

**Statement by the Director-General,
State Atomic Energy Corporation "Rosatom", S.V.Kirienko
The IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety
Vienna, 20 June, 2011**

Mr. President, distinguished delegates,

1. We have gathered here today to seek a joint response to the accident at the Fukushima 1 NPP. We regard this conference as extremely up-to-date. Russia supported this initiative of the IAEA DG from the very beginning.

2. Russia expresses its solidarity with the people of Japan. In my view the pronounced solidarity of the global community is vitally important and it is crucial to keep it in our future work to address the lessons of Fukushima.

3. Obviously it is up to countries to take decisions on the development of national nuclear energy programs.

The Russian leadership has a very firm position in this regard. We will continue to develop nuclear energy, apparently taking into account the Fukushima lessons.

Nuclear energy sector remains to be one of the most innovative and hi-tech sectors.

Disasters cannot and must not impede technological progress. However, lessons need to be learned.

We have to start working together on the enhancement of the entire system of nuclear safety.

Russia is willing to participate in these activities in most responsible and determined way. We have made our mind about the priority of safety in nuclear energy long time ago and we are firm in our position. It is the basis on which we cooperate with other countries.

In this regard I would like to highlight a number of key priorities.

4. In short term we have to make sure that the existing nuclear energy is safe, which means that additional safety assessment of for operational NPPs under extreme impacts is required.

Russia has conducted stress-tests at all its NPPs taking into account the Fukushima lessons.

In mid-April we conducted corporate partners' review of the World Operators Association of NPPs. Nine foreign experts took part in the review, including an expert from the IAEA. Moreover, we held enquiries with public participation.

Now we propose to all interested countries and relevant international organizations to jointly update and reconcile the methodology and criteria of stress-tests. We propose to

conduct them randomly on cross-check basis and exchange results with a view to assure further trust.

We also believe that it is important to increase the efficiency of interface between the WAO and the IAEA, including exchange of best practices related to conduct of missions and inspections. The IAEA needs to enhance its role in the exchange of expertise associated with safe operation and in collaboration with industries and international institutions.

5. Mid-term - **two major activities.**

Firstly, it is essential to move to the construction of advanced NPPs with the use of a combination of active and passive safety systems.

Such designs exist. They are so-called generation 3+ NPPs. Russia has them, so do other countries. Domestically we are constructing 4 such power units and licenses are already issued for a siting of a number of NPP units, the Baltic NPP among them.

The Russian Generation 3+ designs incorporate significant safety-related improvements. In particular, these are corium catcher and coolant, pressure drop system in the first coolant circuit and double containment.

Secondly, it is necessary to update the international legal basis.

The existing international legal basis was established in late eighties upon the results of the Chernobyl lessons assessment and provided for 25 years without grave accidents at nuclear sites.

The Japan disaster demonstrated that significant improvements are required.

The IAEA DG Mr. Amano has come up with a number of proposals. We shall review them thoroughly. They are in line with the initiative of the President of the Russian Federation Mr. Medvedev put forward on 26 April, 2011.

To be more specific, we are proposing the following.

We propose to make amendments to the Convention on Nuclear Safety. It is important to provide for:

- regulations for coordination and interface between states, operators and regulators aimed at the management of accidents and their consequences;
- responsibility of countries, using nuclear power, to assure the level of nuclear safety not less than that provided for by the IAEA standards;
- establishment of proper infrastructure in countries beginning to deploy nuclear power in accordance with the IAEA recommendations and with assistance of the nuclear unit supplying country.

These proposals are based on our extensive expertise in this area. Russia is willing to continue to render consulting assistance in the establishment and strengthening of nuclear power infrastructure to countries that are planning to or building Russian-design nuclear facilities. **Such assistance involves set up of licensing system and safety regulation, development of legal basis, training of specialists taking into account national needs, operation of new NPPs and assured nuclear fuel cycle services, including uranium enrichment.**

Furthermore, we propose to amend the Convention on early notification of a nuclear accident adding provisions on specifics of accident information content and its importance based on INES scale, as well as dates of notification.

And finally, we propose to upgrade the existing IAEA safety standards system. In the first place it is essential to conduct a comprehensive assessment of norms and regulations in terms of introducing amendments or developing new requirements.

Upon the instruction of the President of the Russian Federation we formally provide proposals on the amendments to the Convention on Nuclear Safety and **the Convention on early notification of a nuclear accident** to the IAEA DG as depository of these conventions.

We also present our proposals related to the improvement of the IAEA safety standards system.

And we are looking forward to your support.

6. In long-term perspective it is impossible to assure nuclear safety by enhancing norms and regulations only.

We have to establish a new technological platform - develop innovative technology based on "natural safety".

Such technology needs to comply with sustainable development and non-proliferation requirements. But most of all it needs to assure nuclear safety. We must exclude all probabilities of severe accidents, loss of coolant, steam and hydrogen explosions that lead to fuel damage and huge radioactive emissions, regardless of reasons - human errors, failure and damage of equipment and safety barriers. Meaning that the reactor and fuel should ensure safety without deployment of bulky equipment and automated safety systems at the NPPs.

We are talking about collaboration in the development of closed nuclear fuel cycle technology, to be more specific - fast neutron reactors (BN).

Last year - the year of the 10th anniversary of the IAEA project INPRO on innovative nuclear reactors and fuel cycles Russia proposed to start an International Program on Multilateral Cooperation in the field of fast reactors. The multifunctional fast research reactor that we are developing in Russia could become one of the experimental facilities.

7. I would like to conclude by noting that we have to concentrate on the results. We have a joint platform - the Declaration of the Deauville Summit and documents of the Paris workshop and today's conference in Vienna.

What we need to do now is develop an action plan related to the implementation of the platform and approve it at the 55th Assembly of the IAEA General Conference in September, and get to work without delay.

Thank you for your attention.