Primary energy resources in Lithuania are rather scarce. To meet energy requirements local oil, peat, wood, geothermal and hydro energy, as well as energy from chemical processes could be used. In 2012, their share in the country’s primary energy balance was 20.9%. Their contribution was increasing very fast during the period 1990-2001 owing to steady growth of local oil extraction – from 12,000 tonnes in 1990 to the maximal amount of 471,000 tonnes in 2001. In the following years, extraction of local oil decreased more than 4 times – to 102,300 tonnes in 2012. Certain contribution into balance of indigenous resources is originated from energy of chemical processes. Since 2001, renewable energy sources have played a more important role. In 2012, their share in the balance of indigenous energy resources increased to 75.5%. Currently the main renewable energy resource is biomass (including wood waste, boughs, wood chips, pellets, sawdust and waste from agriculture). The contribution of hydro energy in absolute value is fluctuating depending on climatic conditions with small changes, and since 2006 the contribution of bio-fuels, used as a motor fuel for the road transport, as well as of wind energy has been increasing.

According to the principles of the international statistics it is considered that nuclear fuel is a domestic energy source, independently of where its supply is coming from; therefore, domestic production of primary energy resources in Lithuania includes nuclear fuel, which is used for electricity generation. Thus, taking into account increasing contribution of both domestic energy resources and nuclear fuel into the country’s energy balance, dependence of Lithuania on energy imports decreased from 70% in 1990 to 41.5% in 2003, but after closure of Units 1 & 2 at Ignalina NPP (INPP) energy dependence increased again to 79.1% in 2012.

TABLE 3. ESTIMATED AVAILABLE ENERGY SOURCES

	Estimated available energy sources
	Fossil Fuels			Nuclear	Renewables
	Solid	Liquid	Gas	Uranium	Hydro	Other Renewable
Total amount in specific units*	14	83			1 853	2.5
Total amount in Exajoule (EJ)	240	3 500			6.7	110

*Solid, Liquid: Million tons; Gas: Billion m3; Uranium: Metric tons; Hydro, Renewable: TW

The development of the total primary energy consumption in PJ is shown in Table 4. Oil and oil products were the most important fuels in Lithuania for several decades. However, since 1990 their share in the primary energy balance has been fluctuating in a comparatively large range with a reduced role due to decreasing consumption of heavy fuel oil for production of electricity and district heat. In 2010, after closure of the INPP the share of oil products increased to 36.9%. At present natural gas is one of the most important fuels in Lithuania. In 2012, its share in the Lithuanian primary energy balance was 35.9%. The role of coal has decreased – from 4.8% in 1990 to 2.7% in 2012.

During the period 1990-2009, the share of nuclear – the cheapest imported fuel – was very high. The role of nuclear was very important because being comparatively cheap, nuclear fuel helped to relieve certain burdens of balance of payments and therefore softened social problems. Nuclear fuel helped to increase the security of the primary energy supply, especially in the power sector. The share of nuclear energy in the primary energy balance in the year 2009 (year of final closure of Ignalina NPP) was 29.6%. Over the period 2010-2012 due to closure of the main electricity generation source more than 50% of electriciry required to meet gross country‘s electricity demand is imported from neighbouring countries and in 2012 the share of electricity import in the primary energy balance was equal to 7.7%.

Final electricity consumption and demand decreased from 12 TWh in 1990 to 6.2 TWh in 2000 but was increasing by 4.8% per annum during the period 2000-2008. Electricity consumption was increasing in all sectors of the national economy. In 2009, due to economic recession the total final electricity demand decreased by 7.4%. Over the period 2009-2012 final electricity demand was increrasing on average by 2.1% per year.

TABLE 4. ENERGY STATISTICS

								Average annual growth rate (%)
	1970	1980	1990	2000	2005	2011	2012	2000 to 2012
Energy consumption**
- Total	321.4	508.1	675.7	306.6	380.7	281.8	285.5	-0.59
- Solids***	69.8	47.7	33.4	3.9	7.8	10.1	9.9	8.16
- Liquids	179.1	335.7	286.7	90.7	112.7	105.2	108.4	1.80
- Gases	46.4	106.8	195.9	86.4	103.7	113.8	111.1	2.12
- Nuclear			185.8	91.9	112.8	0	0	-100.00
- Hydro	1.5	1.7	1.5	1.2	1.6	1.7	1.5	1.83
- Other Renewables	31.4	13.6	11.9	27.0	35.2	40.6	44.6	4.26
Energy production
- Total	51.7	24.5	203.9	139.6	166.5	58.8	61.9	-6.55
- Solids***	17.8	6.1	0.6	0.5	0.7	1.3	1.5	9.44
- Liquids	0.0	0.0	0.5	13.5	9.2	4.9	4.4	-8.92
- Gases
- Nuclear			185.8	91.9	112.8	0	0	-100.00
- Hydro	1.5	1.7	1.5	1.2	1.6	1.7	1.5	1.88
- Other Renewables	31.4	13.6	11.9	27.0	35.2	40.6	44.6	4.26
Net import (Import - Export)	269.7	483.7	471.8	162.2	203.5	247.2	247.4	3.58
- Total

* Latest available data

** Energy consumption = Primary energy consumption + Net import (Import - Export) of secondary energy.

*** Solid fuels include coal, lignite

Lithuania has no direct gas or electricity interconnections with the rest of the EU. Currently only Estonia is connected with Finland by two links with total capacity of 1000 MW. Dependence on a single external supplier and status of an “energy island” in the EU are two main factors describing Lithuania’s current energy situation and its energy policy objectives.

A number of projects are being developed which are expected to decrease Lithuania’s dependence on a single external energy supplier. These include, among others, the electricity interconnection “NordBalt” between Sweden and Lithuania, the electricity interconnection “LitPol Link” between Poland and Lithuania, the new Visaginas Nuclear Power Plant (VNPP) in Lithuania, an underground natural gas storage facility and a liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal. However, construction of VNPP is still under consideration.

From 31 December 2009, due to the permanent shutdown of the state-owned INPP, Lithuania’s electricity generation structure (shown in Fig.1) has changed significantly and Lithuania changed from a net exporter of electricity to a net importer of electricity.

The energy sector is particularly important to the Lithuanian economy and energy security is a strategic priority for the Government. It will be ensured by breaking Lithuania’s energy isolation (alternative ways to import energy resources will be established) and by securing sufficient and competitive internal capacities of energy production.

The shutdown of INPP at the end of 2009 required clear and strategically binding attitude how the generation capacity of INPP could be replaced by alternative generation capacities.

FIG 1. Electricity generation and consumption in Lithuania

Lithuania has recently taken steps to deregulate its electricity market and expects the Lithuanian electricity market to be fully deregulated for all consumers by 2015. Lithuania will use “Nord Pool”, the single power market for the Nordic countries, as the model for its electricity market. The deregulation of the Lithuanian electricity market is a crucial step towards the creation of a common electricity market in the Baltic States and Lithuania’s subsequent integration into the “Nord Pool” and the electricity market of continental Europe.

As a consequence of the shutdown of INPP from 1 January 2010, the average electricity price for households, which is regulated, increased by approximately 30 % as compared to the price on 31 December, 2009. 1 January 2010 also marked the official start of the electricity market in Lithuania (in the first among the Baltic States) – a crucial step towards the common Baltic electricity market. In 2010, due to a lack of local generating capacity, approximately 70 % of all Lithuania’s electricity needs were purchased through the electricity market and this market platform translated to the cheapest available power for the consumers. In June 2010, the Government approved the National Renewable Energy Sources Development Strategy, which aims to achieve at least a 23 % share in the gross final energy consumption to be produced from renewables by 2020. The biggest potential is foreseen in wind energy, hydro energy (for power generation) and biomass (mostly for heat production).

