1. BACKGROUND

After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States, public apprehension about the security of radioactive sources has increased in many countries. Radioactive sources are abundant and are extensively used around the world in a wide range of medical, industrial, agricultural and research applications. Some sources contain relatively large amounts of radioactive material that could potentially be used for malevolent purposes. Radioactive material in a source could be used as part of a radiological dispersal device (RDD) or, if the material is easily dispersible, may be spread by breaking open the seal and releasing the material to the environment. Such malevolent actions could conceivably contaminate large areas of an urban environment with minor but measurable amounts of radioactive material. Any potential health effects would be moderated owing to the dispersion of the radioactive contamination; however, anxiety, panic and social disruption could follow such an event. The awareness that terrorists might attempt to use radioactive materials for malevolent purposes has raised questions about the adequacy of the security of radioactive sources.

Many radioactive sources are not generally subject to tight security measures; such measures have traditionally been limited to preventing accidental access or petty theft such as the theft of shielding materials. Traditional security measures aim to prevent unauthorized access to radioactive sources; such access is facilitated when sources are misplaced, forgotten, lost or insecurely stored. Consideration must now be given to what additional security measures are required against the potential malevolent use of radioactive sources. Security measures should now also be focused on preventing the loss of control over radioactive sources. Such a loss of control over radioactive sources could heighten the concern that has arisen recently over the intentional acquisition of radioactive sources for malevolent purposes.

The vast majority of radioactive sources are under the control of competent governmental regulatory authorities, but there are nevertheless many sources that have never been subject to regulatory control, or that were initially regulated but have been abandoned, lost, misplaced, stolen or otherwise removed without authorization; these are termed ‘orphan sources’. Because of their availability and lack of control, such orphan sources pose a risk of being used for malevolent purposes. Recently, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) agreed with the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy and the United States Department of Energy to work together to secure and manage radioactive sources, in particular orphan sources, in the newly independent States on the territory of the former USSR.

In order to address the issues raised by the current concerns about the security of radioactive sources in a comprehensive manner, it is appropriate at this time to assemble officials and experts involved in ensuring the security and regulation of radioactive sources from governments and intergovernmental organizations, as well as law enforcement officials dealing with the prevention of the malevolent use of radioactive sources, customs officials and other border control experts dealing with the prevention of illicit transboundary movement of radioactive materials, and experts in radiation safety and security to discuss the prevention, detection and response to the potential malevolent uses of radioactive sources. With this aim in mind and following increasing interest from its Member States, the IAEA is organizing this International Conference on Security of Radioactive Sources.

2. OBJECTIVE

The objective of the Conference is to promote a wide exchange of information on and to raise governmental and public awareness of key issues relating to the security of radioactive sources, including those posed by their potential malevolent use. It is expected that the Conference will help to foster a better understanding of the nature of the threats of potential malevolent use, on ways to diminish the likelihood of such threats occurring, and on the necessary measures for preparedness and response in case they do occur.

3. SCOPE

The scope of the Conference will include:

1. General background of the nature and extent of the potential threat posed by radioactive sources;
2. Identifying, searching, recovering and securing high risk, vulnerable radioactive sources;
3. Strengthening long term control over radioactive sources;
4. Interdicting illicit trafficking and/or border controls;
5. Planning the response to radiological emergencies arising from the malevolent use of radioactive sources.

Apart from describing the interface between the above areas and the international efforts to combat ‘nuclear related terrorism’ in general, the Conference will not deal with the following issues:

• Security in the transport of radioactive materials (an International Conference on the Safety of Transport of Radioactive Materials, which will specifically address security issues, will take place at the IAEA Headquarters in Vienna from 7 to11 July 2003).
• Security of nuclear fuel cycle facilities, including nuclear reactors.
• Safeguards and security of nuclear materials, except for materials in PuBe neutron sources.

4. OUTPUT

Proceedings of the Conference will be published by the IAEA after the Conference. They will contain the Welcoming Addresses, the Keynote Opening Address by the President of the Conference, all other papers presented at the Conference and the records of the discussions, the Chairpersons’ summaries, and the findings of the Conference as presented by its President. A summary of the Conference findings will be communicated to the Agency’s Member States and submitted for the consideration of the Policy Making Organs of the IAEA.

5. PROGRAMME STRUCTURE

Opening Session

Following registration on 10 March 2003, the Conference will start on 11 March 2003 with an Opening Session in which the IAEA and the host Government will welcome participants, and the President of the Conference will deliver a Keynote Opening Address describing the scope and objective of the Conference. It is envisaged that the co-sponsoring governments and officials from the co-operating intergovernmental organizations will make keynote presentations in this session. In the evening of that day participants will be invited to a formal reception.

