the votes (or 1 156 738 total) were in support of the extension. However, the referendum was announced invalid due to low turnout, which stood at 48.44% and was lower than the required 50%.

After the nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi NPP and with two new NPP projects under development near Lithuania’s borders (Ostrovets NPP in Belarus and Kaliningrad NPP), public acceptance of nuclear power in Lithuania declined. The advisory referendum on supporting the new Visaginas NPP construction in Lithuania was held in the middle of October 2012. The results of the referendum revealed the prevailing negative public opinion on the construction of a new NPP. Just 34% of the voters (463 966) supported the construction of a new NPP, while 63% of the voters (853 163) were against it.

The Lithuanian Energy Institute, Centre for Physical Sciences and Technology, Kaunas University of Technology, and Vilnius Gediminas Technical University are involved in nuclear or nuclear related activities, mainly as technical support organizations (TSOs). These entities provide expertise and necessary technical/scientific support during preparation of safety submittals and safety reviews, and verification of safety justifications. Some of the TSOs are also involved in international projects implemented through international and bilateral cooperation.

The Lithuanian Energy Institute performs a wide range of nuclear related activities, some of which are listed below:

Safety assessment of NPPs;

• Research related to construction of a new NPP in Lithuania;

• Thermohydraulic analysis of accident and transient processes;

• Assessment of thermohydraulic parameters in NPPs;

• Simulation of radionuclide and aerosol transport;

• Assessment of nuclear reactor core modifications and analysis of postulated reactivity accidents;

• Safety analysis of thermonuclear fusion reactors;

• Analysis of new generation NPPs;

• Reliability estimation and control of energy systems;

• Level 1 and Level 2 probabilistic safety assessment of NPPs;

• Strength analysis of construction, piping and components in complex technical systems.

The activities of the Nuclear and Environmental Radioactivity Research Laboratory of the Centre for Physical Sciences and Technology include development and application of nuclear spectroscopy methods, radionuclide metrology and standardization, investigations in environmental radioactivity, radionuclide tracer studies, radioecological monitoring and dose assessment.

The Centre for Non-Destructive Testing at Kaunas University of Technology and the Laboratory of Welding and Material Analysis at Vilnius Gediminas Technical University are highly qualified in the indicated areas. They are equipped with modern instrumentation and also play an important role as TSOs.

With the aid of the European Commission, these facilities were equipped with modern instrumentation.

Not applicable.

Lithuania has or had sustained multilateral and bilateral projects, mostly concerning the safety of NPPs and radioactive waste management with Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States of America.

The main multilateral projects were the International RBMK Safety Review Consortium funded by the Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) programme, Lord Marshall’s Users Group for Soviet Designed Reactors and the IAEA extra-budgetary programme on RBMK reactors. One of the most important projects for Lithuania was the international project Safety of Design Solutions and Operation of NPPs with RBMK Reactors, which covers a broad range of safety related topics, with Unit 2 of the Ignalina NPP used as a reference plant.

During the BARSELINA project (1992–2001) — level 1 and 2 probabilistic safety assessment of the Ignalina NPP was conducted by Lithuania, the Russian Federation and Sweden. This project provides a unified basis for the assessment of severe accident risks for RBMK type reactors and the preparation of remedial measures. Some of the improvements highlighted by the PSA have already been implemented at the Ignalina NPP.

Other projects of the Lithuanian–Swedish bilateral programme involved the application of modern non-destructive testing systems for in-service inspection of the pressure boundary system and the preparation of an Overall Plan for Radioactive Waste Management in Lithuania by Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Co. SKB. The project Fire and Flooding Protection helped to improve the entire fire protection system at the Ignalina NPP.

Further, the IAEA offers many courses for training nuclear specialists. One of the most important national technical cooperation projects, on the systematic approach to training for NPP personnel (completed in 2000), helped strengthen the safety and reliability of the Ignalina NPP.

There have been a number of projects implemented with the United States of America, financed by the Department of Energy and the United States Agency for International Development in the framework of the Nuclear Safety Assistance Programme for Lithuania. Cooperation in nuclear safety improvement at the Ignalina NPP with Japanese specialists also started in 1994. Under the framework of the Agreement of Cooperation for Safety Improvement at the Ignalina NPP signed in 1996, the Japan Science and Technology Agency launched two big projects: Cooperation on Plant Operation Management and Cooperation on Fuel Channel Integrity.

The Installation and Reactor Safety Company (GRS), of Germany, and the Lithuanian Energy Institute are involved in the cooperative project Analysis of Safety Aspects of the Ignalina NPP, which includes studies of neutron dynamics and thermohydraulics. The Lithuanian Energy Institute and the American Nuclear Society signed a memorandum of cooperation in February 2007, which was prolonged for another five year period in February 2011.

