

International Conference on Nuclear Security
Global Directions for the Future
London 16-18 March 2005

Findings of the President of the Conference

The Conference recognised that prevention of the malicious use of nuclear and other radioactive material and the sabotage of nuclear installations has been a feature of the programmes of the IAEA, States and international organizations for several years. These activities were expanded somewhat in the mid-1990s as a result of a number of illicit trafficking incidents, but the terrorist attacks in 2001 in the USA were a wake-up call that alerted the international community to the need to significantly enhance the protection of nuclear and other radioactive material from coming into the hands of criminals or terrorists and being used in malicious acts. Subsequent events in Spain, Indonesia and the Russian Federation have shown that the threat has not diminished since 2001. The international community has reacted strongly and taken several initiatives aimed at preventing nuclear or other radioactive material from falling into the hands of criminals and terrorists. These initiatives include:

- The IAEA Nuclear Security Plan of Activities
- UN Resolution 1373
- UN Resolution 1540
- Strengthening the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM)
- Code of Conduct for the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources (Code of Conduct)
- G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction
- EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
- Global Threat Reduction Initiative

The International Conference on Nuclear Security¹: *Global Directions for the Future* was convened by the IAEA in cooperation with the European Commission, the European Police Office, the International Criminal Police Organization, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the World Customs Organization and hosted by the Government of the United Kingdom. The Conference considered the threat of malicious acts involving nuclear and other radioactive material; the experiences, achievements and shortcomings of national and international efforts to strengthen the prevention of, detection of and response to malicious acts involving these materials; and the ways and means to achieve future improvements.

Facing the challenges

The Conference noted that nuclear terrorism is one of the greatest threats to society. The threats remain the same in nature as they were three years ago; however, the international community and individual States have made important progress in their level of preparedness in preventing, detecting and responding to these threats. The threats involve criminals or terrorists acquiring and using for malicious purposes (a) nuclear explosive devices, (b) nuclear material to build an improvised nuclear explosive device, (c) radioactive material to construct a radiological dispersal device (RDD), and/or (d) the dispersal of radioactivity through sabotage of installations in which nuclear and other radioactive material can be found or of such material in transport. The periodic reports of illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive material, as

¹ Nuclear Security: The prevention and detection of and response to, theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, illegal transfer or other malicious acts involving nuclear material, other radioactive substances or their associated facilities.

well as reports that terrorist organizations have shown interest in obtaining this material, make clear that there is no room for complacency. The political and economic consequences, as well as the health impacts, of a successful malicious use of radioactive material could be devastating. There is a distinct belief that the response to date is not commensurate with the potential consequences from these threats.

In facing these challenges, the Conference recognised that the international community must continue to work to identify specific threats; share and make the best use of the information available about illicit nuclear trafficking and other nuclear security related events; strengthen prevention against such acts; raise the level of awareness of the need for nuclear security among senior officials; and maintain the confidentiality of the sensitive information involved. The relationships and synergies between security, safety and safeguards should be recognized and taken into account in the development of nuclear security programmes.

Enhancing the global nuclear security framework

The Conference noted that instruments that underpin the international nuclear security framework include the CPPNM, the Code of Conduct, other relevant conventions, and safeguards agreements and additional protocols that IAEA Member States conclude with the Agency.

High priority should be given to expeditiously strengthening the CPPNM, which will be discussed at a diplomatic conference to be convened in July 2005. The strengthening of the CPPNM represents a significant step forward for nuclear security. An amended CPPNM can guide the enhancement and updating of the IAEA's existing programmes of assistance to States in the area of nuclear security and in the development of new initiatives. The Conference recognized that consideration should be given to revising INFCIRC/225/Rev. 4 following the conclusion of the CPPNM diplomatic conference. More than 70 States have declared their intention to implement the Code of Conduct. Further discussion of policy and technical issues of relevance for the Code will be held in Bordeaux in June 2005.

Continued and enhanced efforts are needed to provide for the full and effective implementation of the CPPNM and Code of Conduct, facilitated by the establishment of IAEA nuclear security guidelines and recommendations.