In January 2009, the Ministry of Energy of the Republic of Lithuania was re-established for the purpose of reforming the Lithuanian energy sector. Since then, a number of reforms have been undertaken in the energy sector.

In 2009, the EU adopted the Third Energy Package, a package of legislative measures aimed at liberalising EU energy markets. Based on the ownership unbundling requirements of the Third Energy Package, Lithuania is successfully reforming the electricity sector by separating transmission from generation and supply activities. In 2010, four blocks of energy companies were established (consisting of energy transmission, production, distribution and maintenance activities). The ownership unbundling will increase the overall efficiency of the power system, prevent discrimination against new market participants willing to connect to the grid, optimize the use and development of infrastructure, incentivise economic investment and ensure competitive prices for electricity consumers.

Due to historical factors, Lithuania’s high voltage electricity transmission grid is directly interconnected with the high voltage grids of Latvia, Belarus and the Russian Federation. These interconnections allow extensive exchanges of power with such neighbouring systems. However, a core objective of Lithuania’s energy strategy is the integration of its power system into the common European electricity market as well as synchronous interconnection with the Continental system of ENTSO-E. Seeking integration into EU energy systems, a number of energy projects are being carried out.

A marine underwater high voltage cable (Estlink) was completed in 2006 as a result of a joint venture between power companies in Finland and the Baltic States. Estlink allows the transportation of electricity between Finland and Estonia. The electricity is then transported from Estonia through the electricity transmission grid to Lithuania and Latvia. As key parts of the integration of the Baltic electricity market into the common European electricity market, new interconnection lines with Sweden (NordBalt) and Poland (LitPol Link) are in the process of being implemented.

NordBalt is a planned 700 MW submarine power cable between Lithuania and Sweden. In an effort to further exploit renewable energy sources, NordBalt will be constructed with the capability to access energy produced by offshore wind farms that may be constructed in the future. NordBalt is expected to cost €516–738 million, of which €175 million will be provided by the European Economy Recovery Plan. NordBalt is currently targeted for completion by the end of 2015. A number of preparation works for the construction of the interconnection have already been completed.

The LitPol Link is a planned 1,000 MW electricity link between Lithuania and Poland and is listed among the EU’s priority energy infrastructure projects. According to the pre-feasibility study the cost of establishing LitPol Link is expected to be €237 million and the project is expected to be completed by the end of 2015. In addition, Poland will invest €650 million and Lithuania €262 million to upgrade existing energy infrastructure. Preparation for the construction of the LitPol Link has already commenced.

Lithuania is developing the VNPP, in the vicinity of the INPP, that is currently under decommissioning. The pre-development phase of the Visaginas NPP was completed in January 2010. It is a regional project and its costruction should be agreed with all partners. The VNPP project participants are: Lithuania, regional partners Latvia and Estonia, and the Strategic Investor (Hitachi together with Hitachi-GE Nuclear Energy, HGNE). Poland, another potential regional partner, suspended its participation the project at the end of 2011.

2011 was a key year for the project. All the basic technical preparatory work and all preparatory work in various other areas, including the evaluation of the construction sites according to the IAEA safety requirements were completed. After failing of the tender at the end of 2010, the process of granting concession, by way of direct negotiations, with potential strategic investors was being commenced during first half of 2011.

In July 2011 the Lithuanian Government selected Hitachi as strategic investor and HGNE as engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) contractor.

The European Commission was formally notified of the VNPP project under Article 41 of EURATOM in October 2011. In June 2012, after careful assessment of the VNPP Project, the European Commission issued its favorable opinion on this regional Project.

At the end of June 2012 the Parliament of the Republic of Lithuania approved the Concession to be granted to the VNPP Project development company and the selection of Hitachi as the strategic investor, as well as the development of the project based on Hitachi-GE ABWR technology.

It was expected that the regional partners and the approved Strategic Investor Hitachi would establish the Project development and construction company and sign the agreements on the conditions approved by the Parliament by the end of 2012. However, the advisory referendum on new nuclear power plant construction in Lithuania held in the middle of October 2012 provided a negative result, therefore, all the future negotiations and establishment of a Project development company slowed down.

Considering the referendum voting results, following the Parliamentary elections (autumn 2012) the newly elected Government of the Republic of Lithuania), established a working group to evaluate the Visaginas NPP project economy and to review National Energy Independence Strategy. The conclusions of this working group were announced in 2013. According to them, the working group concluded that the new Visaginas NPP project could be further developed if project economy were to be improved and more favorable agreements will be reached with Strategic Investor and Regional Partners.

An agreement between the political parties represented in the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania on strategic guidelines for the foreign, security and defence policy of the Republic of Lithuania for 2014–2020 was signed on 29 March 2014. The agreement provides for cooperation with the European Commission and partner states as early as possible in order to implement the strategic projects aimed at integration of Lithuania’s energy infrastructure into the European energy systems stipulated in the Baltic Energy Market Interconnection Plan (BEMIP) and the National Energy Independence Strategy approved by the 26 June 2012 Resolution of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania No XI-2133. Particularly, in the field of power sector, the project of the Visaginas nuclear power plant improved in terms of funding and participation conditions as a result of negotiations with the partners aimed to expand the independent and competitive basic generation capacity. The Government plans to discuss unresolved project issues with Strategic Investor and Regional Partners during 2014 in order take further decisions regarding the continuation of Visaginas NPP project development.

Electricity in Lithuania is produced by different generators: thermal, hydro and other renewables. Installed capacity accordingly is 2380 MW, 1030 MW and 20 MW. The main generators are Elektrenai (condensing), Vilnius CHP, Kaunas CHP, Mažeikiai CHP, Kaunas HPP, Kruonis PSP, small scale HPP, wind and other renewables.

AB LESTO (LESTO) is the Lithuanian distribution network operator. LESTO distributes and transmits electrical power throughout the entire country and is a distribution network operator. The grid is made up of low and medium voltage lines and equipment.

The electrical power provided through LESTO’s distribution grid reaches more than 1.577 million clients, which are serviced in 45 local LESTO customer service centres.

Litgrid AB, the Lithuanian electricity transmission system operator, maintains a stable operation of the national power system, controls electricity flows, and enables competition in an open domestic electricity market. Litgrid is responsible for integrating the national power system into the European power infrastructure and electricity market. The company is implementing strategic electricity cross-border links, namely, NordBalt and LitPol.

TABLE 5. ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION, CONSUMPTION AND CAPACITY

								Average annual growth rate (%)
	1970	1980	1990	2000	2005	2011	2012	2000 to 2012
Capacity of electrical plants (GWe)
- Thermal	1,375.2	2,308.1	2,646	2,644	2,636	2,757	2887	0.74
- Hydro	98.4	106.9	106	914	1,026	1,027	1028	0.98
- Nuclear			2,600	2,600	1,300			-100.00
- Wind					1	188	274
- Geothermal
- other renewable	0			1	4	51	65	41.60
- Total	1,473.6	2,415	5,352	6,159	4,967	4,023	4254	-3.04
Electricity production (TWh)
- Thermal	6,936.3	11,199.8	10,958.7	2,361.4	3,618.1	3,133	3346.4	2.95
- Hydro	426.6	465.7	414	643.1	819.8	1,055.5	936.	3.18
- Nuclear			17,032.9	8,418.7	10,337.6			-100.00
- Wind					1.8	475.1	542.4
- Geothermal
- other renewable				0.8	7	158.0	217	59.51
- Total (1)	7,362.9	11,665.5	28,405.6	11,424.6	14,784.3	4,821.6	5042.4	-6.59
Total Electricity consumption (TWh)	5,186.4	11,558.7	16,430	10,088.4	11,818.1	11,560.3	11,661.3	1.21

(1) Electricity transmission losses are not deducted.

