The Republic of Korea participates in international efforts related to climate change mitigation under the Paris Agreement. The Government of the Republic of Korea has developed a long term low greenhouse gas emission development strategy (LEDS), including a commitment to limit carbon emissions to 536 million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (Mt CO2-eq) in 2030; in 2018, emissions were 709 Mt CO2-eq. The strategy outlines the following five key elements: (1) expanding the use of clean power and hydrogen across all sectors; (2) improving energy efficiency to a significant level; (3) commercial deployment of carbon removal and other future technologies; (4) scaling up the circular economy to improve industrial sustainability; and (5) enhancing carbon sinks.

In the third Energy Master Plan, which presents energy policy directions up to 2040, the Government of the Republic of Korea commits to advancing the country’s energy transition by increasing the share of renewables to 30–35% by 2040 and phasing out coal fired and nuclear power. It is also to significantly improve energy efficiency and foster the country’s nascent hydrogen industry. In December 2020, the Government of the Republic of Korea announced the ninth Basic Plan for Long-term Electricity Supply and Demand in accordance with the 2050 carbon neutral strategy, announced at December 2020, and the third Energy Master Plan. According to the plan, by 2034 the country will almost quadruple the installed capacity of renewable energy sources, such as solar, wind and hydrogen, to 77.8 GW. The share of renewable energy is expected to rise from 6.5% in 2019 to 20.8% in 2030, and that of coal fired power generation is expected to shrink from 40.4% in 2019 to 34.2% in 2030.

Table 1 shows the energy reserves of the Republic of Korea as of the end of 2020.

TABLE 1. ESTIMATED AVAILABLE ENERGY SOURCES

	Fossil fuels			Nuclear	Renewable**
	Solid	Liquid	Gas	Uranium	Hydro	Other renewables
Total amount in specific units*	932	97	2798	—	2.085	80.1

Source: Korea Resources Corporation (www.kores.or.kr), Korea National Oil Corporation (www.knoc.co.kr) and Korea Energy Statistical Information System (www.kesis.net).

* Solid, gas: thousand tonnes; Liquid: million barrels; Hydro, renewable: GW.

** Renewable Capacity Plan, ‘The ninth Basic Plan for Long-term Electricity Supply and Demand (2020–2034)’.

TABLE 2. ENERGY CONSUMPTION

Final Energy consumption [PJ]	2000	2005	2010	2015	2019	Compound annual growth rate 2000–2019 (%)
Total	5 626	6 291	7 179	8 096	8 489	2.19
Coal, Lignate and Peat	614	591	756	876	793	1.36
Oil	3 339	3 329	3 422	3 774	3 940	0.87
Natural gas	455	668	857	857	897	3.64
Bioenergy and Waste	134	228	344	619	728	9.32
Electricity	946	1 286	1 615	1 781	1 890	3.71
Heat	139	190	184	189	240	2.92

*Latest available data, please note that compound annual growth rate may not be representative of actual average growth.

**Total energy derived from primary and secondary generation sources. Figures do not reflect potential heat output that may result from electricity co-generation.

—: data not available.

Source(s): United Nations Statistical Division, OECD/IEA and IAEA RDS-1

The ministry responsible for developing the electricity policy in the Republic of Korea is the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy (MOTIE). MOTIE works in consultation and close cooperation with the Ministry of Strategy and Finance, six generation companies and the Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO). With energy being regarded as a key component of the rapid economic development of the Republic of Korea, the Government has maintained a strong presence in the sector.

MOTIE, either through direct or indirect Government ownership of energy companies, utilities and several energy research institutes, has maintained a high degree of control in all aspects of energy policy development and implementation.

The Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (NSSC) has the overall responsibility for ensuring nuclear safety through regulatory activities. The NSSC is also a policy maker for the nuclear sector.

MOTIE continues to establish the biennial Basic Plan of Long-term Electricity Supply and Demand (also referred to as BPE), which reflects environmental and safety factors in addition to a stable power supply and economic efficiency.

The ninth Basic Plan for Long-term Electricity Supply and Demand, established in late 2020, includes the forecast for power demand over the next 15 years from 2020 to 2034 and plans for power generation facilities.

The latest power generation blueprint projects the peak electricity demand in 2034 to be 102.5 GW, up 2% from the forecast of 100.5 GW made in the eighth edition, which used the same methodology, as the economy is expected to grow at a slower pace than in the past.

The blueprint calls for a further reduction in the expected peak demand by 12.6% through utilizing technologies of the fourth industrial revolution and introducing new regulations that promote better energy efficiency.

The target reserve margin for 2034 is set to 22% — meaning there will be an excess of approximately 22% of peak demand — assuming the installed capacity for that year to be close to 125.1 GW.

Power generation facilities with a combined capacity of 2.9 GW need to be newly added to existing and already planned facilities with a capacity of 122.2 GW. The new generation facilities will consist of liquefied natural gas (LNG) power stations and pumped storage hydroelectric facilities.