Strengthening nuclear security in states

The conference recognised that while the responsibility for nuclear security rests uniquely with each State, it is of global concern and that international support and cooperation can assist States in their efforts. Through programmes implemented by individual States and by the IAEA, awareness of the measures needed to address nuclear security for all activities involving nuclear or radioactive material has grown significantly over the past three years. In many States steps have been taken towards improving regulatory infrastructure. The physical protection and accountability within many States have been improved. Some States and regions have also begun to establish a second line of defence based on radiation detection at border crossings, as well as to prepare measures for responding to a criminal act or terrorism. These efforts must continue and be strengthened globally.

Priorities for strengthening nuclear security

Priorities for strengthening nuclear security include: continued efforts to enhance the prevention of terrorist acts; and, the physical protection and accountability of nuclear and other radioactive material, in nuclear and non-nuclear use, storage and transport, throughout the life cycle, in a comprehensive and coherent manner. A graded approach to security should continue to be used under which more stringent controls are applied for material or activities that pose the

highest risk; for example, particular attention should be given to high enriched uranium or plutonium. The work towards developing effective approaches, methodologies and equipment for prevention, detection and response must continue. Each of these aspects has an important contribution to play in developing an effective national nuclear security programme.

Sustainability and nuclear security culture

The fundamental principles of nuclear security include embedding a nuclear security culture throughout the organizations involved. By the coherent implementation of a nuclear security culture, staff remain vigilant of the need to maintain a high level of security. While the concept of a security culture is similar to safety culture, it is recognized that there are substantive differences in the assumptions and principles, which underpin security culture. An effort should be made to assure that the two cultures complement rather than conflict with one another

The long-term sustainability of nuclear security efforts is a primary concern. The investments made in States, through their own efforts and through assistance programmes, must be sustained in order to continue to upgrade or maintain an adequate level of security. While the level of threat may change from time to time, an effective level of nuclear security must be appropriately maintained.

Improving regional and international coordination and cooperation

The Conference recognises that there must be coordination and cooperation at the global, regional and bilateral levels. There is a recognized need to strengthen the coordination of the nuclear security work performed by bilateral cooperation programmes, regional partnerships and the IAEA and other international organizations. Limited resources are available, and coordination is needed to optimize the use of resources. Nuclear security is a matter of global concern; the work should include all countries in all regions, as appropriate and promote sharing of experience and lessons learned. The broader challenges for the international community require new approaches and alliances between nuclear authorities, law enforcement and intelligence authorities and the scientific community.

Role of the IAEA in underpinning the global efforts

The Conference recognised that the IAEA has a leading role in the global efforts to improve the global nuclear security framework and for promoting its implementation. The IAEA should continue and strengthen its services in nuclear security, including flexible and modular international advisory service missions, expert advice, training and, on a prioritized basis, the provision of equipment. A focus should be to enhance the sustainability of nuclear security programmes in Member States.

The conference recognized the value in developing a systematic and structured approach to establishing effective nuclear security in each country. It requested the IAEA to work towards the development of a series of documents outlining and supporting the elements of this system as a matter of importance.

The Conference urged the IAEA to continue its efforts to:

- Support full implementation of the CPPNM and the Code of Conduct.
- Establish a comprehensive set of nuclear security guidelines and recommendations.
- Help States improve their regulatory and technical nuclear security systems.
- Coordinate its efforts with those of other bilateral or multilateral assistance programmes. Integrated nuclear security support plans can be used to ensure this coordination.

- Advise Member States on the importance of becoming party to international instruments relevant to combating nuclear terrorism, and to help States as needed in their efforts in that direction.
- Promote research and development on more effective nuclear security approaches and techniques.
- Promote the enhanced exchange of nuclear security relevant information.
- Take an active role to facilitate effective cooperation and coordination at the international and regional levels.

The view of the Conference was that these expanded IAEA efforts will likely require financial resources above those predicted in 2002. Optimal coordination and cooperation with, inter alia, bilateral assistance programmes will significantly enhance the impact of available resources, avoid duplication and identify gaps for improved efforts.

Looking forward; sustaining the progress

The Conference expressed the view that a clear focus and concentrated efforts for the following actions are essential:

1. Accelerate efforts to develop and implement a fully effective global nuclear security framework based on prevention, detection and response.
2. The expeditious agreement among State Parties on amending the CPPNM.
3. Full implementation of the Code of Conduct and an enhanced CPPNM.
4. Enhanced cooperation and coordination at the global, regional and bilateral levels.
5. The IAEA assuming – and being resourced to deliver - a leading role, specifically for supporting the Member States, and for furthering international cooperation.

A follow-up international conference should be convened within five years.