TMI-2 Recovery Project Critical Lessons

Jack DeVine

IAEA, Vienna Austria - January 2013

The TMI-2 Accident – in Brief

The Plant

- Three Mile Island Unit 2, a one-year old B&W 900MWe PWR
- Initiating Event
 - March 28, 1979 Secondary plant malfunction, causing turbine trip, then Reactor scram

The situation unravels

During post- scram RCS pressure transient, PORV sticks open;

- Operators misinterpret plant condition, fail to recognize ongoing SBLOCA they throttle, then secure HPSI
- Core overheats, then clad failure, then major core melt

Actions / Consequences

Ad hoc emergency response:

- Damage to equipment, and the unprecedented / misunderstood conditions, impede progress at every turn
- For the public, a life-changing event
 Uncertainty, fear, traumatic 'precautionary' evacuation
- No injuries, minimal environmental effects
 Containment really works
- Takes months to achieve adequate plant control and stability

The Recovery Program

- TMI-2 cleanup and deactivation a ~\$1billion, 12 year project
- The full extent of core damage was not known for about two years.
- Six years to restart of the undamaged TMI-1
- TMI-2 ultimately placed in post-Defueling Monitored Storage (PDMS)
 - Safe, stable and monitored
 - Final disposition when TMI-1 is decommissioned

Recovery Challenges

Inaccessible Reactor Building (RB)

- Uncertain condition/reliability of systems
- Flooded RB basement, ~600,000 Cs-137 Ci I
- Hi rad, hi contamination
- Core melt
 - Uncertainty of location/condition of damaged fuel
 - Fuel retrieval, handling and disposition
- Waste management
 - Processing and disposal of contaminated water

TMI-2 Lessons

There are compelling lessons relating to the TMI-2 accident and emergency response

But not the subject of this presentation

- Recovery Lessons
 - Among many, five selected for discussion today

Public Trust

Lesson 1: Public trust is an essential component of a successful recovery project

The full set of stakeholder - public, regulators, government, media – is an interactive and influential force.

Corollary: When your world turns brown, it is too late to begin to establish public trust

Principles:

- Public acceptance is based on **trust**, and is central to long term nuclear viability
- It's personal: Focus is on people, not technology

End States, End States, End States

- Lesson 2: Begin and proceed with the end in mind
- □ TMI-2 **Example:** Year 1 Wheel spinning
- It is necessary to define, secure approval (as applicable), and communicate:
 - Plant/site ultimate end state
 - and
 - Interim states/milestones to achieve that ultimate condition

End States (continued)

End State definition must be:

- □ In depth, covering all plant spaces, systems, components
- Based on need, not opportunity (i.e., linked to such factors as public and worker safety, downstream access requirements, etc.)
- Quantitative and realistically achievable
- Prioritized, sequenced interim end states form the basis of project schedule and cost.

Characterization

Lesson 3: Hard fact trumps theory – every time

□ TMI-2 **Example:** TMI-2 De-fueling Concept

Key points:

- Characterization is the bedrock of technical decision making, planning and engineering
- Where it is most difficult, it's usually most important
- Knowledge gained is never perfect key is to get <u>enough</u> information to proceed
- □ It's an iterative, ongoing process think military 'recon'
- Key follow-on task is data management: compiling, organizing and disseminating technical data.

Flexible, Adaptable Methods

- Lesson 4: In the land of surprises, flexibility and adaptability carry the day
- TMI-2 Example: Remote-manual defueling system and tools

Key points:

- This is a key to technical/programmatic risk management
- Adapting proven technology beats invention
- Avoid unnecessary complexity (the 'KISS' principle)

Protecting Workers

- Lesson 5: Radiological recovery work challenges worker safety, every day
- TMI-2 **Example**: In-containment work
- Key Challenge is the composite effect of radiological and industrial hazards:
 - High Radiation (and related stay time constraints)
 - Issues re: congestion / accessibility / visibility / heights / enclosed space / etc.
 - High surface and airborne contamination (and required protective clothing)

In Summary

- TMI-2 Recovery and Clean-up was different in many respect from current and future such projects
 - Improvements in understanding, technology, tools, preparedness, etc.
- Compared to Fukushima Dai-ichi, our job was easy
- BUT, much was learned and the fundamentals will always apply

Thank You!