Between 2020 and 2034, the installed capacity of renewables would increase to 77.8 GW from the current 20.1 GW, with growth mainly coming from solar and wind power. The total capacity of LNG power plants would expand to 59.1 GW from 41.3 GW and that of coal fired power plants will be reduced to 29.0 GW from 35.8 GW.

Meanwhile, the installed capacity of nuclear power generation would contract to 19.4 GW from 23.3 GW, as four new reactors would enter operation and 11 aging reactors would be taken off-line during the period.

Under the new energy roadmap, natural gas and renewable energy sources will have a greater share in the generation mix in terms of installed capacity. Renewable energy would account for 40.3% of the installed capacity in 2034 — up from 15.8% in 2020. The combined capacity of nuclear reactors and coal fired power plants would represent around a quarter of the mix — down from 46.3%.

The Government also aims to generate 20.8% of electricity from renewable energy sources by 2030. The share of natural gas is expected to be 23.3%, while those of coal and nuclear power would be 29.9% and 25.0%, respectively.

Six power generation companies, independent power producers, and community energy systems currently produce electric power, and KEPCO transports the electric power it purchases from Korea Power Exchange through the transmission and distribution network and then sells it to general customers.

Source: General structure of the Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO, with additional information available at: www.kepco.co.kr).

FIG. 1. Structure of the electric power sector.

TABLE 3. ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION

Electricity production (GWh)	2000	2005	2010	2015	2019	Compound annual growth rate 2000–2019 (%)
Total	290 126	389 344	499 356	552 572	582 126	3.73
Coal, Lignate and Peat	111 395	148 791	219 276	236 586	245 003	4.24
Oil	34 581	25 992	18 935	12 518	9 417	-6.62
Natural gas	29 461	62 154	103 184	122 856	147 379	8.84
Bioenergy and Waste	93	294	1 107	3 150	9 763	27.75
Hydro	5 610	5 189	6 472	5 796	6 247	0.57
Nuclear	108 964	146 779	148 596	164 762	145 910	1.55
Wind	17	130	817	1 342	2 681	30.52
Solar	5	15	772	3 975	13 019	51.28
Geothermal	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	197	1 091	2 233
Tidal	0	0	0	496	474

*Latest available data, please note that compound annual growth rate may not be representative of actual average growth.

**Electricity transmission losses are not deducted.

—: data not available.

Source: United Nations Statistical Division, OECD/IEA and IAEA RDS-1

TABLE 4. ENERGY RELATED RATIOS

	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020
Nuclear/total electricity (%)	40.90	40.25	31.31	31.20	29.01

*Latest available data.

Source: RDS-1 and RDS-2

—: data not available.

The pursuit of peaceful nuclear activities in the Republic of Korea was initiated in 1957 when it became an IAEA Member State. The following year, the Republic of Korea passed the Atomic Energy Law. In 1959, the Office of Atomic Energy was established towards the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

The Republic of Korea has carried out a very ambitious nuclear power programme since the 1970s, in parallel with industrialization policies. It has domestically maintained a strong commitment to nuclear power development as an integral part of its national energy policy, aiming to reduce external vulnerability and insure against global fossil fuel shortages.

The localization process of nuclear power technology in the Republic of Korea has included the design, manufacturing, construction, operation and maintenance, fuel fabrication and the building up of a safety regulatory infrastructure in a relatively short period, over several decades. As part of this trend, a high degree of technological self-reliance in various fields of the nuclear industry has been achieved through the construction of Hanbit (Yonggwang) units 3 and 4. At present, NPP technology and related fuel cycle technologies have reached technological maturity and realization in the markets.

The Republic of Korea currently has 24 operational reactors with a net capacity of 23.25 GW(e), providing 29.0% of the country’s electricity as of the end of 2020. Four reactors with an additional net capacity of 5.6 GW(e) are under construction.

The current Government focuses on the safe operation of NPPs, the decommissioning of nuclear facilities and the safe management of spent fuel under the Energy Transition Policy, which was officially announced in 2017.

Nuclear related activities are planned and carried out by various organizations, such as the Ministry of Science and ICT (MSIT), MOTIE, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and the NSSC.

MSIT has overall responsibility for nuclear research and development (R&D) and nuclear international cooperation affairs.

MOTIE is responsible for the construction, operation and decommissioning of NPPs and for the nuclear fuel supply and the management of radioactive waste, including spent fuel.

MOFA is responsible for nuclear diplomatic activities, including the conclusion of bilateral and multilateral agreement and treaties.

The NSSC is responsible for nuclear safety, security and non-proliferation as a regulatory body.

Source: MSIT

FIG. 2. Main functions of nuclear related organizations in the Republic of Korea.

Currently, a total gross capacity of 23.15 GW(e) is installed across 24 operating NPPs, comprising 21 pressurized water reactors (PWRs) and three CANDU pressurized heavy water reactors (PHWRs). There are four units under construction. Table 5 shows the status of the NPPs as of December 2020.