* Latest available data

TABLE 6. ENERGY RELATED RATIOS

	1970	1980	1990	2000	2005	2011	2012
Energy consumption per capita (GJ/capita)	102.4	148.3	182.7	87.6	114.6	93	95.6
Electricity consumption per capita (kW.h/capita)	1448.2	2973.0	4023.5	2516.7	3187	3529.8	3607.5
Electricity production/Energy production (%)	51.3	171.7	50.2	29.5	32	29.5	29.3
Nuclear/Total electricity (%)			60.0	73.7	69.9
Ratio of external dependency (%) (1)	83.9	95.2	69.8	52.9	53.5	80.8	80.0

(1) Net import / Total energy consumption.

* Latest available data

The decision to build a nuclear power plant in the Baltic region for electricity supply to the Baltic States, Belarus and Kaliningrad was made by the former government of the Soviet Union at the beginning of the seventies. After the formal agreement of the Lithuanian Government, the site on the shore of Druksiai Lake, near the borders of Lithuania, Latvia and Belarus was selected. Construction of the first unit of the INPP commenced in April 1978, the second unit followed in April 1980, and the third unit in 1985. The town of Visaginas (formerly Snieckus) was built for the workers of the INPP. The first unit was commissioned in December 1983 and the second in August 1987. In August 1988, the former USSR Council of Ministers suspended the construction of the third unit. In November 1993 the Lithuanian Government decided to abandon the construction of Unit 3 and dismantle the existing structure. The development of the INPP design was carried out by the Research and Development Institute for Energy Technology (VNIPIET) of Russian Federation. This institute developed the design of the reactor internals and other related structural components. The development of the Accident Localization System was carried out by the Sverdlovsk branch of the above mentioned institute. Metal structures of the main building were designed by the Main Design Office "Leningrad Steel Design". The turbine hall, the open distributive system and the auxiliary facilities were developed by the Atomic Energy Design Organization of Ukraine. It was intended that INPP would be the pilot NPP for the RBMK-1500 reactor type. The scientific supervisor of the RBMK-1500 project was the Kurchatov Atomic Energy Institute of Russia. The principal designer of the nuclear steam supply system was the Research and Development Institute of Power Engineering (RDIPE – Russian abbreviation –NIKIET), Moscow, Russia. These two institutes prepared and published the Technical Safety Justification of the RBMK-1500 Reactor in 1987. These institutes, together with the Research and Development Institute for Energy Technology, prepared the Technical Safety Justification of the Ignalina NPP in 1988. This safety report came closer to the Western standard in comparison with the Technical Safety Justification of the RBMK-1500 reactor. However, the Technical Safety Justification of the Ignalina NPP was not officially approved.

In 1999, the decision was made to shudown unit 1 of INPP before 2005 and in 2002 it was decided to shutdown unit 2 in 2009.

The following state institutions and bodies are involved in nuclear power related activities:

• Ministry of Energy

• State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate (VATESI)

• Ministry of Health

• Radiation Protection Centre

• Ministry of Environment

• Enviromental Protection Agency

• Ministry of Social Security and Labour

• Ministry of Transport and Communications

• Ministry of National Defence

• Ministry of Interior

• Ministry Education and Science

• State Security Department

• Governmental Emergencies Commission

• County Governors and

• Local Authorities

and others

The Ministry of Energy is responsible for the implementation of state policy, organizes bilateral and multilateral international co-operation in the sphere of nuclear energy and is the responsible authority for promotion and ownership of nuclear facilities. The Ministry of Energy is the owner of the INPP and is responsible for a broad scale of activities: tariffs, pricing system, organization, and financial audits. The Ministry supervises the nuclear energy sector and is responsible for the preparation of regulatory acts governing nuclear energy and for co-ordination of assistance for nuclear safety improvements. The INPP Problems Co-ordination Division was established in 2001 in connection with the shutdown of INPP unit 1. The task of the Division is supervision of the INPP decommissioning sector and preparation of regulatory acts governing of the decommissioning and radioactive waste management.

The Radioactive Waste Management Agency (RATA) was established in 2001 by the Ministry of Economy for management and disposal of all transferred radioactive waste, generated by the Ignalina NPP during the operation and decommissioning, as well as to collect, process and to dispose of institutional waste. The Agency’s task is to construct and operate the repositories for both short-lived and long-lived radioactive waste. At present the Ministry of Energy is the owner of RATA and is responsible for coordination of its activities.

The Ministry of Economy is responsible for the issuing of licenses for the export, import and transit of nuclear, radioactive and other materials used in nuclear technology, nuclear equipment and dual-use items.

The State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate (VATESI) is the main regulatory and supervisory institution of nuclear safety, which sets safety requirements, controls whether they are complied with, issues licenses and permits, performs safety assessments, regulatory inspections and other functions. VATESI’s mission is to perform the state regulation and supervision of safety at nuclear facilities in order to protect the public and environment against the harmful effects of nuclear and radiation events and accidents. VATESI is a governmental institution, established in 1991. The VATESI Head directly reports to the President and Government. The main goals of VATESI are:

• State regulation and supervision of safety at Ignalina NPP and other nuclear facilities;

• State regulation and supervision of nuclear waste management at nuclear facilities;

• Supervision of use of nuclear materials and technologies for peaceful purposes (application of the IAEA and EURATOM safeguards);

• State regulation and supervision of physical security of nuclear facilities, nuclear material and nuclear fuel cycle materials;

• State regulation and supervision of transportation of nuclear fuel cycle materials;

• State regulation and supervision of radiation protection of workers at nuclear facilities;

• State regulation and supervision of emergency preparedness at nuclear facilities.

The Ministry of Health shall:

• prepare and approve standard acts and rules on the health of the personnel of nuclear facilities and the population residing in the monitored zones of the facility and control compliance thereof;

• undertake environmental health studies of radiation impact on people and the environment and establish health protection requirements;

• agree on the sitting for nuclear facilities and undertake state environmental health analysis of their construction;

• take part in the authorization of the constructed or reconstructed nuclear facilities, issue the environmental health passport for work with radioactive materials and other sources of ionizing radiation;

• establish the standards for medical examination for the personnel working with radioactive materials and the sources of ionizing radiation, the frequency of the examination, contraindications and control the compliance with the standards;

• undertake monitoring of the health of the nuclear facility personnel and the residents of the monitored zone of the facility;

• ensure the preparedness of medical institutions for the elimination of the consequences of the accident;

• establish the radiation protection norms for the population and control compliance with them;

• organize medical examination of the containment forces of a nuclear accident and the population affected by radiation exposure and submit findings and proposals for the reduction of radiation exposure;

• determine occupational diseases for the personnel in the sphere of nuclear energy and study the causes of the diseases;

• carry out the education on radiation protection of the population.

Most of these functions are delegated to the Radiation Protection Centre (RPC), which is the regulatory body coordinating the activities of the executive and other bodies of public administration and local government in the field of radiation protection, monitoring and expert examination of public exposure. Among other responsibilities the RPC is responsible for supervision of the fulfilment of the requirements regarding the radiation protection of workers (excluding in nuclear facilities) and the general public from negative impacts caused by ionizing radiation. In case of a nuclear accident at INPP, RPC presents recommendations to the State Emergency Commission, to all levels of Emergency Management Centres, executive and other bodies of public administration for the reduction of exposure doses and prevention of deterministic and stochastic effects of radiation on the public and emergency workers. RPC performs analysis of food stock, drinking-water and other samples, contaminated by radionuclides, and presents suggestions to the Ministry of Health to approve food stock and their raw materials, drinking-water, temporary maximum permissible levels of radioactive contamination for the emergency consequences liquidation period, organizes supervision and control of their compliance. Also, RPC presents suggestions to the Ministry of Health about the necessity of applying iodine prophylaxis and provide information to the public, within the limits of its competence, about protection actions. In order to continually ensure emergency preparedness, RPC has approved the emergency preparedness plan and established an internal EPO.

