

# Updating WENRA Reference Levels for existing reactors in the light of TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi accident lessons learned

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## Content WENRA

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### 01 WENRA





## 01 WENRA Basic facts

- Association of the Heads of nuclear regulatory authorities of the EU countries with NPP and Switzerland
- Original Terms of Reference signed on 4 February 1999
  - Revised on 14 March 2003
  - Revised on 26 March 2010
- Independent from politics
- European centre of competence for Nuclear Safety
- Common approach and commitment to continuous improvement of nuclear safety

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## 01 WENRA Basic facts

#### 17 Members 9 Observers





## 01 WENRA Working Groups

#### **RHWG** Reactor Harmonization Working Group

WGWD Working Group on Waste and Decommissioning

Ad-hoc Working Groups established for post-Fukushima activities (sub-groups of RHWG) :

- Natural hazards
- Containment integrity
- Accident management
- Periodic safety review
- Mutual assistance



### 02 WENRA Safety Reference Levels for Existing Nuclear Power Plants





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**02 WENRA Safety Reference Levels** Development of Safety Reference Levels

#### **OBJECTIVE**

to increase harmonisation within WENRA countries on safety requirements issued by the regulatory bodies and their implementation in existing NPPs.

#### PROCESS

- Initiated in 2000
- Set of Reference Levels (RLs) available in 2006
- Adapted version in 2008 taking into account the stakeholder comments




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## **02 WENRA Safety Reference Levels** Content of Safety Reference Levels

Sets of RLs in 18 areas where harmonisation was considered as necessary

- Issue A : Safety Policy
- Issue B : Operating Organisation
- Issue C : Management System
- Issue D: Training and Authorization of NPP Staff
- Issue E : Design Basis Envelop for Existing Reactors
- Issue F : Design Extension of Existing Reactors
- Issue G : Safety Classification of Structures, Systems and Components
- Issue H : Operational Limits and Conditions
- Issue I : Ageing Management
- Issue J : Systems for Investigation of Events and Operational Experience Feedback





## **02 WENRA Safety Reference Levels** Content of Safety Reference Levels

Sets of RLs in 18 areas where harmonisation was considered as necessary (con't)

- Issue K : Maintenance, In-service Inspection and Functional Testing
- Issue LM : Emergency Operating Procedures and Severe Accident Management Guidelines
- Issue N : Contents and Updating of Safety Analysis Report
- Issue O : Probabilistic Safety Analysis
- Issue P : Periodic Safety Review
- Issue Q : Plant Modifications
- Issue R : Onsite Emergency Preparedness
- Issue S : Protection against Internal Fires



**02 WENRA Safety Reference Levels** Implementation of Safety Reference Levels

WENRA Countries agreed upon

- The incorporation of the RLs within their national requirements
- The implementation of the RLs in all NPPs

Action plans within countries to harmonise at both levels



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## Review of the WENRA Safety Reference Levels for existing plants after the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident



## **03 Post-Fukushima review** WENRA's commitment

March 2012 : WENRA Statement - WENRA Conclusions arising from the Consideration of the Lessons from the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Accident

WENRA Emphasizes institutional (roles and responsibiliteis of governments, regulators and utilities) and cultural (continious improvement) aspects of nuclear safety in addtion to technical issues. WENRA is ready to tackle further issues as necessary on the basis of the lessons learned from the Fukushima accident. WENRA's commitment is to proceed along the path of defining or revising existing Reference Levels as well as developing guidance documents for practical use by regulators.



## 03 Post-Fukushima review RHWG Task

To review and revise the existing RLs (2008) or to develop additional RLs

#### 3 Sub-groups

- T.1 Natural hazards
- T.2 Containment integrity
- T.3 Accident management

#### Goals :

- Include the lessons learned from Fukushima
- Maintain consistency and balance within RLs



Design Extension for existing plants – Issue F

- In accordance to IAEA SSR 2/1, "Design Extension Conditions" (DEC) where introduced (instead of Beyond DBA)
- Clear differentiation between DEC without core melt (DEC A) and DEC with core melt (DEC B)
- More prescriptive on the identification and selection of DEC to be analysed
- Expressing more detailed the goals of the safety analysis for DEC



#### Design Extension for existing plants – Issue F

- Addressing safety in the spent fuel pools
- Addressing 'multi-unit' sites
- Requiring effective means after natural hazards more severe than design basis
- No preferences expressed on the use of mobile or fixed equipment
- Requirements on the use if relied upon in the safety assessment :
  - Capacity and capability
  - Availability and accessibility
  - Connection points
- NPP autonomy for a justified time

# A guidance document will be issued to explain and support the RLs in Issue F



#### Additional RLs on natural hazards – Issue T

- Screening of hazards relevant to the site
- Identification of the design basis events
  - Target value 10<sup>-4</sup>/year
  - 0.1 g minimum PGA for seismic events
- Requirements on the development of a protection concept to minimize the threats
- Considerations on events exceeding the design basis events
  - To ensure that the chosen design basis is sound
  - To ensure that sufficient margins exist before cliff edge effects

# A guidance document will be issued to explain and support the RLs in Issue T





Emergency Operating Procedures and Severe Accident Management Guidelines – Issue LM

- Addressing spent fuel storage safety
- Addressing multi-unit sites with common resources
  - All reactors challenged by the same event
  - Possibility of mutual support
- Qualification of equipment relied on in SAMGs
- Stress the need to carefully consider whether measures from accident procedures can be implemented taken into account deterioration of site conditions
- Extend training needs to all emergency response personnel, reflecting realistic conditions



#### On-site emergency prepardness – Issue R

Enhancing the emergency preparedness

- Improving the consideration on accidents affecting several installation on site
- Addressing consideration on long lasting accidents and disrupted regional infrastructure
- Enhancing requirements on staff in the above situations (number, training)
- Appropriate procedures to manage the emergency, including for the use of mobile equipment



## 03 Post-Fukushima review Other changes

- Addressing Safety Culture Issue C (Management System)
- Clarifications and alligning of Issue E (Design Basis Envelope) to Issue T en F
- Treatment of natural hazards and spent fuel storage in PSA Issue O
- Consequential changes for
  - Contents and Updating of the SAR Issue N
  - Periodic safety review Issue P



### 04 Conclusions





## **04** Conclusions

Thorough review of the RLs for existing plants

- Adding an issue on natural hazards
- Taking into account the Fukushima lessons learned and European Stress Test Actions
  - multi-unit site, mobile equipment, natural hazard, enhanced emergency preparedness and training,...
- Resulting in a coherent and well balanced set of new RLs for existing plants

Available on <u>http://www.wenra.org/publications/</u> Public consultation has been held (01/12/2013 – 28/02/2014). RHWG is considering the received comments.

Final version expected in the middle of 2014

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# Thank you.

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