TABLE 5. STATUS AND PERFORMANCE OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

Reactor Unit	Type	Net Capacity [MW(e)]	Status	Operator	Reactor Supplier	Construction Date	First Criticality Date	First Grid Date	Commercial Date	Shutdown Date	UCF for 2020
HANBIT-1	PWR	995	Operational	KHNP	WH	6/4/1981	1/31/1986	3/5/1986	8/25/1986		99.9
HANBIT-2	PWR	988	Operational	KHNP	WH	12/1/1981	10/15/1986	11/11/1986	6/10/1987		76.1
HANBIT-3	PWR	986	Operational	KHNP	DHICKAEC	12/23/1989	10/13/1994	10/30/1994	3/31/1995		9.0
HANBIT-4	PWR	970	Operational	KHNP	DHICKAEC	5/26/1990	7/7/1995	7/18/1995	1/1/1996		0.0
HANBIT-5	PWR	992	Operational	KHNP	DHICKOPC	6/29/1997	11/24/2001	12/19/2001	5/21/2002		30.8
HANBIT-6	PWR	993	Operational	KHNP	DHICKOPC	11/20/1997	9/1/2002	9/16/2002	12/24/2002		100.0
HANUL-1	PWR	966	Operational	KHNP	FRAM	1/26/1983	2/25/1988	4/7/1988	9/10/1988		78.4
HANUL-2	PWR	967	Operational	KHNP	FRAM	7/5/1983	2/25/1989	4/14/1989	9/30/1989		88.8
HANUL-3	PWR	997	Operational	KHNP	DHICKOPC	7/21/1993	12/21/1997	1/6/1998	8/11/1998		100.0
HANUL-4	PWR	999	Operational	KHNP	DHICKOPC	11/1/1993	12/14/1998	12/28/1998	12/31/1999		85.5
HANUL-5	PWR	998	Operational	KHNP	DHICKOPC	10/1/1999	11/28/2003	12/18/2003	7/29/2004		100.0
HANUL-6	PWR	997	Operational	KHNP	DHICKOPC	9/29/2000	12/16/2004	1/7/2005	4/22/2005		74.8
KORI-2	PWR	640	Operational	KHNP	WH	12/23/1977	4/9/1983	4/22/1983	7/25/1983		37.1
KORI-3	PWR	1011	Operational	KHNP	WH	10/1/1979	1/1/1985	1/22/1985	9/30/1985		87.9
KORI-4	PWR	1012	Operational	KHNP	WH	4/1/1980	10/26/1985	12/31/1985	4/29/1986		91.4
SHIN-KORI-1	PWR	996	Operational	KHNP	DHICKOPC	6/16/2006	7/15/2010	8/4/2010	2/28/2011		99.9
SHIN-KORI-2	PWR	996	Operational	KHNP	DHICKOPC	6/5/2007	12/27/2011	1/28/2012	7/20/2012		100.0
SHIN-KORI-3	PWR	1416	Operational	KHNP	DHICKOPC	10/16/2008	12/29/2015	1/15/2016	12/20/2016		68.8
SHIN-KORI-4	PWR	1418	Operational	KHNP	DHICKOPC	8/19/2009	4/8/2019	4/22/2019	8/29/2019		76.8
SHIN-WOLSONG-1	PWR	997	Operational	KHNP	DHICKOPC	11/20/2007	1/6/2012	1/27/2012	7/31/2012		100.0
SHIN-WOLSONG-2	PWR	993	Operational	KHNP	DHICKOPC	9/23/2008	2/8/2015	2/26/2015	7/24/2015		99.9
WOLSONG-2	PHWR	596	Operational	KHNP	AECL/DHI	9/25/1992	1/29/1997	4/1/1997	7/1/1997		76.6
WOLSONG-3	PHWR	627	Operational	KHNP	AECL/DHI	3/17/1994	2/19/1998	3/25/1998	7/1/1998		68.3
WOLSONG-4	PHWR	600	Operational	KHNP	AECL/DHI	7/22/1994	4/10/1999	5/21/1999	10/1/1999		78.1
SHIN-HANUL-1	PWR	1340	Under Construction	KHNP	DHICKOPC	7/10/2012
SHIN-HANUL-2	PWR	1340	Under Construction	KHNP	DHICKOPC	6/19/2013
SHIN-KORI-5	PWR	1340	Under Construction	KHNP	DHICKOPC	4/1/2017
SHIN-KORI-6	PWR	1340	Under Construction	KHNP	DHICKOPC	9/20/2018
KORI-1	PWR	576	Permanent Shutdown	KHNP	WH	8/1/1972	6/19/1977	6/26/1977	4/29/1978	6/18/2017
WOLSONG-1	PHWR	661	Permanent Shutdown	KHNP	AECL	10/30/1977	11/21/1982	12/31/1982	4/22/1983	12/24/2019

Data source: IAEA - Power Reactor Information System (PRIS).

Note: Table is completely generated from PRIS data to reflect the latest available information and may be more up to date than the text of the report.

*Latest available data.

Source: RDS-2

—: data not available.