The Ministry of Environment or its authorized institution, according to the manner set out by the legal acts, conducts the state construction supervision of the building structures of nuclear installations, prepares and approves methodology of assessment of damage caused by ionizing radiation to the environment and its compensation and periodically informs the general public and the state and municipal authorities on the radiation situation in the country.

The Ministry of Social Security and Labour is responsible for compliance with the requirements of labor, safety at work and related statutory acts.

The Ministry of Transport and Communications participates in the drafting of laws and subordinate legislation and the training and certification of personnel for the transportation of nuclear and radioactive materials.

The Fire and Rescue Department is the coordinating institution in respect of the preparation of emergency plans and their implementation in the event of an accident at the INPP. The department organizes the training sessions of population protection in the event of a nuclear accident.

The Ministry of the Interior ensures fire protection of the NPP and other nuclear facilities. It also ensures physical protection of the NPP, other nuclear facilities and nuclear materials during transport across the country. The Ministry of the Interior is responsible for preparation, co-ordination and implementation of the interdepartmental anti-terrorist and anti-penetration action plans, investigating the cases of theft and illegal possession of nuclear and radioactive materials and other dual-use items.

The State Security Department exercises prevention of subversive, sabotage and terrorist acts, as well as other offences aimed at damaging the interests of state security at nuclear facilities, in their environment, and on transportation routes of nuclear and radioactive materials. It performs the trustworthiness check of personnel of nuclear facilities and personnel involved in transportation of nuclear material.

The Governmental Emergencies Commission is responsible for the co-ordination of the activities of all the bodies and forces taking part in the containment of a nuclear accident and its consequences.

The County Governors have powers that are delegated to them by the Law on County Government, the Law on Nuclear Energy and other laws and subordinate legislation of the Republic of Lithuania. Some of these have reference to nuclear facilities and emergency activities within their county.

The Local Authorities are responsible for municipal and public interactions with sitting applications, nuclear facilities and activities in the territories under their jurisdiction that are within the sanitary protection or monitoring zones.

INPP is the only nuclear installation in Lithuania. It contains two RBMK-1500 reactors, which have their own design peculiarities compared to RBMK-1000. INPP is located in the north-eastern part of Lithuania, near the borders with Latvia and Belarus. The power plant was built as part of the Soviet Union's North-West Unified Power System. The first Unit of INPP was connected to grid at the end of 1983, and the second Unit in August 1987. Design lifetime of the units was projected out to 2014-2017 accordingly. In total, four units were originally planned to be built on the INPP site. Construction of the third unit was suspended in 1988 due to political pressure, and construction of the fourth never started. INPP shut down Unit 1 on 31 December, 2004 and Unit 2 on 31 December, 2009 in compliance with the protocol of Lithuania's EU accession.

On 26 December 2008, the first unit was finally designated as shut down. Defueling of Unit 1 began in 2006. It was performed according to a working programme which was based on a VATESI approved safety justification. The safety justification confirmed monotonic increase of subcriticality during refueling and demonstrated acceptability of consequences of possible accidents. During refuelling, relevant parameters were monitored by equipment. Until the end of the defueling process, the reactor was monitored by control room personnel all the time. A part of removed spent fuel assemblies was transported to Unit 2 for after-burning. In December 2009, defueling was completed. 978 FAs have been transported to Unit 2 for afterburning and the remaining assemblies were put into spent fuel storage pools.

After shut-down, Unit 2 was maintained in a post-operation state based on VATESI license and in accordance with the requirements of the Technical conditions for operation of Unit 2. The validity of the Technical conditions was extended until 31 December, 2010. Technical conditions for operation of Unit 2, covering the defueling phase have now been developed. The Unit 2 Decommissioning Project, covering shutdown, defueling phases and including the Safety Analysis Report, has been developed. In September 2010, the Decommissioning Project and the SAR were approved by VATESI. From the organizational point of view, activities for INPP safety assurance are implemented within the framework of SIP-3.

TABLE 7. STATUS OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

Reactor Unit	Type	Net Capacity [MW(e)]	Status	Operator	Reactor Supplier	Construction Date	First Criticality Date	First Grid Date	Commercial Date	Shutdown Date	UCF for 2015
IGNALINA-1	LWGR	1185	Permanent Shutdown	INPP	MAEP	1977-05-01	1983-10-04	1983-12-31	1985-05-01	2004-12-31
IGNALINA-2	LWGR	1185	Permanent Shutdown	INPP	MAEP	1978-01-01	1986-12-01	1987-08-20	1987-12-01	2009-12-31
IGNALINA-3	LWGR	1380	Cancelled Constr.	INPP	MAEP	1985-06-01				1988-08-30

Data source: IAEA - Power Reactor Information System (PRIS).

Note: Table 7 is completely generated from PRIS data to reflect the latest available information and may be more up to date than the text of the report.

Decommissioning: information and plans

On 5 October 1999, the Seimas approved the National Energy Strategy in accordance with which Unit 1 at INPP was considered to be shut down by 2005, given the long-term substantial financial support conditions of the European Union, G-7 and other countries and international financial institutions. On 31 December 2004, Unit 1 was shut down in compliance with the protocol of Lithuania's EU accession, and Unit 2 was to be operated until the end of 2009.

On 19 February 2001, the Government approved the Decommissioning Programme of INPP Unit 1 envisaging the measures for 2001-2004. On 2 February 2005, the Government of the Republic of Lithuania approved the new Decommissioning Programme for both Units of INPP. The main objectives of the Programme are:

• To ensure safe operation of INPP during the preparatory decommissioning phase and during the actual decommissioning activities.

• Develop, modify and add to the legal acts related to INPP decommissioning.

• Ensure the work of INPP Decommissioning Service and Unit 1 Surveillance Service.

• In the order defined by the legal acts, evaluate both the preparatory decommissioning projects and the decommissioning projects in respect to nuclear and radiation safety, as well as license them.

• To mitigate negative social and economic effects. It also specifies necessary organizational, technical, economic and social measures to achieve the above mentioned objectives.

Furthermore, on 25 February 2005, the plan was approved by the order of the Minister of Economy on implementation of measures of the decommissioning programme of INPP Units 1 and 2, envisaging the measures for addressing environmental, social and economic problems, as well as the consequences of premature decommissioning. The document is reissued once a year.

The Final Decommissioning Plan

Pursuant to the provisions of the Law on Nuclear Energy (Off. Journal, 1996, No 119-2771) and General Requirements for Decommissioning of the Ignalina NPP, VD-EN-01-99, (Off. Journal, 1999, No 85 -2558) which were effective at the time of preparation for decommissioning of the INPP, the INPP prepared the Final Decommissioning Plan (FDP) which was finally approved by the Head of VATESI in May 2004 and in July 2005 the FDP was approved by the Ministry of Economy. In compliance with the Requirements for Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities, P-2009-02, (Off. Journal, 2009, No 43-1708) superseding the above mentioned General Requirements for Decommissioning of the Ignalina NPP, VD-EN-01-99, the FDP shall be reviewed at least once per 5 years considering the experience gained during the implementation of the decommissioning process, changes in the decommissioning strategy, decommissioning performance schedule, financing, etc.

Therefore, in 2010 the process for the FDP update was initiated which is still ongoing due to incorporation of comments provided by the interested state institutions participating in the FDP agreement process and the major delays.

Though the final date of termination of the overall decommissioning process has shifted, the adopted decommissioning strategy remains unchanged and is further implemented as the strategy of immediate dismantling.

The FDP evaluates the main milestones of decommissioning including cost estimation for the post-shutdown period, and the cost of the necessary decommissioning preparatory work and decontamination and dismantling activities. The FDP also determines the configuration of Unit 1 and Unit 2 systems during fuel unloading from the reactor (first phase) and during fuel unloading from the spent fuel storage pools (second phase).