In 2009, the Lithuanian Energy Institute joined the European Technical Support Organization Network (ETSON), with members (at that time) including Bel V (Belgium), ÚJV (Czech Republic), VTT (Finland), IRSN (France) and GRS (Germany). In 2009, members of ETSON decided to create the European Nuclear Safety Training and Tutoring Institute (ENSTTI). Thus, in 2009, two European TSOs (IRSN and the Lithuanian Energy Institute) created ENSTTI. Later, Bel V and GRS joined ENSTTI. The Lithuanian Energy Institute has actively participated in the following international collaborative projects:

Sixth Framework Programme:

Network of Excellence for the Sustainable Integration of European Research on Severe Accident Phenomenology and Management (SARNET) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2004–2008);

• Nuclear Plant LIFE Prediction (NULIFE) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2006–2011).

Seventh Framework Programme:

Treatment and Disposal of Irradiated Graphite and Other Carbonaceous Waste (CARBOWASTE) — Lithuanian Energy Institute, Center for Physical Sciences and Technology (2008–2012);

• REDOX Phenomena Controlling Systems — Center for Physical Sciences and Technology (2008–2012);

• Safety and Efficacy of a New and Emerging Dental X ray Modality (SEDENTEXCT) — Vilnius University (2008–2011);

• Fate of Repository Gases (FORGE) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2009–2013);

• Network of Excellence for the Sustainable Integration of European Research on Severe Accident Phenomenology (SARNET2) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2009–2013);

• MATerials TEsting and Rules (MATTER) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2011–2014);

• Proposal for a harmonized European methodology for the safety assessment of innovative reactors with fast neutron spectrum planned to be built in Europe (SARGEN IV) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2012–2013);

• New MS Linking for Advanced Cohesion in Euratom Research (NEWLANCER) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2011–2013);

• Sustainable Network of Independent Technical Expertise for Radioactive Waste Disposal (SITEX) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2012–2013);

• Code for European Severe Accident Management (CESAM) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2013–2017);

• CArbon-14 Source Term (CAST) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2013–2018);

• Advanced Safety Assessment: Extended PAS (ASAMPSA_E) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2013–2016);

• Building a platform for enhanced social research related to nuclear energy in Central and Eastern Europe (PLATENSO) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2013–2016);

• Nuclear Cogeneration Industrial Initiative — Research and Development Coordination (NC2I-R) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2013–2015);

• Assessment of Regional Capabilities for New Reactor Development through an Integrated Approach (ARCADIA) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2013–2016);

• Preparing NUGENIA for Horizon 2020 (NUGENIA-PLUS) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2013–2016).

Horizon 2020 Programme:

Implementation of activities described in the Road Map to Fusion during Horizon 2020 through a joint programme of the members of the EUROfusion consortium (EUROfusion) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2014–2018);

• Baltic Region Initiative for Long Lasting Innovative Nuclear Technologies (BRILLIANT) — Lithuanian Energy Institute, Center for Physical Sciences and Technology, UAB VAE SPB (2015–2018);

• Sustainable Network for Independent Technical Expertise of Radioactive Waste Disposal — Interactions and Implementation (SITEX-II) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2015–2017);

• Increasing Safety in NPPs by Covering Gaps in Environmental Fatigue Assessment (INCEFA-PLUS) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2015–2020);

• In-Vessel Melt Retention Severe Accident Management Strategy for Existing and Future NPPs (IVMR) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2015–2019);

• FAST Nuclear Emergency Tools (FASTNET) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2015–2019);

• European Joint Programme for the Integration of Radiation Protection Research (CONCERT) — Radiation Protection Centre (2015–2020);

• History of Nuclear Energy and Society (HoNESt) — European Humanities University (2015–2018);

• Bentonite Mechanical Evolution (BEACON) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2017–2021);

• Thermal treatment for radioactive waste minimization and hazard reduction (THERAMIN) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2017–2020);

• Research and development in support of the GEMINI Initiative (GEMINI Plus) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2017–2020);

• Management and Uncertainties of Severe Accidents (MUSA) — Lithuanian Energy Institute, Vytautas Magnus University (2019–2023);

• Reduction of radiological consequences of design basis and design extension accidents (R2CA) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2019–2023);

• Towards European licensing of SMR (ELSMOR) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2019–2023);

• StakeHolder-based Analysis of Research for Decomissioning (SHARE) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2019–2021);

• European Joint Programme on Radioactive Waste Management (EURAD) — Ignalina NPP, Lithuanian Energy Institute, Center for Physical Sciences and Technology (2019–2024).