2.2.2.1.Plant upgrading and plant life management

Beginning in September 2002, the Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Company (KHNP) conducted power uprating projects for Kori units 3 and 4 to upgrade their reactor thermal power and eventually increase the electrical output. Kori units 3 and 4 reached their new rated thermal power (2900 MW(t), a 4.5% stretch power uprate) in December and February 2009, respectively, and increased their electrical output by 34.1 MW(e) from 999 MW(e) (original output) to 1033.1 MW(e) (uprated output).

After the implementation of power uprating for Kori units 3 and 4, KHNP attempted to conduct other power uprating projects for Hanbit units 1 and 2 and Hanul (Ulchin) units 1 and 2. However, owing to public acceptance considerations, these projects are on hold. To effectively manage major structures, systems and components (SSCs) and to reduce the maintenance costs associated with the operation of NPPs, long term asset management strategies based on equipment reliability processes (INPO AP-913) were developed at KHNP as part of its plant life management efforts.

2.2.2.2. Continued operation (licence renewal)

The definition of continued operation of NPPs is stated in the nuclear law enforcement ordinance; according to this legal statement, it is possible to extend a plant’s operation beyond its design lifetime. The period of continued operation of NPPs is a ten year timeframe according to the current legal framework in the Republic of Korea. It is mandatory for the utility to conduct a periodic safety review (PSR) of its operating NPPs every ten years and to submit PSR reports for regulatory review. An enhanced PSR report, including a lifetime evaluation report (LER) and radiological environment report, should be submitted by the utility to the NSSC in the continued operation application two to five years before the end of the design lifetime. The LER of the continued operation includes ageing management programmes and time limited ageing analyses, identifying the SSCs within the scope of continued operation.

In June 2006, KHNP submitted the safety evaluation report for the continued operation of Kori-1 to the regulatory body of MSIT, and MSIT officially permitted continued operation on 11 December 2007. The safety evaluation report on Wolsong-1 was also submitted in December 2009 and the NSSC permitted continued operation on 27 February 2015.

2.2.3. Permanent shutdown and decommissioning process

KHNP permanently shut down Kori NPP-1, the Republic of Korea’s first NPP, in June 2017 and Wolsong NPP-1 in December 2019.

TABLE 6. STATUS OF DECOMMISIONING PROCESS OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

Reactor unit	Shutdown date	Shutdown reason	Decom. strategy	Decom. phase	Management phase	Decom. licensee
Kori-1	18 Jun. 2017	Termination of continued operation	Dismantling	Planning	Wet storage on-site	KHNP
Wolsong-1	24 Dec. 2019	Economic	Dismantling	Planning	Wet & dry storage on-site	KHNP

According to the ninth Basic Plan of Long-term Electricity Supply and Demand, finalized by MOTIE in December 2020, four APR1400 units will be constructed by 2025. However, the construction of new NPPs and plant lifetime expansion will not be pursued.

TABLE 7. PLANNED NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

Station/project name	Type	Capacity (MW)	Construction start year	Expected commercial year
Shin Hanul-1	PWR	1400	2012	2021
Shin Hanul-2	PWR	1400	2013	2022
Shin Kori-5	PWR	1400	2017	2024
Shin Kori-6	PWR	1400	2018	2025

Note: The construction of Shin-Kori Unit 4 was completed in 2019

APR1400 is a Generation III light water reactor (LWR) with a capacity of 1400 MW(e), evolved from OPR1000. Unlike OPR1000, which has a two-train active safety system, APR1400 has a four-train active safety system, with the aim of achieving higher safety levels than OPR1000. The standard design of APR1400 was domestically certified in May 2002, and Shin Kori units 3 and 4 are the first plants to implement the APR1400 design. Shin Kori units 3 and 4 have been in commercial operation without any issues since December 2016 and July 2019, respectively.

The APR1400 design was certified according to European Utility Requirements (EUR) in November 2017. The EU-APR standard design is the APR1400 design that meets European safety standards. Also, in August 2019 the APR1400 standard design received certification from the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) — the first time for non-US NPP acquisition. As a result, the brand value of the Republic of Korea’s NPPs increased, and KHNP diversified the NPP export market by acquiring both NRC design certification and EUR certification.

In 1985, the Government made the landmark decision to implement a national self-reliance policy and allocated related roles and responsibilities among domestic nuclear organizations to streamline and nationalize the nuclear power industry (see Fig. 3).

FIG. 3. Structure of the nuclear power industry in the Republic of Korea.

Note: Overall project management — Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Company (KHNP); architectural engineering and nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) design — Korea Electric Power Corporation Engineering & Construction Company (KEPCO E&C); nuclear fuel design and fabrication — KEPCO Nuclear Fuel (KEPCO NF); research and development — Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI); NSSS, turbine and generator manufacturing — Doosan Heavy Industries & Construction (DHI); safety regulations — Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety (KINS).

The technological self-reliance strategy has been applied since the construction of Hanbit units 3 and 4, which were constructed by domestic technical staff based on domestic NPP technology, and became the model for the first NPPs built to a Republic of Korea standard. Based on the enhancement of domestic technology in the heavy chemical industry and the technology acquired from participating as subcontractors to foreign companies, the roles were reversed — where domestic companies served as the main contractors, with foreign companies as subcontractors that supported the key technology — thus achieving a higher degree of self-reliance in NPP construction.