The Plan encompasses the entire period of the INPP decommissioning (starting with the preparatory works for step by step dismantling of separate installations, systems and equipment not needed any more to ensure the safe operation and maintenance of the INPP, actual dismantling and decontamination of those installations, construction of new facilities dedicated for interim storage of spent fuel and radioactive waste, removal of spent fuel from the units to the constructed interim storage facility, demolishing of emptied buildings, and the final recultivation of the site).

In order to implement the adopted strategy decommissioning activities and implementation of separate projects are carefully planned. FDP describes principles, methods and technologies, as well as the general schedule necessary to ensure safe in respect to nuclear, radiation, physical protection, environment protection and efficient decommissioning process.

The INPP FDP covers the following areas of concern: Applied regulatory framework; Adopted dismantling strategy of the INPP installations; Description of the plant to be decommissioned; Decommissioning plan and schedule; Licensing strategy of the decommissioning process; Dismantling techniques and tools; Decontamination technology; Radiological characterization of the INPP installations, buildings and the territory; The INPP decommissioning project technical concept; INPP waste management strategy; Description of radioactive and hazardous materials already accumulated and to be accumulated during the decommissioning process; Decommissioning safety assessment; Description of the decommissioning environmental impact assessment process; Radiation protection programme; INPP organizational chart during the decommissioning stage; Decommissioning expenses and financing; Description of the management system; Demolishing of buildings and recultivation of the site.

The overall INPP decommissioning process is subdivided into several stages in order to facilitate coping with the arising risks and to ensure reliable distribution of funds and consecutive implementation of works. The general planning of the decommissioning activities will be specified during implementation of separate dismantling and decontamination projects when identifying the interrelated activities. In respect to nuclear safety the activities such as handling of spent fuel, modification and isolation of systems, dismantling and decontamination of systems not related to safety are carried out after the final shutdown of the reactors. The preparatory works, actual dismantling and decontamination works are performed by the INPP qualified staff.

Decommissioning Project for INPP Unit 1 Final Shutdown and Defueling Phase

The Decommissioning Project for INPP Unit 1 Final Shutdown and Defueling Phase, including SAR and EIA Reports, was prepared in August 2004. The project and its SAR and EIA were accepted by competent State authorities.

In June 2006, VATESI approved the Decommissioning Project for INPP Unit 1 Final Shutdown and Defueling Phase and its safety analysis report. VATESI also arranged a nuclear safety review of the project and the review's conclusion was submitted to the Ministry of Environment, which arranged the State Complex Expertise of the project. The conclusions of State Complex Expertise were issued in October 2006.

The Decommissioning Project covers works which will be performed within the frames of prolonged operational license for INPP Unit 1. It is one of the documents substantiating the permission for reactor final shutdown. The project has a double purpose:

Process regulations, in which: the systems (their parts) which are not needed any more are indicated, their further isolation/modification is described, that allow reducing costs for the shutdown Unit maintenance;

In-line decontamination of MCC and refueling machine is described (with the aim to reduce personnel irradiation during further dismantling works performance).

Guide on planning in which all expenses of the described period are estimated (related not only to process activities, but to operation of remaining systems, treatment of fuel and radioactive waste, as well as other preparatory works), need in man power, personnel irradiation, discharges into environment and radiation impact on the population.

The Project does not cover dismantling works, since they will be performed within the frames of other dismantling and decontamination projects.

In June 2007 VATESI and the INPP agreed as to what documents would have to be analyzed in order to grant Unit 2 the status of a finally shutdown facility.

Environmental impact is analyzed in the EIA report, on the basis of which the Ministry of Environment has accepted an affirmative solution regarding the final shutdown of INPP and possibilities of nuclear defueling with respect to environmental impact. In accordance with the Espoo Convention EIA report is subject to consultations.

Decommissioning Project for INPP Unit 2 Final Shutdown and Defueling Phase

The Unit 2 Decommissioning Project covering final shutdown, defueling phases and including the Safety Analysis Report, was developed in November 2009. In September 2010, the Decommissioning Project and the SAR have been approved by VATESI.

Unit 2 decommissioning EIA, covering the final shutdown and defueling phase, was developed in June 2009. In August 2010 the EIA was approved by the Ministry of Environment.

In accordance with the Requirements for decommissioning of nuclear facilities (P-2009-02), INPP must obtain VATESI permission for final shutdown of Unit 2 reactor. Such permission may be granted following provision to VATESI and review by the regulator of relevant documentation, including:

Ministry of Environment conclusions on Unit 2 EIA covering the final shutdown and defueling phase,

Conclusions of the State expertise panel on Unit 2 Decommissioning Project covering the final shutdown and defueling phase, and Technical specifications for operation of Unit 2 for the reactor defueling phase.

Historical enhancement of Ignalina NPP performance

The Safety Analysis Report (SAR) of 1995-1996 was the first Western-style safety analysis for any Soviet-design NPP. Specialists from the Ignalina NPP, Russia (main RBMK designer RDIPE), Canada, UK, USA and Sweden participated in the project. The SAR team supported the Ignalina NPP management, showing that (1) an adequate safety case for continuing operation had been demonstrated; (2) the safety case would be adequate to the point of first gap closure, which will be the lifetime limiting factor; and (3) the plant’s safety standards and practices had been assessed and recommendations for improvement had been made and accepted by Ignalina NPP. A significant conclusion stated in the SAR is that none of the analyzed safety concerns require the immediate shutdown of the plant.

The Review of Safety Analysis Report (RSR) of 1995-1997 was an independent review of the SAR, performed by Western (France, Germany, Italy, UK and USA) and Eastern (Lithuania, Russia) experts. The RSR team agreed with almost all the SAR team’s recommendations for improvement and made some additional recommendations. They, however, were not able to agree that a fully adequate safety case had been demonstrated and gave a set of recommendations both on the additional analyses and safety improvement measures to be implemented. These recommendations formed a basis for the INPP’s Second Safety Improvement Programme (SIP-2), approved in 1997.

Lithuania, Russia, USA, Sweden, United Kingdom and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development participated and were taking part in the performance of the Safety Improvement Programme SIP-2, which was started in 1997. Objective of SIP-2 programme was the improvement of safety of INPP with reference to equipment, operating procedures and management to a level of Western standards.

The safety of INPP Unit 2 operation was based upon Safety Analysis Report - SAR-2. SAR-2 was prepared in 2000 and after review by VATESI in September 2004, INPP received an indefinite validity license for Unit 2 operation.

From 2006 to 2008, INPP updated the SAR for Unit 2. The update was implemented taking into account the results of modifications, analytical work and changes to INPP safety management system, carried out during the period of 2001-2007. 127 modifications of Unit 2 main equipment and 50 analytical works have been carried out based on review report of SAR-2 (RSR-2), VATESI recommendations, as well as based on INPP's own initiative as part of the process of updating SAR-2. The results of analytical work were used as a basis for implementation of a number of modifications at Unit 2, such as use of uranium-erbium fuel with 2.8% enrichment, commissioning of a diverse shut down system, use of cluster control rods. Implementation of these modifications allowed for a significant increase of nuclear safety of INPP Unit 2.

The main modification which was done at INPP unit 2 was installation of Diverse Shutdown System (DSS). In October 2004, DSS was put into trial-industrial operation. The requirement of the Regulations on the availability of two independent Shutdown Systems was implemented. DSS implementation was fully completed in 2008, including training of the operating and maintenance staff.

In 2001, INPP made an important step towards the management of beyond design accidents – in addition to emergency procedures the Symptom-Based Emergency Operating Instructions (SOAI) were introduced. Symptom-based emergency operating procedures are easy to handle in the accidents in which it is difficult to correctly diagnose the cause. In order to prevent the evolution of the design accidents into the beyond design accidents and to mitigate the consequences of the beyond design accidents the Guidelines on the management of the beyond design accidents (Russian abbreviation – RUZA) have been developed at INPP for Unit 2. In order to implement RUZA strategies, during the period 2007-2008 the existing INPP equipment was modified and INPP personnel involved in emergency response activities was trained. Leak Before Break (LBB) concept has been implemented at INPP in 2007. This assured the fulfilment of the existing nuclear requirements.