• INNOvative tools FOR dismantling of GRAPHite moderated nuclear reactors (INNO4GRAPH) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2020–2023);

A number of Lithuanian experts also participate in IAEA training courses as Agency experts.

VATESI, established in 1991, is an independent state institution exercising state regulation and supervision of nuclear safety, physical security, activities involving nuclear materials and other activities in the area of nuclear energy involving sources of ionizing radiation. VATESI acts in accordance with the Law on Nuclear Energy, Law on Nuclear Safety, other laws and the Statute of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate. VATESI reports to the President and the Government.

The main responsibilities of VATESI are the following:

To exercise the functions of state regulation and supervision of nuclear safety; physical security of nuclear facilities, nuclear fuel cycle materials and other nuclear materials; accounting for and control of nuclear materials; radiation protection in nuclear facilities; and oversight of the use of sources of ionizing radiation within nuclear facilities.

• To draft and approve by the order of the head of VATESI the requirements and rules for nuclear safety; physical security of nuclear facilities, nuclear fuel cycle materials and other nuclear materials of the defined quantity; accounting for and control of the nuclear materials; and radiation safety in the area of nuclear energy, mandatory to all the state and municipal authorities and to all persons engaged in nuclear energy related activities.

• To set requirements for physical security of sources of ionizing radiation used in the area of nuclear energy and supervise their implementation.

• To set requirements in the nuclear energy area for obligatory radiation safety training, instruction and evaluation of knowledge of persons responsible for radiation safety, and supervise their implementation.

• To set requirements for certification of persons seeking to obtain the right to train persons responsible for radiation safety and perform the certification.

• To analyse and assess the documents submitted by applicants for obtaining a licence or a permit as well as the documents submitted by licence holders or permit holders or other persons, to adopt relevant decisions regarding such documents, and to review and evaluate nuclear safety.

• To supervise and inspect applicants, licence and permit holders or the persons rendering services, supplying goods or performing work for them or other persons engaged in activities pertaining to nuclear materials and nuclear fuel cycle materials.

• To issue or suspend licences and permits, other authorization decisions, revoke suspension of licences and permits, other authorization decisions, or revoke licences and permits, other authorization decisions; to supervise authorized activities.

• To cooperate with foreign institutions exercising state regulation and supervision in the sector of nuclear energy, within its competence to participate in activities of international organizations and institutions, committees and groups of the European Union.

• Within its competence and in the manner laid down by the legal acts, to prepare and/or submit to the Government the draft laws and legal acts of the Republic of Lithuania on the issues of nuclear safety; physical security of nuclear facilities, nuclear materials and nuclear fuel cycle materials; accounting for and control of nuclear materials; and radiation safety in carrying out nuclear energy related activities involving sources of ionizing radiation.

  To prepare and submit to the Government or its authorized institutions proposals regarding improvements of the system ensuring nuclear safety; physical security of nuclear facilities, nuclear materials and other nuclear fuel cycle materials; accounting for and control of nuclear materials; and radiation safety in the area of nuclear energy.

• In the event of a nuclear and (or) radiological accident, to provide the interested state and municipal authorities with time critical information about the radiation situation in the nuclear installation, estimated threats of the nuclear and (or) radiological accident and other related information.

• To participate in emergency preparedness activities, such as regulation and supervision of on-site emergency preparedness, or notification of international organizations and neighbouring countries in case of a nuclear accident.

• In cooperation with the State Security Department, Ministry of the Interior and Ministry of National Defence, to conduct national threat assessment and develop design basis threat for nuclear material and nuclear facilities.

VATESI is empowered to impose the following administrative enforcement measures:

(i) Pursuant to the Law on Public Administration and Order No. 22.3-106, 24 October 2011, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate On the Approval of Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-1.1.4-2017 Rules of Procedure for Applying the Enforcement Measures Set by the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate, VATESI is empowered to issue an economic entity, individual stated in the Article 8, para. 1 of the Law on Radiation Protection, radiation protection officer or dosimetry service with a mandatory requirement to eliminate insignificant violations of legal acts.

(ii) Pursuant to the Law on Nuclear Safety VATESI is empowered to impose the following administrative enforcement measures:

• Issue a mandatory requirement to licence or permit holders committing them to eliminate detected violations in nuclear safety and physical security, to suspend the work within the time limits set by the Head of VATESI and/or to shut down the nuclear reactor, to decrease its capacity, to discontinue operation of other equipment or activities;

• Impose fines on legal entities according to the Article 47, paras 1 and 2 of the Law on Nuclear Safety (known as economic sanctions);

• Issue the licence or permit holder with a warning regarding the possible license or permit suspension, to suspend the licence or permit, to revoke the license or permit.

