Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism as an Important Element of National and International Security

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Ratification of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, Amendment of CPPNM, accession to the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and amending the Criminal Code of Ukraine with provisions governing liability for unlawful production of nuclear explosive devices are among practical steps towards closer cooperation with countries who share common goals in developing a reliable system of protection against the threat of nuclear terrorism.

As the result of accession to the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism Ukraine has undertaken voluntary compliance with its principles aimed primarily to prevent purchase, transfer and use for terrorist purposes of nuclear materials, radioactive substances, makeshift explosive devices using such materials, as well as to counter unlawful acts against nuclear facilities.
Analysis of available threat assessment data demonstrates that potentially hazardous nuclear energy facilities are among the most likely targets of terrorist attacks.

The most important reasons include the scale of adverse radiological consequences of terrorist acts at such facilities and dependence of safety of local population on their reliable and sustainable operation.

This is the most dangerous types of terrorist activity, considering the likelihood of disastrous consequences (radioactive contamination of vast territories, water supply sources and life support systems). This is a picture of tragedy 1986 on Chornobulska nuclear power plant.
Examples of Negative Consequences of a Radiological Accident
Ministry of Fuel and Energy of Ukraine has under its control nearly 90% of the Ukraine’s entire nuclear energy infrastructure including nuclear power plants, research reactors, and nuclear industrial facilities.
The Ukrainian Ministry of Fuel and Energy has appointed a Deputy Minister in charge of counter-terrorism activities, whereas a specialised division within the Ministry – Physical Protection and Emergency Response Department – is responsible for exercising government administration in this area.

Physical Protection and Emergency Response Department implements government policy in establishment and improvement of regulatory framework for physical protection and counter-terrorism activity. In the past ten years the Department has prepared and introduced nearly 30 regulatory documents at the national and sectoral level, including guidelines for training specialists in physical protection and methodology guidance *Nuclear Security as a Measure to Protect against Nuclear Terrorism*, and established qualification requirements to officers involved in this activity.

Along these lines the Ministry of Fuel and Energy is involved in a comprehensive effort to build a modern and efficient system for prevention of nuclear terrorism to combine activities at operative, tactical and strategic levels and allow long-term prediction of potential developments.

On the following slide you will be offered a scheme of interface between the Ministry and elements of the functional subsystem and objects of terrorism suppression activity. This subsystem is a part Integral Government System for Prevention, Response and Interruption of Terrorist Acts and Mitigation of Their Consequences.
Integral Government Man-caused and Natural Emergencies Prevention and Response System (SGES)

Integral Government System for Prevention, Response and Interruption of Terrorist Acts and Mitigation of Their Consequences (SGCTS)

MFE Functional Subsystem of the Integral Government Man-caused and Natural Emergencies Prevention and Response System

MFE Functional Subsystem of the Integral Government System for Prevention, Response and Interruption of Terrorist Acts and Mitigation of Their Consequences

MFE Governing Bodies

- Commission, MFE HQ
- Commission, MFE HQ
- Systematic Monitoring Unit, MFE

Facility Level Crisis Prevention and Response Structure

MFE facility level man-caused and natural emergencies prevention and response functional subsystem

MFE facility level functional subsystem for prevention, response and interruption of terrorist acts and mitigation of their consequences

Facility Level Governing Body

- Commission, Facility HQ
- Commission, Facility HQ
- Control Centre, Operation Desk

Territorial subsystems of SGES and SGCTS
Counter-terrorism programme of the Ministry of Fuel and Energy (MFE) operates within the framework of the Crisis Prevention and Response System; the Ministry maintains a Crisis Systematic Monitoring Unit being a central element to assessment of all situations, including from the perspective of suppression of potential acts of nuclear terrorism.

This scheme is interconnected and based on the cooperation of all members this subsystem. Thanks to the fact that facilities work on the field of nuclear security culture it helps to achieve the goals of the subsystem.
improvement of coordination of activity in prevention, response and interruption of terrorist acts and of preventive, security, logistical, training and other activities

Subsystem Goals

- readiness of terrorism suppression forces and means
- interruption and mitigation of effects of terrorist acts
- training the population to act amid emergencies caused by terrorist acts
- security of potential targets of terrorist encroachments
- security of potential targets of terrorist acts
- training the population to act amid emergencies caused by terrorist acts
Pursuant to MFE guidelines, companies, enterprises and organisations under MFE jurisdiction have established headquarters to suppress acts of nuclear terrorism and implemented plans of preventive actions and periodic reports. That also includes:

- enhanced control over accounting and control systems in respect of nuclear material, other radioactive substances and shipments of weapons, ammunition and explosives;

- improvement of physical protection and security systems and in-site and access control procedures at nuclear facilities;

- desktop and tactical exercises at nuclear facilities jointly with the Security Service and the Ministry of Interior aimed to practice aspects of prevention of terrorist acts and mitigation of their consequences;
• revision of Acts of Joint Commissions in order to improve nuclear facility physical protection and security systems;

• joint inspections of status of physical protection and security of nuclear facilities potentially vulnerable to terrorism;

• establishment of an interdepartmental workgroup involving personnel of special services and other ministries and agencies whose task would be to improve nuclear facility protection and security systems, and allocation of relevant funding.
Summary:

1. Ukraine has recognised prevention of terrorism as one of the priorities of its national and international policy.

2. Ministry of Fuel and Energy (MFE), as an active contributor to all international counter-terrorism initiatives and agreements, is working consistently towards improvement of capabilities in prevention of nuclear terrorism threat.

3. Accumulation of real threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism and appreciation of danger put forward particular requirements to governments in implementing activities aimed to enhance security of nuclear facilities whose integral part is activity in assuring physical protection of nuclear materials, nuclear facilities, radioactive wastes and other sources of ionising radiation carried out by the Ministry.

4. Ukraine has established and maintains the Integral Government System for Suppression, Prevention, Response and Interruption of Terrorist Acts and Mitigation of Their Consequences.

5. The Ministry implements government policy in creation and improvement of regulatory framework in physical protection and counter-terrorist activity.
Thank you for your attention!