The implementation of these systems helped to increase the safety of the Unit since it allowed detecting small coolant leaks at early stages.

Upon Lithuania’s decision regarding continuation of development of nuclear energy, at the end of 2006 three energy companies of the Baltic States - AB Lietuvos Energija, AS Latvenergo and Eesti Energia AS - conducted a feasibility study concerning implementation of the new NPP project in Lithuania. It was concluded that the project is feasible to implement and was substantiated from the economic, technical, environmental and legal points of view.

The Visaginas Nuclear Power Plant (VNPP) project comprises construction of a new NPP and the related infrastructure in Lithuania. Upon implementation of the project, the shutdown Ignalina NPP Units will be replaced by modern, safe and environmentally-friendly electric power production technology.

Considering the fact that Lithuania already had an operating NPP, as well as sufficient experience in developing nuclear energy infrastructure and maintaining a high level of nuclear safety, this experience will be used when constructing VNPP. The VNPP will be constructed next to the current INPP, which is located on the south bank of Drukšiai Lake, six kilometers from the town of Visaginas and next to the border with Latvia and Belarus.

The preparations for the new NPP project in Lithuania were started at the end of 2006. The JSC “Visaginas NPP project” (further – VAE) was established in August 2008 and took over the preparatory works, which were carried out by the Nuclear Energy Department of Lietuvos Energija AB since the end of 2006.

VAE was responsible for the implementation of the preparatory works for construction of VNPP such as comprehensive construction sites study, transportation study, environmental audit and other project preparatory works that are necessary in order to have proper arrangements, after the establishment of project implementing company, to develop VNPP construction project.

In July 2007, the environmental impact assessment of the construction of a new NPP in Lithuania began. A consortium of Finish and Lithuanian companies implemented a project “Preparation of environmental impact assessment programme for NPP”, in which the scope of the new NPP environmental impact assessment guidelines was determined. In the report of the EIA, possible environmental impacts of the construction and exploitation of new NPP were assessed in cooperation with other Finish and Lithuanian institutions (Lithuanian Energy Institute, Institute of Botany, institute of Ecology and National Public Health Surveillance Laboratory). The possible international impact of the new power plant to the Republics of Latvia and Belarus was also assessed. According to the EIA report of 2009, positive evaluations of the responsible institutions were made concerning the planned economic activity and, therefore, following this report, the Ministry of Environment decided on the possibilities of new NPP construction in Lithuania. The resolution on the permissibility of construction and operation of a new NPP, based on generation III or III+ PWR, BWR or PHWR technology with the power capacity up to 3,400 MW_e was adopted by the Ministry of Environment in April 2009.

VNPP is a regional project and the electricity which the new nuclear plant will produce is expected to be distributed to the entire region. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are officially participating in the project as regional partners. In December 2009, Lithuania started a procedure to attract experienced investors with strong credentials in the development of new generation and operation of NPPs to the VNPP project.

The Government of Lithuania conducted direct negotiations with potential strategic investors early in 2011. Two competitive proposals were received in May 2011. In July 2011, the Government of Lithuania selected Hitachi Ltd. (Japan) as strategic investor and Hitachi-GE Nuclear Energy (Japan) as engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) contractor. Hitachi proposed to build a single 1.350 MW_e Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR) unit. It is expected that the reactor will be commissioned in 2020-2022.

The Government of Lithuania has agreed the Concession Agreement with the Strategic investor and Project company for the VNPP Project in May 2012. In June 2012, the European Commission, after the careful assessment of the VNPP Project, issued its favorable opinion on this regional Project.

At the end of June 2012, Parliament approved the Law on the Concession to be granted to the VNPP Project development company and the selection of Hitachi as the strategic investor, as well as the development of the project based on the Hitachi-GE ABWR technology. It was expected that Lithuania and Hitachi would establish the Project development and construction company and sign the agreements on the conditions approved by Parliament till the end of 2012. However, due to the negative result of the referendum on new NPP construction in Lithuania, held in middle of October 2012, future negotiations and Project development and construction company establishment slowed down.

In order to make a formal decision on Visaginas NPP project in line with referendum voting results the Government of the Lithuanian Republic, what came into power after the 2012 Parliament elections established a working group to evaluate the Visaginas NPP project economy and to review National Energetic Independence Strategy. The conclusions of this working group were announced in the first half of 2013. The working group concluded that the new Visaginas NPP project could be further developed if project economy will be improved and more favourable agreements will be reached with Strategic Investor and Regional Partners.

In February 2013 shares of Visaginas NPP project development company Visagino Atomine Elektrine (VAE) were transferred from the Ministry of Energy to be held in trust by the Ministry of Finance. In August 2013 the state-owned energy business group and its parent company Visagino Atomine Elektrine were been renamed to “Lietuvos Energija”, JSC. Change of the business name occured as a part of the corporate governance reorganization of the group of energy companies.

In November 2013 the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under the Ministry of the Environment based on application provided by “Lietuvos Energija”, JSC confirmed the validity of Visaginas NPP Environmental Impact Evaluation and prolonged the decision of ability to construct new nuclear power plant at confirmed sites approved by Ministry of the Environment in 2009 year for another 5 years.

The Government plans to discuss unresolved project issues with Strategic Investor and Regional Partners during 2014 in order take further decision regarding continuation of Visaginas NPP project development.

TABLE 8. PLANNED NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

Station/Project Name	Type	Capacity	Expected Construction Start Year	Expected Commercial Year
Visaginas NPP	ABWR	1,350 MWe	NA

Not applicable.

Not applicable.

Not applicable.

In 2009, following the decision of the Ministry of Environment in the course of the preparatory works for the construction of the new NPP, VAE initiated the Construction Site Evaluation against IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) Safety Standards. The selection and evaluation of NPP sites according to IAEA safety requirements is defined in the special Decree of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania No. 300 (Official Gazette, 2009, No. 46-1814).

The objectives of the evaluation were to assess suitability of the potential VNPP construction sites against IAEA safety requirements document No. NS-R-3 ,,Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installations” and the VATESI regulations. Under the agreement Assessment of Potential Visaginas NPP Construction Sites in Respect of External Events between VAE and LEI, the tasks on external factors (such as human-induced events, meteorological phenomena, site flooding) assessment were performed.

Moreover, site seismic and engineering geological investigations conducted in 2009-2010 by a number of Lithuanian and foreign companies. The completed document, “Geotechnical, Geological, and Seismological Data Inventory (GGSDI) for the Visaginas Sites” concludes that both potential VNPP construction sites are favourable for new construction. Additionally the site evaluation results were reviewed by Independent IAEA Site Safety Review Mission (SSRM) which took place 8–12 November, 2010. IAEA mission stated that “Sites evaluation is conducted in line with IAEA requirements and guides, the volume of investigation is sufficient, and sites are suitable for construction of Visaginas NPP”.

The site evaluation report was submitted to the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate (VATESI) and to the other Lithuanian authorities involved in site assessment process. Regulatory review and assessment of site evaluation report process is ongoing.

In May 2012, Engineering Geological (Geotechnical) Soil Investigations for NPP Design were initiated by signing a contract between a Lithuanian and USA company consortium. The purpose of works was to obtain sufficient engineering geological information and geotechnical engineering parameters of geological layers to support the final design of ABWR safety related structures at the construction site of VNPP. The fieldwork activities were completed in September 2012.

The advisory referendum on supporting new Visaginas NPP construction in Lithuania was held in the middle of October 2012. The results of voting showed negative public opinion against new NPP construction and project development. 34% of voters gave support for new NPP construction while 63% of voters were against it. However, local community of two neighboring to planed NPP site districts – Ignalina and Zarasai as well as nearest Visaginas city showed highest support to new Visaginas NPP construction in Lithuania.