KHNP is responsible for overall project management, including the construction and operation of NPPs in the Republic of Korea. KEPCO Engineering & Construction Company (KEPCO E&C) was established in 1975 to foster self-reliance in power technologies, particularly in nuclear power engineering for PWRs, maintaining prime responsibility for architectural engineering. KEPCO Nuclear Fuel (KEPCO NF) was established in November 1982 through a joint investment of KEPCO and the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) to localize nuclear fuel fabrication for PWRs and PHWRs. The NSSC and the Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety (KINS) conduct safety regulatory activities for all nuclear or radiation facilities under construction or in operation at all stages, from siting to decommissioning. Doosan Heavy Industries & Construction has taken part in plant manufacturing through its capacity to supply heavy industrial construction equipment and machinery.

KHNP works to secure a reasonable sales price of electricity and to reduce the cost of production in order to maximize retained earnings, which can be used for future capital expenditure. To acquire additional funding, KHNP mainly issues corporate bonds with diversified maturities to attract national and international investors.

KHNP is also managing financial risks in order to reduce and eliminate related risk to acceptable levels in compliance with policies and procedures.

In order to increase the transmission capability between (Shin) Hanul and the metropolitan area, series and parallel reactive power compensation facilities (FACTS: TCSC, STATCOM) were installed by the end of December 2020 and started operating at the substations near the east coast by KEPCO. There is also a 500 kV HVDC project (East-west connection Project) under development by KEPCO between (Shin) Hanul and the metropolitan area, to the ninth Basic Plan for on Electricity Demand and Supply by MOTIE.

TABLE 8. SELECTED NULEAR POWERT PLANT SITES AND CHARACTERISTICS

Station	Source of cooling water	Operation status	Transport infrastructure	Approval status
Kori-1	Sea water	Permanent shutdown	Wharf Main access road	Operating licence
Kori-2	Sea water	Operational	Wharf Main access road	Operating licence
Kori-3	Sea water	Operational	Wharf Main access road	Operating licence
Kori-4	Sea water	Operational	Wharf Main access road	Operating licence
Shin Kori-1	Sea water	Operational	Wharf Main access road	Operating licence
Shin Kori-2	Sea water	Operational	Wharf Main access road	Operating licence
Shin Kori-3	Sea water	Operational	Wharf Main access road	Operating licence
Shin Kori-4	Sea water	Operational	Wharf Main access road	Operating licence
Shin Kori-5	Sea water	Under construction	Wharf Main access road	Construction permit
Shin Kori-6	Sea water	Under construction	Wharf Main access road	Construction permit
Hanbit-1 (Yonggwang-1)	Sea water	Operational	Wharf Main access road	Operating licence
Hanbit-2 (Yonggwang-2)	Sea water	Operational	Wharf Main access road	Operating licence
Hanbit-3 (Yonggwang-3)	Sea water	Operational	Wharf Main access road	Operating licence
Hanbit-4 (Yonggwang-4)	Sea water	Operational	Wharf Main access road	Operating licence
Hanbit-5 (Yonggwang-5)	Sea water	Operational	Wharf Main access road	Operating licence
Hanbit-6 (Yonggwang-6)	Sea water	Operational	Wharf Main access road	Operating licence
Wolsong-1	Sea water	Permanent shutdown	Wharf Main access road	Operating licence
Wolsong-2	Sea water	Operational	Wharf Main access road	Operating licence
Wolsong-3	Sea water	Operational	Wharf Main access road	Operating licence
Wolsong-4	Sea water	Operational	Wharf Main access road	Operating licence
Shin Wolsong-1	Sea water	Operational	Main access road	Operating licence
Shin Wolsong-2	Sea water	Operational	Main access road	Operating licence
Hanul-1 (Ulchin-1)	Sea water	Operational	Wharf Main access road	Operating licence
Hanul-2 (Ulchin-2)	Sea water	Operational	Wharf Main access road	Operating licence
Hanul-3 (Ulchin-3)	Sea water	Operational	Wharf Main access road	Operating licence
Hanul-4 (Ulchin-4)	Sea water	Operational	Wharf Main access road	Operating licence
Hanul-5 (Ulchin-5)	Sea water	Operational	Wharf Main access road	Operating licence
Hanul-6 (Ulchin-6)	Sea water	Operational	Wharf Main access road	Operating licence
Shin Hanul-1 (Shin Ulchin-1)	Sea water	Under construction	Main access road	Construction permit
Shin Hanul-2 (Shin Ulchin-2)	Sea water	Under construction	Main access road	Construction permit

In order to enhance local acceptance, KHNP puts the utmost effort into supporting local businesses, conflict management and social contribution activities. Every year, a survey is carried out among local residents in the areas around NPPs to gauge the following: contribution to the local economy, resident satisfaction regarding local cooperation and improvement of living environment, support of nuclear power use, and confidence in safety measures and information release.

