

Spent Fuel Storage Integration in the United States

Planning for Storage and Transportation

IAEA International Conference on the Management
of Spent Fuel from Nuclear Power Reactors

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
Topics to be discussed

- Background of U.S. Dry Storage
 - Canister types
 - Decommissioned reactor sites
 - Damaged fuel criteria
- Canister loading issues
 - Loading damaged fuel
 - Welding/NDE issue
 - Vendor Safety Review
- Conclusions



U.S. ISFSI Locations

U.S. Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations (ISFSI)



- Midwest**
- 1 Dresden
 - 2 GE Morris (wet)
 - 3 Braidwood
 - 4 LaSalle
 - 5 Byron
 - 6 Duane Arnold
 - 7 Quad Cities
 - 8 Clinton

- Northeast**
- 1 Maine Yankee
 - 2 Seabrook
 - 3 Vermont Yankee
 - 4 Yankee Rowe
 - 5 Pilgrim
 - 6 Haddam Neck
 - 7 Millstone
 - 8 Indian Point
 - 9 Susquehanna
 - 10 Three Mile Island
 - 11 Limerick
 - 12 Peach Bottom
 - 13 Oyster Creek
 - 14 Hope Creek
 - 15 Salem
 - 16 Calvert Cliffs

● 59 Reactor sites operating a general licensed ISFSI
● 6 Reactor sites pursuing a general licensed ISFSI
● 15 Specific licensed ISFSI (at or away from reactor site)
 No known sites are pursuing a future specific licensed ISFSI
■ 3 Reactor sites have not announced intentions regarding ISFSI
 34 States have at least one ISFSI

Current as of
June 1, 2015

ISFSI Overview

- U.S. Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations, abbreviated as ISFSI, are where the spent fuel canisters are stored in radiation shielding overpacks also called casks.
- The ISFSI can be licensed by the NRC using a site-specific license or can be licensed for reactor sites using a general license.
- Most current U.S canisters use welded lids, although some canisters use bolted lids



Initial Storage Plans

- Plans were to store the spent fuel for nominal amount of time in spent fuel pool (SFP) then send to Department of Energy (DOE) for reprocessing
- Moratorium on reprocessing of spent fuel issued in 1977, SFP's continue to fill up
- Licensees re-rack the SFP's with high density racks to gain space for storage and time
- Ultimately the licensees turn to dry fuel storage to allow continued reactor operation




Dual-Purpose Canisters

- Initial canisters were storage-only
- In late 1990's the canister types licensed by the NRC shifted to using a General License canister for dual-purpose use
- Dual purpose canisters licensed for storage under 10 CFR Part 72 could also be transported using a transportation overpack under 10 CFR Part 71
- The spent fuel could be transported to the final repository or interim storage site using the dual-purpose canister



Multi-Purpose Canisters

- Multi-purpose canisters were proposed by DOE in Yucca Mountain Repository application
- DOE awarded contract to develop canister licensed for storage, transportation, and disposal
- Canister was called a Transportation, Aging, and Disposal (TAD) canister
- Specified to hold 21 PWR or 44 BWR assemblies to minimize heat load generated during disposal period



Decommissioned Reactors

- Decommissioned reactor sites do not have spent fuel pools to repackage or unload spent fuel canisters and do not have the overhead cranes to transfer canisters into transportation overpacks
- Some decommissioned and reactor sites have methods to transfer canisters:
 - Specially fabricated facilities
 - Cask Transfer Facilities



Damaged Fuel Assemblies

- One of the key attributes for placement of fuel into a canister is whether the fuel is damaged
- Damaged fuel assembly contains defects in the cladding greater than pinhole leaks or hairline cracks and/or cannot be handled by normal means
- Damaged fuel must be placed in damaged fuel can inside canister authorized for damaged fuel




Damaged Fuel Assemblies

- Failure to place a damaged assembly in damaged fuel can or inside a canister authorized for damaged fuel will place the canister out of compliance and will result in:
 - Needing to remove damaged fuel assembly (may need to cut or remove lid)
 - Needing to request exemption from NRC to use the canister for storage-only use
 - Will result in needing to repackage spent fuel in another canister for transportation

Methods to Identify Damaged Fuel Assembly

- Visual examination of all 4 sides of assembly
- Review reactor core operating chemistry for evidence of leaking assemblies
- In-mast sipping of the discharged fuel assemblies for evidence of leakage
- Vacuum sipping of older fuel assemblies
- Ultrasonic Testing (UT) of the fuel assembly for evidence of water in the pins



Canister Loading Issue #1

- Contractor performed UT testing on older fuel and issued preliminary report indicating fuel assemblies were not damaged
- Secondary contractor review identified that 13 of the fuel assemblies were in fact damaged (contained water)
- Licensee had loaded 5 of the 13 assemblies into canisters not licensed for damaged fuel
- Exemption granted by NRC for storage-only use of the canister



Canister Loading Issue #2


- License had examined older fuel assemblies using UT technique and loaded into dual-purpose canister
- During drying process using heated helium, Krypton-85 gas was exhausted from drying equipment indicating damaged fuel assembly
- Licensee continued to dry and then weld canister with damaged fuel assembly inside
- Exemption granted by NRC for storage-only use of the canister



Canister Loading Issue #3

- Licensee performed spent fuel classification using another agency's definition of damaged fuel, which allowed much larger cladding defects
- Site-specific licensee issued that included NRC definition of damaged fuel
- Licensee incorrectly loaded 6 damaged fuel assemblies (based on fuel classification) into 5 canisters not authorized for damaged fuel storage
- License amendment granted by NRC for storage-only use of the canisters

Canister Loading Issue #4

- Licensee was welding 6th canister during a loading campaign when the NRC inspector identified issue with non-destructive examination process
 - Licensee found that all 6 canisters (1 in process and 5 located on the ISFSI pad) were inoperable
 - Licensee requested exemption, NRC requested additional data to support justification
 - Licensee performed volumetric examination (phased array) of closure welds and is reviewing data
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Canister Issue #5

- Cask Vendor removed requirement for helium leak test during canister fabrication process using 10 CFR 72.48 safety review
- NRC determined that vendor needed prior approval to remove helium leak test
- Over 100 canisters had been loaded with spent fuel before the issue was discovered by the NRC
- Each licensee had to provide data to NRC indicating canisters were not affected and cask vendor had to leak test canisters that had not been loaded

Conclusion

- The dry cask industry continues to mature as evidenced by loading canisters with:
 - Higher heat loads/burn-up assemblies
 - Higher capacity
- However, the industry is not so advanced that errors cannot occur
- The industry must remain vigilante and exchange operating experience with fabrication and loading processes associated with dry fuel storage



QUESTIONS ?