Background Session

A Background Session will address the scientific and technical background on the security of radioactive sources and will benchmark the possible consequences of their malevolent uses. It will describe the situation with regard to the security of radioactive sources, including the perceived nature and extent of the threat and the existing security arrangements for various types of sources.

Topical Sessions

Two Topical Sessions will address (i) the remedial measures necessary to deal with the present situation by identifying, searching, recovering and securing high risk, vulnerable radioactive sources and (ii) prospective measures to prevent the loss of control over radioactive sources by strengthening their long term control and security. Special emphasis will be given to the threat posed by the potential malevolent use of radioactive sources.

In each Topical Session, Invited Speakers will present Expert Papers addressing a number of key issues relating to the topic. The experts’ papers are expected to address among other things proactive steps governments might take on their own or with the assistance of the IAEA in order to address concerns on the security of radioactive sources. The presentation of each Expert Paper will be followed by a general discussion.

Panel Discussions

Four Panel Discussions among senior experts will address the following specific issues: interdicting illicit trafficking; roles and responsibilities of the various parties involved; planning the response to radiological emergencies arising from the malevolent use of sources; and the role of the news and information media, as well as public education, communication and outreach. The panel discussions are expected to establish a basis for possible future action on these issues.

Concluding Session

The Conference will end with a Concluding Session, at which the Chairpersons of the Topical Sessions will present a summary of the Topical Sessions’ and Panel Discussions’ findings. These presentations will be followed by a closing presentation from the President of the Conference summarizing the Conference findings and giving his concluding remarks. The Conference will be adjourned by concluding messages from the Government of Austria and from the representatives of the Governments of the Russian Federation and the United States of America.

The detailed programme content is presented in the Annex. Updated versions of the Programme of the Conference will be posted well in advance on this Conference webpage. The final Programme will be made available upon registration at the Conference.

6. PARTICIPATION

Applicants interested in participating in the Conference must complete the Participation Form (Form A, enclosed) and convey this Form to the IAEA through one of the competent official channels to the IAEA (e.g. the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the national atomic energy authority or the Permanent Mission in Vienna of the applicant’s State). Applications can be accepted only if they are conveyed to the IAEA through such official channels.

The deadline for receipt of Government designations at the IAEA is 1 March 2003.

Subsequent communications should be addressed to the Scientific Secretary of the Conference if they concern technical matters and to the Conference Organizer if they concern administrative matters.

7. VENUE

The Conference will take place at the Hofburg Kongresszentrum in Vienna, Austria, from 10 to 13 March 2003. Registration will take place on Monday 10 March from 15:00 to 18:00 hours and continue on Tuesday 11 March morning from 8:00 hours onwards. The Opening Session will start on Tuesday 11 March at 09:30 hours. A welcoming reception will be held in the evening of 11 March. The Conference is expected to adjourn in the afternoon of Thursday 13 March.

8. WORKING LANGUAGE

The working language of the Conference will be English. Simultaneous interpretation into and from Russian will be provided.

9. EXPENDITURES/GRANTS

There is no registration fee for participation in the conference.

As a general rule, the IAEA does not pay the cost of attendance, such as travel and living expenses, of participants. However, funds are available to help meet the cost of attendance of qualified specialists, mainly from Member States eligible to receive technical assistance under the IAEA’s Technical Co-operation Programme. The grants awarded will be in the form of lump sums usually covering only part of the cost of attendance.

Should a Government wish to apply for a grant on behalf of a Conference participant, it should address specific requests to the International Atomic Energy Agency. Governments should ensure that applications for grants are submitted by 15 January 2003, and are accompanied by a duly completed and signed Grant Application Form (Form C, attached). Applications that do not comply with these conditions will not be considered.

10. ACCOMMODATION

Detailed information on accommodation and other administrative details will be available on the Conference website.

11. VISAS

Designated participants who require a visa in order to enter Austria should submit the necessary application to the nearest diplomatic or consular representative of Austria as soon as possible. Please note that these procedures may take up to three weeks.

12. KEY DATES

Deadline for receipt of participation form (Form A): 1 March 2003.
Deadline for application for grants (Form C, if applicable): 15 January 2003.

13. CONFERENCE WEBPAGE

Please, visit this webpage regularly for information regarding this Conference.