MSIT is responsible for the formulation and implementation of policies on nuclear R&D, human resource development (HRD) and international cooperation, including nuclear energy promotion and radiation technology development.

Agencies related to nuclear R&D under MSIT are KAERI and the Korea Institute of Radiological and Medical Sciences (KIRAMS). KAERI carries out a wide range of nuclear R&D activities in areas such as nuclear reactors, nuclear fuel cycle, radioactive waste management, nuclear safety, radiation and radioisotope applications, and basic and applied research. KIRAMS focuses its research efforts on the medical utilization of radiation and radioisotopes for radiation treatments, nuclear medicine, radiological science, medical engineering and bioengineering technology.

In 1997, the Government of the Republic of Korea established the Comprehensive Nuclear Energy Promotion Plan (CNEPP), which includes the national policy on nuclear energy utilization, promotion and related sectoral tasks, according to the Nuclear Energy Promotion Act. As part of the CNEPP, a national nuclear R&D plan is formulated every five years (since 1997) to account for major changes in R&D and to summarize other technological progress. The national nuclear R&D plan from 2017 to 2021 was established in 2016 with the vision of advancing nuclear technology development and reassuring the public, in addition to enhancing nuclear safety and complete core technology. The plan focuses on five research fields: (i) nuclear safety; (ii) radioactive waste management; (iii) advanced reactors and fuel; (iv) application of radiation and radioisotopes; and (v) fundamental technologies. A technology innovation project for operating NPPs is also in development for the nuclear industry.

Under the Energy Transition Policy established in 2017, the relative proportion of nuclear power is to be gradually scaled down and the use of renewable energy expanded in the long term. At the end of 2017, MSIT established the Future Nuclear Technology Development Strategy to support the R&D part of the Energy Transition Policy and expand the socioeconomic application of nuclear technology capability. Five specific R&D strategies were suggested for its successful achievement: (i) secure plant safety and decommissioning technology; (ii) expand the use of nuclear and radiation technology; (iii) promote overseas exports; (iv) secure new energy sources such as fusion energy; and (v) commercialize nuclear technology.

As part of the follow-up measures of this strategy, MSIT set up a plan to strengthen future nuclear safety capabilities at the end of 2018. The plan promotes three development strategies: maximization of the safe operation of NPPs for the next 60 years; expanded utilization of safety based technology capabilities; and securing and disseminating innovative nuclear safety technologies.

At the end of 2019, MSIT announced the Future Radiation Industry Creation Strategy in line with the Future Nuclear Technology Development Strategy. It is designed to create new industries and markets in the radiation field. Its main tasks include providing intensive support to promising radiation technologies, technology development for safety enhancement, the establishment of a self-sufficiency system for isotopes and the industrialization of exports.

In December 2020, as a follow-up to the 5th CNEPP, the Government presented the next four policy directions and future tasks of the 6th CNEPP (2022–2026): (i) maximize the safety of operating NPPs for long-term operation and lay the foundation for safe spent fuel management; (ii) expand nuclear exports and pioneer new emerging markets by strengthening domestic industrial capabilities and promoting technological innovation; (iii) actively promote convergence with other fields and new technologies, expand challenging basic and fundamental research and maximize the use of large scale nuclear research facilities; and (iv) strengthen public participation and communication, and continue efforts to enhance the nation’s status through international cooperation.

In addition, the government has devised three step by step strategies to respond to changes in the global nuclear power market by utilizing its accumulated nuclear reactor technology development capabilities: (i) construction of the first SMART NPP and creation of the initial small modular reactor (SMR) market through international cooperation; (ii) development of the Republic of Korea’s unique i-SMR (innovative small modular reactor), which can have a competitive advantage in the global market in the 2030s; (iii) preemptively securing non-LWR type SMR technology and promoting challenging basic nuclear research in preparation for the diversification of the SMR market, which is expanding from the power generation market to the non-power generation market.

The Republic of Korea has signed nuclear cooperative agreements with 29 countries, holding joint standing committees with the United States of America, France, the Russian Federation, China, India and Saudi Arabia on a regular basis, annually or once every two years. The two main purposes of bilateral cooperation are the advancement of nuclear technology by securing specific technologies and facilitating a foundation for overseas promotion by expanding technical exchanges on a long term basis. The main cooperative areas are nuclear R&D, safety, safeguards and emergency preparedness. Table 9 shows the current status of the joint standing committees with six countries.

TABLE 9. JOINT STANDING COMMITTEES

Country	Joint standing committee	Time and place
France	24th Republic of Korea–France Joint Coordinating Committee on Nuclear Energy	25 Nov. 2020 (Video conference)
United Arab Emirates	3rd Republic of Korea–United Arab Emirates High-Level Consultation on Nuclear Cooperation	19 Nov. 2020 (Video conference)
China	14th Meeting of Republic of Korea–China Joint Committee on Nuclear Energy	9–10 Dec. 2019 Seoul
Russian Federation	19th Joint Coordinating Committee on Atomic Energy Cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Korea	3–4 Jun. 2019 Seoul
Saudi Arabia	3rd Republic of Korea–Saudi Arabia Joint Nuclear Committee	13–14 May 2019 Riyadh
United States of America	37th Meeting of Republic of Korea–United States of America Joint Standing Committee on Nuclear Energy Cooperation	5–7 Dec. 2018 Seoul

On a multilateral level, the Republic of Korea actively participates in international cooperation with the IAEA, the Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD/NEA) and other international cooperative frameworks, including the Generation IV International Forum (GIF) and the International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation (IFNEC).