(iii) Pursuant to the Law on Radiation Protection VATESI is empowered to impose the following administrative enforcement measures:

• Issue an individual stated in Article 8, para. 1 of the Law on Radiation Protection with a mandatory requirement to eliminate violations of legal acts governing radiation safety and/or physical security of ionizing radiation sources, to issue a warning to suspend activities with ionizing radiation sources, to suspend activities with ionizing radiation sources;

• Issue a warning regarding the possible revocation of activity registration, to revoke activity registration;

• Issue the licence or temporary permit holder a warning regarding the possible licence or temporary permit suspension, to suspend the licence or temporary permit, to revoke the licence or temporary permit;

• Issue person who provides radiation training with a mandatory requirement to eliminate violations of legal acts governing radiation and/or physical protection trainings;

• Issue natural person holding radiation protection attestation certificate a warning about possible suspension of radiation protection attestation certificate, to suspend radiation protection attestation certificate, to revoke radiation protection attestation certificate;

• Issue nuclear facility dosimetry service or other individuals responsible for measurement and/or evaluation of exposure dose a mandatory requirement to eliminate violations of legal acts governing recognition requirements, to issue a warning about possible suspension of recognition certificate, to suspend validity of recognition certificate, to revoke validity of recognition certificate;

• Issue radiation protection expert a warning about possible suspension of validity of radiation protection expert certificate, to suspend validity of radiation protection expert certificate, to revoke validity of radiation protection expert certificate;

• Revoke permission to transport radioactive material or validity of standard document to transport radioactive material.

(iv) Pursuant to the Code of Administrative Offences of the Republic of Lithuania, VATESI is empowered to impose administrative fines and other administrative sanctions on natural persons.

The Law on Nuclear Energy and the Law on Nuclear Safety, together with the regulations made under the laws, establish the authorization system for activities related to nuclear materials or nuclear fuel cycle materials, as well as for nuclear facilities during the following stages: site evaluation, design, construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning as well as release from control. The supervision of closed radioactive waste repositories and the acquisition, keeping, use and transportation of nuclear or nuclear fuel cycle materials is also executed according to the laws mentioned above.

Some of the steps of the authorization process are divided into several substeps. Licences, permits and approvals of the documents are used as separate authorization steps and substeps.

The Law on Nuclear Safety establishes the following types of licences and permits issued by VATESI:

Licence for construction of a nuclear facility (or facilities);

• Licence for operation of a nuclear facility (or facilities);

• Licence for construction and operation of a nuclear facility (or facilities) (an alternative authorization replacing two separate licences for construction and operation);

• Licence for decommissioning of a nuclear facility (or facilities);

• Licence for supervision of a closed radioactive waste repository (or repositories);

• Licence for transportation of nuclear fuel cycle materials, nuclear materials and other fissile materials with the exception of small amounts as described in the Law;

• Licence for acquisition, keeping and use of nuclear materials and other fissile materials with the exception of small amounts as prescribed in the Law;

• Permit for first carry-in of nuclear fuel to the site of a nuclear power plant, unit or non-power nuclear reactor;

• Permit for the first carry-in and testing of the nuclear facility using nuclear and/or nuclear fuel cycle materials (can be issued if a common licence for construction and operation was issued previously);

• Permit for first startup of a unit of a nuclear power plant or non-power nuclear reactor;

• Permit for industrial operation of the nuclear facility;

• Permit for startup of the nuclear reactor after its short term shutdown;

• Permit for shipment of radioactive waste generated in the nuclear fuel cycle;

• Permit for shipment of spent nuclear fuel.

‘Nuclear facility’, ‘nuclear material’, and ‘spent nuclear fuel’ are defined in the Law on Nuclear Energy. Nuclear facility includes the following:

Nuclear power plants;

• Units of nuclear power plants;

• Non-power nuclear reactors;

• Storage facilities for nuclear materials;

• Storage facilities for radioactive waste;

• Radioactive waste processing facilities;

• Radioactive waste disposal facilities.

‘Nuclear material’ covers plutonium, uranium (natural, enriched with isotopes of uranium-235 or uranium-233 or depleted) and thorium found in the form of metal alloys, chemical compounds or concentrates or in a mixture with other materials; ‘spent nuclear fuel’ covers nuclear fuel that was subjected to exposure in the core of a nuclear reactor and was permanently removed from it. Spent nuclear fuel may be reprocessed with the aim of reusing it or managed as radioactive waste and placed in a waste disposal facility.

