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Outline

- French SFR program
- SFR program requirements
- Main assumptions and operating parameters
- Core and fuel
- Robust Safety Demonstration
- Optimized Energy Conversion System
- Improved ISI&R capabilities
- Improved O&M capabilities
- Twinning and Modularity
- Conclusions



French SFR program

Objective and context

 Evaluate the industrial prospects of waste transmutation to respond to June 2006 French law on the management of nuclear waste and resources

Program in tight cooperation between CEA, AREVA and EDF

Main milestones

- 2009 : selection of the main tracks for R&D and design studies
- 2012 : selection of the main design options and assessment of the industrial capabilities of SFRs for waste transmutation

Next steps

- Decision of launching the design and construction of a prototype
- Industrial deployment of the new generation of SFRs (2040-2050)





SFR program requirements

Financial risk at the same level as for other plants

- Extended (60 years) and reliable lifetime
- Robust design, tolerant to equipment or operators faults
- Improved inspection and repair capabilities
- Improved maintenance capabilities
- Investment and operation costs close to Generation III plants
- Decommissioning taken into account at the design stage
- Flexibility of management of nuclear materials
 - ◆ Closed Pu cycle, conversion ratio ≥1
 - Flexibility for nuclear materials recycling/burning (plutonium, minor actinides)



SFR program requirements

- Robust safety demonstration for the core and the reactor systems
 - Safety requirements at least as severe as those for Gen III+ reactors (EPR™)
 - Prevention and mitigation of risks due to sodium chemical reactivity
 - Prevention and mitigation of severe accidents
 - Robustness to different scenario analyses (no cliff edge effect)
 - Robustness to external hazards



Overall, very challenging and often contradictory requirements : need to reassess the feedback from previous projects and operation and to investigate innovation tracks to solve or alleviate difficulties



Main assumptions and operating parameters

Reactor power level

- Up to 3600 MWth (1500 MWe)
 - Take maximum benefit of the size effect to improve economics
 - Take advantage of earlier studies (RNR 1500, EFR, etc.)
- Studies underway to evaluate if a lower power level could provide benefit in terms of robustness, with reasonable impact on the economic competitiveness

Twinning of two reactors envisioned for lower power level

Other parameters

Core inlet / outlet temperatures	395°C / 545°C]
Core pressure drop	~ 3,5 bars	
Secondary loop inlet / outlet temperatures	525°C / 340°C	5
Water / Steam temperatures	240°C / 490°C @ 185 bars steam pressure	edf
Design life	60 years	

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Core and fuel

- Major objective is to obtain a high performance core configuration resulting in low energy release in case of severe accident
- Current design based on a break even core with improved safety characteristics (sodium void-coefficient, Doppler worth, rod worth, etc.)
- Fuel S/A design based on a "fat pin and a small wire" SPX1 concept, with U/PuO2 fuel and ODS cladding SFR Average burn up of 100GWd/t eDF $\hat{}$ PHENIX AREVA

Core and fuel

Shutdown systems

- Actions under way to implement a third shutdown level
- System like SEPIA (SEntinel for Passive Insertion of Antireactivity) could provide a fully passive and diversified response for short and long term management of unprotected transient

Core configuration

- 5 batches scheme (410 EFPD cycles)
- Possibility to substantially increase the cycle length (4 or 3 batches, or even less), with favorable impact on load factor

MA transmutation

- Different options investigated (homogeneous or heterogeneous)
- Objective is to minimize impact on the reactor design and fuel cycle



High performance, safety enhanced core with long cycle durations

Optimizations still underway to improve the robustness of safety demonstrations and economics at the same time








Robust Safety Demonstration

Prevention and mitigation of severe accidents

Extensive use of the lines of defense approach

- focusing on the design of a core with favorable reactivity coefficients
- minimizing risks associated with sodium
- diversifying and enhancing reliability of safety systems
- Provisions against energetic criticality sequences resulting from core melt down
- Provisions for core degradation safe management (core catcher, decay heat removal)



Core catcher study



Significant R&D program launched to improve lines of defense robustness, and to prevent/mitigate core fusion accidents. Objective is a safety level consistent with EPR[™].