The Republic of Korea has been a donor state for the IAEA’s technical cooperation programme since 2010. As a longstanding contributor to a regional cooperative agreement (RCA), the Republic of Korea plays a pivotal role in the field of nuclear medicine and radiotherapy. It supports IAEA activities in nuclear applications, such as financial contributions to ReNuAL+ and the operation of IAEA Collaborating Centres (the Advanced Radiation Technology Institute (part of KAERI) and KINS). In relation to IAEA activities in nuclear technology and applications, the Republic of Korea has contributed to IAEA’s response to COVID-19 by offering financial support and sharing knowledge pertaining to successful quarantine, including diagnostic technology and systems. The Republic of Korea also serves as a reliable member in numerous IAEA advisory groups and technical working groups.

The Republic of Korea has been an active member of OECD/NEA activities since 1993. The range of participation varies from contributing to joint research activities to joining international discussions within the framework of OECD/NEA. As of 2021, the Republic of Korea participates in 24 of the 26 joint research projects; one of these is the ATLAS project, led by the Republic of Korea, aiming to provide experimental data for resolving key LWR thermohydraulic safety issues following the Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident. Maintaining its role on OECD/NEA’s Steering Committee and in key positions of Standing Technical Committees, the Republic of Korea actively engages in joint projects to deal with emerging cross-cutting issues such as the decommissioning of nuclear facilities, radioactive waste management and knowledge management.

The Republic of Korea has also participated in GIF since its first meeting in 2000. Since 2006, the Republic of Korea has carried out joint research on next generation nuclear energy systems such as sodium cooled fast reactors and very high temperature reactors. In 2019, the representative of the Republic of Korea was appointed as a vice chair, to promote R&D collaboration among the GIF members and observer organizations. More than 30 remarkable experts and engineers are participating in various projects and cooperating in international joint research programmes.

Since 2010, the Republic of Korea has also contributed to IFNEC activities, exploring multilateral approaches for promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy. It has shared its experience in the development of nuclear technology systems and their applications with diverse members at every subgroup meeting within the framework, including the Infrastructure Development Working Group (IDWG), the Reliable Nuclear Fuel Services Working Group (RNFSWG) and the Nuclear Supplier and Customer Countries Engagement Group (NSCCEG).

2.10.1.1. On-line

Social media platforms are frequently used for direct, two way communication. Energy related information, including nuclear issues, is delivered in various formats, such as through news outlets, infographics, webtoons and video clips. For example, with the purpose of active public communication and transparent information sharing regarding NPP safety, the following approaches have been pursued: the establishment of an NPP information reliability centre, the operation of public voice bulletin boards, and system building for a social network service (SNS) alarm service with major NPP news. Many other programmes are ongoing.

Especially since 2011, KHNP’s official SNS accounts actively engage with the public through multiple outlets such as YouTube, Facebook, Instagram and blog posts, including active communication with the younger generations.

2.10.1.2. Off-line

Publicity actions on nuclear power safety are continuously emphasized throughout available corporate information and exhibition centres at NPPs and at the KHNP headquarters. Also, the official communication channel operates sensitive environmental detection facilities and local committees to maintain active trust building among local communities and across different NPP sites.

Activities regarding radiological emergency preparedness are based on the Act on Physical Protection and Radiological Emergency (APPRE), which stipulates a system for the management of radiological emergencies, as well as the Framework Act on Civil Defense and the Basic Act of Disasters and Safety Control, which stipulates a system of national response capabilities against disasters of various types. The APPRE, legislated in May 2003 and put into force in February of 2004, stipulates overall radiological emergency management affairs, including the prevention of, preparedness for, and response to radiological emergencies, radiological emergency medical treatment, and international cooperation.

Pursuant to the APPRE, the NSSC formulates the National Radiological Emergency Plan every five years, linked with the Basic Plan for National Safety Management established based on the Basic Act of Disasters and Safety Control. Each year, the NSSC prepares the National Radiological Preparedness Plan, which is an annual implementation plan for five year intervals based on the National Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plan. Local governments with relevant jurisdiction establish and implement a regional radioactive disaster prevention plan every year in accordance with the National Radiation Disaster Prevention Plan and the National Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plan. The nuclear licensee formulates a radiological emergency plan and obtains approval from the NSSC before using nuclear facilities.

APPRE defines nuclear facilities as follows:

• Nuclear power reactors;

• Nuclear reactors for research;

• Nuclear fuel cycling facilities;

• Storage/processing/disposal facilities for radioactive waste;

• Utilization facilities for nuclear material;

• Other facilities related to the use of nuclear energy and those obtaining a construction permit and operating license for nuclear facilities as a nuclear licensee.

