

Credible Assurance to the International Community

Special Symposium for the IAEA 50th Anniversary
Global Challenges for the Future of Nuclear Energy and the IAEA
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Jill N. Cooley
Director, Division of Concepts and Planning
Department of Safeguards



Atoms for Peace: The First Half Century
1957-2007


IAEA Safeguards

- **Purpose** - To provide assurance about the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear material and facilities
- **Objectives** - Timely detection of diversion and deterrence through risk of early detection
- **Task** - To verify correctness and completeness of declarations made by States


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Nuclear Fuel Cycle



Nuclear Fuel Cycle



Nuclear Material Accountancy



Inspectors counting and identifying fresh fuel at a power reactor




Verification of UF₆ cylinders

Containment and Surveillance




Surveillance cameras being serviced




Sealing of a spent fuel rack


Strengthening the Safeguards System



New Legal Authority



New Legal Authority




Advanced Technologies




Environmental Sampling


Remote Monitoring



Satellite Imagery



Broader Information Sources



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State Level Approach to Safeguards

- Use of all information about a State's nuclear programme to plan, implement and evaluate safeguards activities in a State ("information driven").
- A comprehensive State evaluation, conducted to provide as complete a picture as possible of a State's nuclear programme, used as basis for drawing safeguards conclusions.
- For a State with a comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) and an additional protocol (AP) in force, the objective is to draw the broader safeguards conclusion.
- With a broader conclusion, it is possible to optimize safeguards implementation under CSAs and APs – *Integrated Safeguards*.

Challenges to Safeguards Implementation

- Implementing additional protocols in more States
- Drawing the broader safeguards conclusion and moving to integrated safeguards
- Safeguarding complicated and different types of facilities

Major Safeguards Implementation Efforts

- Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant
- JMOX Project
- Chernobyl
- Enrichment plants in U.S. and France
- India
- DPRK

Development of New Approaches

Decommissioning




Fig. 13: First segment of RPV closure head onto its temporary position on the barge



Geological Repository

Pebble bed reactors



Further Strengthening of Safeguards

- Conclusion and full implementation of existing safeguards instruments
 - All NNWS NPT parties to conclude CSAs
 - States to fulfill all legal obligations under safeguards agreements and APs
 - All States to conclude APs
- Expanding technical capabilities (expanding the NWAL; broadening satellite imagery; use of novel technologies)
- Broader information



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Some Implementation Statistics for 2005

- Number of facilities under safeguards 925
(in 72 States)
- Nuclear material under safeguards 140 000
SQs (90 t Pu; 845 t Pu in spent fuel; 30 t HEU; 57 t LEU)
- Number of Inspections 2 150
- Number of complementary accesses 160
- Metal seals (detached and verified) 17 500
- Other seals (verified in situ) 9 700
- Nuclear material samples 800
- Environmental samples 800

Regular Budget: \$109 M; Extrabudgetary: \$13M



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