Robust Safety Demonstration

Provisions against external hazards

- Robust containment against commercial aircraft crash
- Seismic isolation for the Nuclear Island



Robust containment study



Safety may lead to design options not prone to cost reduction but necessary to minimize licensing and financial risks

Enhanced safety should also contribute to a better public acceptance








Optimized Energy Conversion System

Prevention against sodium/water reaction


Current secondary loop design based on modular Steam Generators

- Robust demonstration with regard to sodium/water reaction
- Design more costly than large monolithic SGs but should provide advantage in terms of maintenance and repair



Alternatives to sodium or water, but requiring significant R&D

- Supercritical CO₂ cycle
- Alternative fluids (such as Pb-Bi) to replace the secondary sodium





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Optimized Energy Conversion System

- Prevention against sodium fires
 - Different solutions under review: sectorization, double pipes, tunnels or inerted rooms
 - Production of aerosols will require specific extraction or filtering capabilities
- For both sodium/water reaction and sodium fires, leaks have to be detected as early as possible and R&D is underway to improve detection performance and reliability
- R&D performed on ferritic-martensitic steels to evaluate possibilities of simplification and cost reduction of SGs

Some design options may be more costly but could be counterbalanced by improved maintenance and repair capabilities with positive impact on plant availability

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
Improved ISI&R capabilities

- Need for both continuous monitoring and periodic inspection
- Need for "industrial" inspection techniques
 - Large effort placed on the development of high temperature sensors (and associated remote handling tools) for ultrasonic NDE and telemetry under sodium


Sensor for under sodium NDE



Remote handling tools



Focus on structures simplification, component removal capability, accessibility, core discharge and primary circuit draining provisions, repair capabilities





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Improved O&M capabilities

- Systems need to be simplified to facilitate maintenance operations, reduce O&M costs and limit risks associated to human factor
 - Reduction in the number and length of piping
 - Reduction in the number of auxiliary systems
 - Trade-off to be found between prevention of Na issues and ease of access for maintenance operations
- Refueling and component handling to be optimized to improve availability factor
- Reactor design to be optimized to minimize personnel exposure
 - Selection of Co-free materials to facilitate maintenance
 - Neutronic protection to be optimized based on maintenance needs



Target is to achieve an availability factor close to that considered for Gen III+ reactors

SPX component handling flask







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Twinning and Modularity

Twinning of reactors is envisioned to reduce costs

- Most significant cost savings obtained with sharing of fuel handling and component handling systems together with associated buildings
- Additional savings result from :
 - lessons learned and team mobilization effects for the second or multiple units
 - series effect and reduced financial risks for lower power levels
- Unlikely that cost savings resulting from modularity of smaller reactors (for instance 600 MWe) could balance cost increase due to the size effect (on a per MWe basis)
- On the other side, twinning of large power reactors could be a drawback to the SFR deployment



Need to optimize the power level of twinned reactors to find the best balance between market demand, costs and risks (range 750 to 1500 MWe under consideration)





Conclusions

- France is involved in a significant R&D program to evaluate the industrial prospect of MA transmutation in SFRs
- Decision is expected in 2012 to launch an industrial project, including a demonstration plant
- Economics is one of the aspects considered when studying design alternatives, but trade-off has to be found with safety, ISI&R and O&M capabilities with the objective to
 - Improve the robustness of safety demonstration
 - Reduce financial risks
 - Improve the public acceptance
- Economic competitiveness of SFR is dependent on future Uranium prices. Focus is to ensure competitiveness with Gen III reactors at the deployment date (2040-2050)
- Additional costs of MA burning will be evaluated and compared to the cost of alternative options