Hence, nuclear licensees, such as operators of NPPs and facilities related to spent fuel and radioactive waste, are required to perform emergency response activities in case of a radiation emergency or a disaster in accordance with the radiological emergency plan and the rules and requirements mentioned above.

The NSSC carries out an inspection on the licensee’s duties, facilities and equipment to respond to potential radiological disasters, radiological emergency education and radiological emergency exercise per the NSSC Notice ‘Regulation on Inspection for Radiological Emergency of Nuclear Licensee’.

In order to carry out effective resident protective measures based on their distance from nuclear installations, the APPRE was revised in May 2014 to divide the radiation emergency planning zone (EPZ) into a precautionary action zone (PAZ) and an urgent action planning zone (UPZ), based on IAEA safety standards. With the power reactor and related facilities as the centre, the PAZ has a radius of 3–5 km and the UPZ a radius of 20–30 km. Subordinate statutes were also revised to set the EPZ, taking regional characteristics such as roads and topography into consideration.

In June 2018, the NSSC revised the APPRE in order to establish and operate a radiological impact assessment information system to be used should a radiological disaster occur. The revised APPRE stipulates that KINS is responsible for the collection, analysis, and management of meteorological, socio-geographic, and nuclear power installation status information as well as environmental radiation monitoring and radiological analysis results.

2.11.2.1. Radiological emergency response regime

2.11.2.2. Protective measures

The operator of nuclear installations shall periodically conduct repeated training and exercises for emergency personnel to qualify them by providing thorough knowledge of their emergency duties. The International Nuclear Safety School of KINS, the Nuclear Training Center of KAERI and the Human Resource Development Institute of KHNP operate training courses on emergency preparedness for personnel who may be involved in an emergency response.

According to the APPRE, radiological emergency training is comprehensively managed at a national level. In that sense, KINS has conducted regulatory inspections of radiological emergency training programmes in radiological emergency educational institutes. To support the implementation of comprehensive and systematic radiological emergency training, the NSSC Notice on Education for Radiological Emergency Preparedness specifies the designation and notification of radiological emergency staff, the establishment of training programmes and methods, and other necessary details.

After the expansion of the EPZ in May 2014 in accordance with the revised APPRE, the NSSC put forward its follow-up measures by revising the Enforcement Decree in November 2014, in which joint exercises of radiological preparedness organized by local governments take place at NPP sites once every two years instead of once every four years, and intensive exercises focusing on resident protection are to be introduced. In addition, emergency preparedness exercises were further strengthened by initiating a massive combined exercise with central government participation once a year instead of once every five years. Emergency exercises, in which on-site and off-site emergency preparedness organizations must participate, are conducted as follows:

1. Unified exercises, in which the emergency organizations of nuclear installations, off-site emergency organizations, as well as central and local governments participate; these are held under the supervision of the NSSC on a national level once every year according to the emergency preparedness training plan schedule.

2. Integrated emergency exercises, in which all on-site and off-site emergency organizations of the licensee (commercial and research reactor) participate, are held at the nuclear installation site once every two years, led by local governments.

3. On-site emergency exercises, in which all emergency units in nuclear power stations of two units participate, are held every year.

4. Drills, in which each emergency unit in a nuclear installation participate, are held every quarter.

5. For newly constructed nuclear installations, on-site emergency exercises are held to demonstrate emergency response abilities before the rated thermal output reaches 5%. Integrated emergency exercises are carried out for nuclear power installations constructed at a new site.

The promotion and regulation of nuclear energy in the Republic of Korea were originally managed by a single government agency (the former Ministry of Education, Science and Technology). However, in an effort to enhance regulatory independence and fairness, the Government decided to separate the regulatory responsibilities from the previous nuclear energy administrative system. As a result, the NSSC was established as an independent administrative organization in 2011 in order to take over responsibility for comprehensive nuclear safety regulations aimed at protecting the public and the environment from nuclear and radioactive threats.

After being established under the President of the Republic of Korea pursuant to the Act on the Establishment and Operation of the NSSC in 2011, the NSSC was moved to the Prime Minister’s Office following a cabinet reshuffle in 2014. The NSSC independently regulates overall nuclear safety as a government body and cooperates with ministries such as MSIT, MOTIE, the Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport.

Under the regulatory framework of nuclear safety, in accordance with the Act on Establishment and Operation of the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission, the NSSC has the responsibility and handles regulatory and administrative activities for nuclear safety, including the utilization of reactors and related facilities, fuel cycle facilities, radioactive waste disposal facilities, nuclear materials, and radioactive isotopes and radiation generators. The NSA stipulates that the NSSC has the full authority and sole responsibility when it comes to safety regulation for nuclear installations.

In addition, for effective nuclear safety regulation on technical areas, KINS, KINAC and the Korea Foundation of Nuclear Safety (KoFONS) provide the NSSC with expertise and technical support on the topics of nuclear safety, security and non-proliferation.