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# Ageing of Nuclear Reactors: Safety and Security Perspectives for the Future

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# 1. Introduction

### Clear signs for nuclear power expansion

- No serious accident during last 20 years
- Good safety performance
- Improved public confidence in operator and regulator

### But many 'aged plants' in the future

- Most current reactors in operation for more than 30 years

### Ageing

- Time dependent degradation in SSCs (Structures, Systems and Components)
- Ageing effects on large components have the potential to limit operating lifetime of plants



# 2. Approaches to Physical Ageing

## Provisions to limit the effects on safety in design stage

- Specification of service conditions on SSCs
- Arrangements for monitoring, examination, inspection and testing
- Maintenance programme

### Operating experience feedback in operation stage

- To address unexpected ageing effects
- To prevent the recurrence of ageing problems raised in other countries

### Use of advanced science and technology

- More accurate diagnosis using advanced NDE techniques
- Earlier detection of defects with new inspection tools
- More reliable determination of replacements with improved assessment of the condition of ageing



# 3. Non-physical Aspects of Ageing

### Documentation control

- Essential for effective ageing management
- Necessary to determine the level of ageing that has taken place and how much residual life is to be expected
- Make long term operation possible

### Knowledge transfer

- From personnel who worked at the time of construction to new generations of personnel
- Lessons and detailed knowledge concerning the particular SSCs

### Securing components

- Seeking replacement or equivalent parts when manufacturers no longer exist
- Identifying critical components and making them ready on-site as spare parts



# 4. Regulatory Issues

### Ageing is believed to be manageable

Long term operation would be continuously attempted in the future

### Long term operation relies on

- Management capability of the operating organization
- Regulatory competence to deal with the whole spectrum of technical, societal and global issues



# - Design Criteria for External Events

### Change of design criteria to consider

- Unusual weather conditions such as local heavy rain and snow, fierce heat and cold, and super typhoon/hurricane
- Sea-level rising, tsunamis and earthquakes beyond design criteria

#### Design criteria should be re-established

- Reflecting new data on weather, earthquake and tsunami

### International cooperation is needed among countries suffering from similar natural disasters



# - Security Aspects

### Possibility of attack on NPPs

- Security has become very important with conventional nuclear safety issues after 9/11
- Interface between safety and security has been emphasized

#### Security aspects of ageing reactor

- Still in need of scrutiny
- More opportunity to get loose information related to the plant
- More intelligent and systematic sabotage

### Protection of security information should be considered and duly incorporated in ageing management



# - Human and Organizational Factors and Safety Culture

### Skilled operators familiar with reactor systems

- Invaluable assets of safe operation
- Sometimes a source of events with their overconfidence

#### Overconfidence

- Resulted from past good performance, praise from domestic or international parties, and no critics from peers
- No accident and good performance → overconfidence and complacency → accident in the long run

#### Leadership for safety

- Plays an important role in promoting safety culture

#### Regulatory or self-obligatory framework on top manager's leadership requirements



# - Stakeholder Interaction

### Increased expectation of the public on safety

- Demand more involvements in regulatory decision processes
  - When long term operation is planned, they may argue the plant shutdown at the expiration of license
- Challenges to regulators when influences are strong enough to affect regulatory decision

### Regulatory approach to meeting the public demands

Transparency in regulatory process, public communication, public trust and confidence

### Future role of regulator

- Should the role of regulator end with just assurance of nuclear facilities' being operated within an acceptable level of safety?
- Should it be extended to achieving the public's satisfaction with safety?



# 5. International Cooperation

#### Global approach to assuring safety and security of ageing reactors

- Effective for wide and rapid exchange of information about the unexpected ageing effects
- IAEA's contribution to this area appreciated

### System for operational experience feedback

- Ageing-related defects are rarely reported
- Needs to be refined
  - To cover ageing related events
  - To classify the events into more categories

### Safety Review Service for Long Term Operation

- For comprehensive and systematic review
- Based on the current activities of AMAT and SALTO projects





# 6. Conclusion

- From the past experiences, ageing is believed to be manageable
- Much efforts should be made to deal with the whole spectrum of technical, societal and global issues of ageing
- International cooperation should be more consolidated to assure safety and security of ageing reactors