It also should be mentioned that some activities (hold points) during various stages in the lifetime of a nuclear facility require separate authorizations that are supported by a safety review and assessment:

During the stage of site evaluation of a nuclear facility, VATESI shall review and assess the site evaluation report. In order for the site evaluation report of a nuclear power plant to be approved, positive conclusions with respect to it shall be presented by the following institutions: the Ministry of Health, the Civil Aviation Administration, the Lithuanian Geology Service, the Lithuanian Hydro Meteorological Service and the Fire Prevention and Rescue Department.

• Before the design activities start, the technical specifications for the design have to be approved by VATESI.

• The design of a nuclear facility has to be performed and assessed according to the requirements established by the competent institutions, including VATESI, the Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Health, Ministry of the Interior and other institutions involved, according to the Law on Construction, the Law on Nuclear Energy and the regulations made under the laws.

• Commissioning can be performed according to a commissioning programme. VATESI’s agreement on the commissioning programme is necessary before commissioning starts.

• The legislation obligates the licence holder to conduct a periodic safety analysis. VATESI’s agreement on the periodic safety analysis report is necessary. The Law on Nuclear Safety defines cases when the safety analysis report must be updated, with agreement from VATESI obtained.

• VATESI’s agreement is necessary on documentation of modifications and testing that was not foreseen in the design, or documentation of other divergences from a nuclear facility design, prior to the start of modifications.

• VATESI’s agreement is necessary on physical security plans and plans for radioactive discharges into the environment.

The Law on Nuclear Safety together with the Regulations on the Issuance of Licences and Permits Necessary to Engage in Nuclear Energy Activities, approved by the Government of the Republic of Lithuania, and the Rules on Import, Export, Transit and Transport of Radioactive Material, Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel, approved by a decree of the Minister of Health and head of VATESI, regulate the issuance, amendment and suspension of licences and permits listed in the Law on Nuclear Safety; the maintenance of the list of documents which have to be submitted for issuance of every type of licence and permit or amendment of a licence or permit; and instructions for providing documents which must be provided in order to revoke or suspend a licence or permit. Detailed requirements for safety documents are determined in the respective nuclear safety requirements and rules issued by VATESI. Some requirements for the content of the documents that the applicant is required to provide for the issuance or amendment of an appropriate licence or permit are established by the aforementioned regulation as well.

According to the procedure set in the legislation, the applicant has to submit an application to VATESI to obtain a licence or permit or its amendment.

Together with the application to issue a licence or permit, a schedule of submission of application documents has to be prepared and agreed with VATESI. The Law on Nuclear Safety sets requirements and conditions for acceptance of an application or of a schedule of application documents, as well as time limits for the acceptance of an application and agreement on a schedule.

The Law on Nuclear Safety also determines conditions for refusal of the application for a licence or permit.

VATESI makes decisions on authorizations according to its competence after review and assessment of safety submittals that are required by legal acts. According to VATESI’s internal management system Procedure Document on Review and Assessment of Safety Justifying Documents and Procedure Document for Licensing, specialists of VATESI have to prepare review and assessment reports as well as safety evaluation reports in support of VATESI decisions on the issuance of authorization. According to recent practice, safety evaluation reports are usually available to applicants (licence holders) and their summaries are available to the public on the VATESI web site. The list of the documents under which a licence or permit is issued is also prepared.

The Law on Nuclear Safety sets requirements and conditions and time limits for issuance of licences and permits. Some additional conditions (e.g. necessary authorizations by other national regulatory bodies) are also established by the Law on Nuclear Safety as well as the Law on Nuclear Energy. A licence or permit has to be issued for an unlimited period of time until official decision of the regulatory body in this regard (with an exception for permits to transport radioactive materials or spent nuclear fuel). The permits to transport radioactive materials or spent nuclear fuel are issued for a 3 year period.

The Law on Nuclear Safety also determines the conditions for making decisions not to issue a licence or permit specifying the reasons based on provisions of the law.

Pursuant to the Law on Nuclear Safety, VATESI issues certificates for approval of package design and shipment of radioactive material under conditions specified in the Law on Nuclear Safety.

Following the provisions of the Law on Radiation Protection, VATESI registers activities and issues licences and permits for nuclear energy area activities involving sources of ionizing radiation, which mainly include either a licence or a temporary permit to carry out activities involving ionizing radiation at a nuclear facility and a licence or a temporary permit to store or maintain sources of ionizing radiation at a nuclear facility. VATESI also issues certificates to natural persons seeking to obtain the right to train persons responsible for radiation safety or to perform activities as radiation protection experts.