45% of Ignalina and 65% of Zarasai districts voters gave support for new NPP construction in Lithuania. In Visaginas city itself more than 84% of local community accepted and supported the decision of construction of new NPP just 6 km away from Visaginas city.

The Government plans to discuss unresolved project issues with Strategic Investor and Regional Partners during 2014 in order take further decision regarding continuation of Visaginas NPP project development and the general public will be provided with the results of the decision.

Lithuanian Energy Institute, Centre for Physical Sciences and Technology, Kaunas University of Technology, and Vilnius Gediminas Technical University are involved in nuclear or nuclear related activities, as the Technical Support Organisations (TSO) mainly. They provide expertise and necessary technical-scientific support during preparation of safety submittals, safety reviews, verification of safety justifications. Some of these TSOs are also involved in international projects implemented through international and bilateral cooperation.

Lithuanian Energy Institute performs a wide range of nuclear-related activities, some of which are listed below:

1. safety assessment of nuclear power plants;

2. research related to construction of a new nuclear power plant in Lithuania;

3. Thermal-hydraulic analysis of accident and transient processes;

4. assessment of thermal-hydraulic parameters in NPP;

5. simulation of radionuclides and aerosols transport in the compartments;

6. assessment of nuclear reactor core modifications and analysis of postulated reactivity accidents;

7. safety analysis of thermonuclear fusion reactors;

8. analysis of new generation nuclear power plants;

9. reliability estimation and control of energy systems;

10. Level 1 and Level 2 probabilistic safety assessment of NPPs;

11. strength analysis of constructions, piping and components in complex technical systems;

12. etc.

Activities of the Nuclear and Environmental Radioactivity Research Laboratory of the Centre for Physical Sciences and Technology are development and application of nuclear spectroscopy methods, radionuclide metrology and standardization, investigations in environmental radioactivity, radionuclide tracer studies, radio-ecological monitoring and dose assessment.

The Centre for Non-Destructive Testing at Kaunas University of Technology and the Laboratory of Welding and Material Analysis at Vilnius Gediminas Technical University are highly qualified in the indicated areas, equipped with modern instrumentation and also plays an important role as technical support organisations.

With the aid of the European Commission, these facilities were equipped with modern instrumentation.

Not applicable.

Lithuania has or had multilateral and bilateral projects, mostly concerning safety of NPPs, with several highly developed Western countries, including Sweden, Germany, the USA, the UK, France, Belgium, Italy, Switzerland, Denmark, Canada, Finland and Japan.

The main multilateral projects were the TACIS founded International RBMK Safety Review Consortium, Lord Marshall's Users Group for Soviet Designed Reactors and the IAEA extra budgetary programme on RBMK reactors. One of the most important projects for Lithuania was the international project “Safety of Design Solutions and Operation of NPP’s with RBMK Reactors” covering a broad range of safety related topics, with Unit 2 of the INPP used as a reference plant.

The BARSELINA project (1992-2001) – level 1 and 2 probabilistic safety assessment of the INPP was conducted by Sweden, Lithuania and Russia. This project provides a unified basis for the assessment of severe accident risks for RBMK type reactors and the preparation of remedial measures. Some of the improvements highlighted by the PSA have already been implemented at the INPP.

Another project of the Lithuanian-Swedish bilateral programme was the application of modern non-destructive testing (NDT) systems for in-service inspection of the pressure boundary system. One other project is the preparation of an "Overall Plan for Radioactive Waste Management" in Lithuania by Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Co., SKB. Project “Fire and flooding protection” helped to improve the whole fire protection system at Ignalina NPP.

The performance of SAR (1995-1996), RSR (1995-1997), the review of SAR-2 (2001-2003), safety analyses recommended by SAR, RSR and Ignalina Safety Panel (1997-1999), Safety Improvement Programme SIP-2, which was started in 1997, should be mentioned as a good example of the multilateral collaboration.

IAEA offers many courses for nuclear specialists’ training. One of the most important national Technical Co-operation projects - Systematic approach to training (SAT) for NPP personnel, completed in 2000, helped to strengthen safety and reliability of the Ignalina NPP.

There have been a number of projects implemented with the USA, financed by the Department of Energy and USAID framework of Nuclear Safety Assistance Programme for Lithuania. Co-operation in nuclear safety improvement at the Ignalina NPP with Japan specialists started in 1994. In the frame of the Agreement of Co-operation for Safety Improvement at the Ignalina NPP signed in 1996, Science and Technology Agency of Japan started two big projects: “Co-operation on plant operation management” and “Co-operation on fuel channel integrity”.

GRS (Germany) and Lithuanian Energy Institute were and are involved in the co-operative project of Analysis of Safety Aspects of INPP, including the studies of neutron dynamics and thermal hydraulics. Lithuanian Energy Institute and American Nuclear Society have signed a “Memorandum of cooperation in February 2007, which was prolonged for another five-year period in February 2011.

In 2009, the Lithuanian Energy Institute was accepted to the European Technical Support Organisation Network (ETSON), with core members (at that time) IRSN (France), GRS (Germany), Bel V (Belgium), ÚJV (Czech Republic), VTT (Finland). In 2009 members of ETSON decided to create European Nuclear Safety Training and Tutoring Institute (ENSTTI). Thus, in 2009 two European TSOs (IRSN in France and LEI in Lithuania) created ENSTTI. Later, ENSTTI joined GRC (Germany) and Bel V (Belgium). Lithuanian Energy Institute actively participated and participates in international collaboration projects:

6th Framework Programme:

7th Framework Programme:

A number of Lithuanian experts participate in IAEA training courses as experts delegated by this Agency.

International Co-operation for Visaginas NPP construction

See section 2.3.1.

VATESI, which was established in 1991, is an independent state institution exercising state regulation and supervision of nuclear safety, activities involving nuclear materials and other activities in the area of nuclear energy involving sources of ionising radiation, which acts in accordance with Law on Nuclear Safety, other laws and regulations of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate. VATESI reports to the President and the Government. Until October 2011, VATESI was accountable to the Government only.

The main responsibilities of VATESI can be found in section 2.1.2. Additional responsibilities are:

• according to the procedure and conditions provided in the laws exercises functions of the state regulation and supervision of nuclear safety, physical security of nuclear facilities, nuclear fuel cycle materials and other nuclear materials of the defined quantity, accounting for and control of the nuclear materials, also of radiation protection in nuclear facilities as well as oversight of use of sources of ionising radiation within nuclear facilities;

• to perform supervision of the compliance with the requirements set forth by the legal acts for activities in the area of nuclear energy subject to licences or permits and monitor exercising of the rights and obligations of licence holders and/or permit holders;

• to draft and approve by the order of the Head of VATESI the requirements and rules for nuclear safety, physical security of nuclear facilities, nuclear fuel cycle materials, and other materials of the defined quantity, accounting for and control of the nuclear materials, also for radiation safety in the area of nuclear energy, mandatory to all the state and municipal authorities and to all persons engaged in nuclear energy area related activities;

• after coordination with the Ministry of Health, to draft and approve by the order of the Head of VATESI the radiation protection requirements of workers or certain risk groups of workers, who permanently or temporarily work at nuclear facilities, as well as of other persons who temporarily perform operations at nuclear facilities;

• after coordination with the Ministry of Health to establish norms for release of radionuclides from nuclear facilities and to monitor compliance with the norms for release of radionuclides;

• to perform supervision of the compliance with the requirements of the legal acts regulating nuclear safety, physical security of nuclear facilities, nuclear fuel cycle materials and other nuclear materials of the defined quantity, accounting for and control of the nuclear materials, as well as radiation safety in the area of nuclear energy;

• to analyse and assess the documents submitted by applicants for obtaining a licence or a permit, also the documents submitted by licence holders or permit holders or other persons, shall adopt relevant decisions regarding such documents, shall review and evaluate the nuclear safety;