14. CONFERENCE SECRETARIAT

Scientific Secretariat of the Conference:

Scientific Secretary of the Conference:

Mr. Vilmos Friedrich
Division of Radiation and Waste Safety
Unit of Safety and Security of Radiation Sources
(Project Manager of Russian-US-IAEA Initiative)
International Atomic Energy Agency
P.O. Box 100
Wagramer Strasse 5
A-1400 Vienna, Austria

Telephone No.:	(+43) 1-2600-21067
Telefax No.:	(+43) 1-26007
E-mail:	V.Friedrich@iaea.org
E-mail address for paper submission:	intconf.sources@iaea.org

Technical responsibilities

Programme Manager of the IAEA Subprogramme on Safety and Security of Radiation Sources:

Mr. Brian Dodd
Division of Radiation and Waste Safety
International Atomic Energy Agency
P.O. Box 100
Wagramer Strasse 5
A-1400 Vienna, Austria

Telephone No.:	(+43) 1-2600-26427
Telefax No.:	(+43) 1-26007
E-mail:	B.Dodd@iaea.org

Co-ordination of Issues Related to Nuclear Terrorism:

Mr. Richard A.G. Hoskins
Office of Physical Protection and Material Security
International Atomic Energy Agency
P.O. Box 100
Wagramer Strasse 5
A-1400 Vienna, Austria

Telephone No.:	(+43) 1-2600-21807
Telefax No.:	(+43) 1-2600-29299
E-mail:	R.Hoskins@iaea.org

Administration and organization:

Ms. Regina Perricos
Division of Conference and Document Services
Conference Services Section
IAEA-CN-113
International Atomic Energy Agency
P.O. Box 100
Wagramer Strasse 5
A-1400 Vienna, Austria

Telephone No.:	(+43) 1-2600-21315
Telefax No.:	(+43) 1-26007
E-mail:	R.Perricos@iaea.org

• Welcoming address by the Director General of the IAEA.
• Welcoming Address by the Government of Austria.
• Keynote Opening Address by the President of the Conference.
• Presentation by the Government of the Russian Federation.
• Presentation by the Government of the United States of America.
• Presentation by the European Commission (EC).
• Presentation by the European Police Office (EUROPOL).
• Presentation by the International Criminal Police Organization (ICPO–Interpol).
• Presentation by the World Customs Organization (WCO).

Background Session

B1)	Description of the Situation with Regard to the Security of Radioactive Sources (including the perceived nature and extent of the threat, the categorization of important radioactive sources and the potential for undertakings by the States).
B2)	Existing Security Arrangements for Various Sources, including. Stationary sources, e.g. industrial irradiators. Mobile sources, e.g. sources used in research centres. Sources used in public access facilities, e.g. hospitals. Sources used in public areas, e.g. for well logging or pipeline radiography.

Topical Session I:

T1)	Identification of High-Priority Radioactive Sources.
T2)	Searching for Orphan Sources.
T3)	Recovering Orphan Sources.
T4)	Storing and Recycling Recovered Sources in a Secure Manner.
T5)	Final and Secure Disposal of Radioactive Sources.

Topical Session II:

T6)	Implications of Increasing the Security of Radioactive Sources. Beneficial uses versus security measures. Burden of costs (all types) versus consequences of misuse. Commercial interests.

T7)	Strengthening Security Procedures. Lifetime (cradle-to-grave) record keeping and tracking. Inventories, tagging, appraisals, surveillance, seals. Verification of legal purchases, import/export controls.

T8)	Strengthening Control over Radioactive Sources: Case Studies. The IAEA’s TC Model Project on Upgrading the Radiation Protection Infrastructure.

T9)	Physical Protection of Significant Radioactive Sources.

Panel Discussion I:

P1)	Strategy and Methods for Detection of Illicit Trafficking.
P2)	Border Monitoring and Controls.
P3)	Capabilities of Detection Equipment and Development Needs.

Panel Discussion II:

P4)	Governmental Authorities, Including: Regulatory Authorities, Police and Customs, Intelligence and Confidentiality Authorities.
P5)	Manufacturers, Distributors and Users.
P6)	Waste Management Organizations, e.g. Those Operating Stores and Repositories.
P7)	International Bodies and Arrangements: Intergovernmental organizations. International co-operation, response and information exchange. USA/Russia/IAEA tripartite initiative for securing and managing radioactive sources. Other, bi-, tri- and multilateral agreements. Potential role of the Conference on Disarmament in preventing the malevolent use of radioactive materials.

Panel Discussion III:

P8)	Preparedness and Response to: Threats, Theft, Detection, Incidents and Accidents.
P9)	Administrative, Technical, Physical and Legal Issues.

Panel Discussion IV:

P10)	Communicating with the Public Following Threats or Events.
P11)	Public Education.
P12)	Dissemination of Useful Information without Allowing its Misuse.

Concluding Session

• Summaries by the Chairpersons of the Topical Sessions.
• Closing presentation by the President of the Conference.
• Concluding message by the representative the Government of Austria.
• Concluding message by the representative of the Government of the Russian Federation.
• Concluding message by the representative of the Government of the United States of America.