

# Remediation Following the Goiania Accident



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# Relevant Facts



- Cs -137 teletherapy unit left in an **abandoned** clinic due to a legal dispute (1985)
- Regulator **was not notified** as established in the authorization issued in 1971
- Due to rumors about a valuable lead equipment, the source unit **was stolen** on Sept 13<sup>th</sup>, 1987
- Equipment was dismantled, sold to a junkyard and the source capsule opened and **enjoyed its brilliant light** by others (Sept 13 – 21, 1987)
- The Regulator, National Nuclear Energy Commission, was informed on Sept 28<sup>th</sup> - **two weeks after the theft of the source**
- 50.9 TBq of <sup>137</sup>Cs in the form of CsCl powder were released and **spread throughout the urban environment**

## Summary of the initial actions (emergency phase)



- In the **first screening made in the city**, several sites and residences at the urban area (1km<sup>2</sup>) had elevated dose rates of ionizing radiation:
  - Isolation and evacuation of the area
  - Monitoring and treatment of the most exposed people
  - Decontamination/demolition of houses
  - Reconstruction of areas
- The inhabitants were removed to the Olympic Stadium of Goiania, where the first **screening of the population** was done.

# Hard initial works and social disruption

- 159 houses monitored, 101 houses contaminated
- 200 persons evacuated from 41 of them
- 42 decontaminated, 6 demolished & 53 recuperated



# Remediation of Hotspots

torrential  
rain

contamination  
was spread

deep layers of soil  
were contaminated

- Removal of top soil layers and concrete cover:  
4 sites



- Removal of the top soil layers and soil cover:  
1 site



High level of anxiety amongst the public + time and resources consuming remedial actions

**Restricted use**

# Recovery Phase: 3 months later



REMEDICATION FOR **NONRESTRICTED** USE  
OF THE LAND (PUBLIC AND PRIVATE)

## MAIN CONSTRAINS



**POLITICAL AND SOCIAL  
PRESSURE**

**RADIATION PROTECTION  
CRITERIA NOT AVAILABLE**

**LACK OF SITE SPECIFIC  
INFORMATION**

**DOSE CRITERIA AND  
ASSESSMENT  
VERY CONSERVATIVE**



# Radiation Protection Criteria



- **CNEN regulation: (CNEN-NE-3.01)**
- **1 mSv/a for members of the public (ICRP 26-practices)**
  - **ADOPTED CRITERIA**
  - **5 mSv in the first year**
  - **1 mSv/a lifetime average (70 years)**



# Exposure Pathways



- Gamma exposure indoors
- Gamma exposure outdoors
- Internal dose
  - Inhalation of resuspended soil
  - Ingestion of home grown vegetables, fruits, pork, poultry and eggs
    - Obs 1: vegetables being contaminated by root uptake and deposition of resuspended soil
    - Obs 2: pork being contaminated by ingestion of nonleafy vegetables (20% of diet) and chicken only by ingestion of soil

# Operational Criteria




- **1 mSv/a** – gamma exposure indoors:
  - 0,5  $\mu\text{Sv/h}$  and 37 kBq/m<sup>2</sup> surfaces contamination;
- **3 mSv/a** – gamma exposure outdoors
  - 1  $\mu\text{Sv/h}$  and 22,5 Bq/g in soil (upper 2cm layer)
- **1 mSv/a** – internal dose
  - Home garden: it was reached when soil was removed to comply with gamma exposure criteria
  - fruits: 0,65 Bq/g

**87Bq/g** reference level for nonradioactive waste at that time – but the concept of **clearance level did not exist**

# Removal of surface soil



## Long Term external dose rate forecast



# Inventory of waste after 15 years



<b>Waste Group</b>	<b>Time to reach 87 Bq g<sup>-1</sup></b>	<b>metallic boxes</b>	<b>drums</b>	<b>Volume (m<sup>3</sup>)</b>	<b>Activity (TBq)</b>
1	0	404	2710	1231	0.06
2	> 0 - 300 y	918	1511	1862	15.59
3	> 300 y	25	2	42	30.06
<b>Total</b>		<b>1347</b>	<b>4223</b>	<b>3136</b>	<b>45.71</b>

# Research on Cs Spreading





- **Dose assessment probabilistic simulation have shown:**
  - the external dose the main contribution to the dose uncertainty (external occupancy ratio)
  - Soil resuspension factor and the parameter related to soil concentration profile would help to improve the uncertainty
- **Research on Cs spreading from surface soil was conducted:**  
**Goiania Project**



# Behaviour of street dust



1990



2000



# Challenges Faced during and after the Recovery Phase



- Lack of **policy and strategy for remediation** of contaminated areas and continuous follow up monitoring
- Lack of **radiation protection criteria for remediation**, for re-use and recycle of contaminated material, absence of clearance values
- Lack of information on **dynamics of environmental behavior** of radionuclides in urban environment
- To convince the **local population that the recovery phase is necessary** but they have not been in risk for so long after the emergency period
- To explain the **local population that there is no need** to leave the environment cesium free
- To conduct **follow up studies** although refused by the local population since they want to forget the event



## Lessons learned during and after the recovery process



- **Soil profile is a good method** for determining the soil layer to be removed - 60% in average upper 1.5 cm soil layer - avoiding the jointly removal of big amounts of clean soil
- The **amount of removal material** was seen by the population as proportional to the risk they have been exposed to and this shall be avoided
- Further construction processes and urban services **bring back to surfaces** formerly buried contaminated material
- Lack of remediation criteria together with lack of site specific information lead to the use of conservative approaches and **generation of unnecessary public stress, waste and costs**
- Need for research to make available information of the main **environmental parameters for each type of climate** (the weathering half-life is much bigger in Europe than was shown in Goiania)

# Conclusions



- **Need of a policy and strategy for remediation** of contaminated sites including the management of generated waste (it should be part of the waste management policy and strategy);
- Need of robust legal framework with **clear radiation protection criteria** for each type of exposure situation;
- Approval by the Regulatory Authority of **possible remediation options**, including the re-use and recycling of contaminated material;
- Need of **radioecological research** to characterize main features of country's environments such as soil type, building material properties, weathering processes;

## Conclusions (cont.)



- **Removal of surface soil layers** should be done carefully and according to the soil profile results to avoid removal of large amounts of “clean” soil;
- **Care must be taken with remediation strategies** that do not physically remove the contamination from long-term accessible environments;
- **Involvement of local people in tasks** associated with remediation is very important to get information and gain confidence;
- Involvement of local people, governmental and non-governmental organizations are **key for a good decision on strategies to be adopted.**

# Still left some concerns...



- **Unforeseen uses** of decontaminated areas (restricted use)
- Urban maintenance **at or close** to released areas
- Population concerns on **long term effects**

# General Final Remark



- **Environmental remediation of contaminated areas is not clean up but reduction of exposure to radiation**, whatever the reason and type of source. But some technical, political and social constraints and concerns can risk remediation becoming effective.
  
- **How to minimize this risk and avoid improvisation?**
  - A consistent plan for remediation of contaminated areas
  - Approval in advance by regulator of possible remediation strategies (not only clean up)
  - A communication plan together with an education strategy
  - A well trained inter-agency team
  - A good follow up plan