• to supervise and inspect applicants, licence and permit holders or the persons rendering services, supplying goods or performing works for them or other persons engaged in activities pertaining to nuclear materials and nuclear fuel cycle materials;

• in the cases specified in the laws and other legal acts by a decision of the Head of VATESI to issue, suspend licences and permits, revoke suspension of licences and permits, or cancel licences and permits, establishes or changes their terms, supervises compliance with such terms;

• subject to coordination with the Ministry of Health to establish limits for release of radionuclides from nuclear installations and monitor compliance with the norms for release of radionuclides;

• to draft and approve by an order of the Head of VATESI the modification categories of a nuclear installation and a description of the procedure for carrying out modifications;

• to cooperate with foreign institutions exercising state regulation and supervision in the sector of nuclear energy, within its competence shall participate in activities of international organisations and institutions, committees and groups of the European Union;

• within its competence and in the manner laid down by the legal acts to prepare and/or submit to the Government the draft laws and legal acts of the Republic of Lithuania on the issues of nuclear safety, physical security of nuclear facilities, nuclear materials and nuclear fuel cycle materials, accounting for and control of nuclear materials, also of radiation safety in carrying out nuclear energy related activities involving sources of ionising radiation;

• to prepare and submit to the Government or its authorised institution proposals regarding the national policy and strategy in the sector of nuclear energy and implementation thereof;

• to prepare and submit to the Government or its authorised institutions proposals regarding improvements of the system ensuring nuclear safety, physical security of nuclear facilities, nuclear materials and other nuclear fuel cycle materials, accounting for and control of nuclear materials, also radiation safety in the area of nuclear energy;

• in the event of a nuclear and/or radiological accident to provide the interested state and municipal authorities with the time-critical information about the radiation situation in the nuclear installation, estimated threats of the nuclear and/or radiological accident and other related information;

• according to the procedure and conditions provided in the laws and other legal acts to participate in emergency preparedness activity, such as regulation and supervision of on-site Emergency preparedness, or Notification of international organization and neighbouring countries in case of a nuclear accident.

For implementation of these tasks, the Head of VATESI issues nuclear and radiation safety, physical security and nuclear material accountancy and control requirements and rules, issues licenses and permits to the activities related to nuclear safety, controls adherence to the requirements set out in licences conditions, safety requirements and rules, implements enforcement measures, such as:

- issue a warning of suspension of licence or permit, suspend or revoke licence or permit;

- impose a fine on the legal entity which fails to act in line with the requirements established by Law on Nuclear Safety and other legal acts that regulate nuclear safety and other legal and regulatory requirements.-impose fines on a natural person for the infringement of the nuclear safety requirements;

-provide mandatory instructions to all licence or permit holders, committing them to remedy the detected infringements in nuclear safety, to suspend the activities within the time-limits set by the Head of VATESI and/or to shut-down the nuclear reactor, to decrease its capacity, to discontinue operation of other equipment or activities.

The recent licensing system in the field of nuclear energy was established by adopting the following laws:

1. Law on Nuclear Energy of 1996, new edition – 2011;

2. Law on Nuclear Safety of 2011;

3. Law on Radiation Protection of 1999,

4. Law on the Management of Radioactive Waste of 1999, new edition - 2011

The regulations made under the Laws govern siting, design, construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning of nuclear facilities, and provide other safety requirements.

The Law on Nuclear Energy and the Law on Nuclear Safety, together with the regulations made under the Laws, establish the licensing system for activities related to nuclear materials or nuclear cycle materials (their transportation, acquisition, etc.), as well as for nuclear facilities of the following life-stages: site evaluation, design, construction, commissioning, operation, and decommissioning. The supervision of the closed radioactive waste repository, acquisition, keeping, use and transportation of nuclear or nuclear fuel cycle materials is also executed according to the laws mentioned above. This regulation should encompass the following areas:

• nuclear safety, radiation safety and physical security of nuclear facilities, nuclear and nuclear fuel cycle materials;

• fire protection of safety related structures, systems and components;

• emergency preparedness in nuclear facilities and during transportation of nuclear and/or nuclear fuel cycle materials;

• radioactive waste management safety;

• the release of radionuclides into the environment;

• management systems of legal entities engaged in a licensed activity and other activities involving nuclear and nuclear fuel cycle materials or carried out in nuclear facility as well as assessment of the nuclear facility construction site.

VATESI is a competent authority for the licensing of activities involving nuclear materials or nuclear cycle materials or carried out in nuclear facilities within the legally defined life-stages.

The legislation provides the following nuclear safety related authorisations during site evaluation and design stages of a nuclear facility:

1. During the stage of site evaluation, VATESI shall review and assess the site evaluation report. The positive conclusions with respect to the site evaluation report shall be presented by the following institutions: the Ministry of Health, the Civil Aviation Administration, the Lithuanian Geology Service, the Lithuanian Hydro Meteorological Service and the Fire and Rescue Department, in order to approve it.

2. Before the design activities start, technical specification for design has to be approved by VATESI.

3. Design of a nuclear facility has to be performed and assessed according to the requirements established by the competent institutions, including VATESI, Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Interior and other institutions involved according to the Law on Construction, the Law on Nuclear Energy, the Law on Nuclear Safety and the regulations made under the Laws.

According to the Law on Nuclear Safety, the following types of licences and permits are established in order to be issued by VATESI:

• licence for construction of a nuclear facility (or facilities);

• licence for operation of a nuclear facility (or facilities);

• licence for construction and operation of a nuclear facility (or facilities);

• licence for decommissioning of a nuclear facility (or facilities);

• licence for supervision of a closed radioactive waste repository (or repositories);

• licence for transportation of nuclear fuel cycle materials, nuclear materials and other fissile materials with exception of the small amount as described in the Law.;

• licence for acquisition, keeping and use of nuclear materials and other fissile materials with exception of the small amount as prescribed in the Law;

• permit for first carry-in of nuclear fuel to site of NPP, unit or non-power nuclear reactor;

• permit for the first carry-in and testing of the nuclear facility using nuclear and/or nuclear fuel cycle materials;

• permit for first start-up of unit of NPP or non-power nuclear reactor

• permit for industrial operation of the nuclear facility;

• permit for start-up of the nuclear reactor after its short-term shutdown

• permit for shipment of radioactive waste generated in nuclear fuel cycle

• permit for shipment of spent nuclear fuel

Following the provisions of the Law on Radiation Protection, VATESI issues licences and permits for the nuclear energy area activities involving sources of ionising radiation, which mainly are a licence or a temporary permit to carry out activities under ionising radiation at a nuclear facility and a licence or a temporary permit to store, maintain sources of ionising radiation at a nuclear facility.

The Law on Nuclear Safety prohibits every activity associated with nuclear facility, nuclear materials and nuclear cycle materials without an authorisation issued by VATESI. For authorisation VATESI issues, suspends, amends, revokes suspension or revokes licences or permits.

A licence for the construction of a nuclear facility may be granted only if the Parliament of Lithuania (in case of NPP) or the Government of Lithuania (in case of other facilities) has adopted a legal act on the facility.

Every licence may have licence conditions attached. Conditions attached to the licence ensure necessary control and enforcement of the purposes of the laws. Licence conditions should be observed during the construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning stages of the facility.

As stipulated in the Law on Nuclear Safety, licences and permits shall be issued to legal entities or persons having sufficient technological, financial, management system, human, accident preparedness, physical security capacities, capacities of safe storage, transportation, accounting for and control of nuclear materials meeting the provisions of IAEA and Euratom for safeguard, allowing proper fulfilment of the conditions of the licensed activity and ensuring nuclear safety.

Lists of information and documents that the applicant is required to provide for the issue of an appropriate licence or permit are established by the Resolution of the Government of Lithuania.