Countering Proliferation:
The UK Global Threat Reduction Programme

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Overview of presentation

• UK policy framework
• UK Global Threat Reduction Programme:
  – Scope
  – Implementation
  – International collaboration
  – Programme risks
  – Future challenges
• Conclusion
The UK’s National Security Strategy

“providing security for the nation and for its citizens remains the most important responsibility of government”

- A set of principles—including multilateralism

- Key security challenges—including terrorism; nuclear weapons, other Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

- The UK’s response—including the UK’s Counter-Proliferation Strategy
The UK’s Counter-Proliferation Strategy

• **Dissuade** states from acquiring, developing, and contributing to the spread of WMD, and related materials and expertise

• **Detect** attempts by states, and terrorists, to develop or acquire this capability

• **Deny** access to WMD and the necessary materials, equipment, technology and expertise to develop them, while promoting commerce and technological development for peaceful purposes

• **Defend** our country, our citizens, our Armed Forces and our strategic interests from the threats posed by proliferation
The UK’s Global Threat Reduction Programme (GTRP)

- Important part of ‘Deny’ strand
- UK’s largest cooperative counter-proliferation assistance programme, with an annual budget of around £36million
- Delivers UK contribution to the G8 Global Partnership established at Kananaskis in 2002
- FCO hold the policy lead, **DECC deliver the nuclear and radiological portfolio** (~90%) and MOD the chemical and biological programmes
Nuclear and Radiological portfolio: current activities

• Management of spent nuclear fuel at Andreeva Bay, North West Russia—with EBRD, Norway, Sweden, Italy, EU TACIS
• Scientist Redirection in Russia and Former Soviet Union states (Closed Nuclear Cities Programme)
• Plutonium Reactor Shutdown in Aktau, Kazakhstan—joint programme with US Department of Energy (DOE)
• Nuclear and Radiological Security Programme
Nuclear and Radiological Security Programme-scope

• Mostly a “first line of defence” programme

• Addresses technology, equipment, and cultural aspects of security
  – Physical protection upgrades at sites
  – Nuclear Security Workshops (now run in Russian and English)
UK Global Threat Reduction Programme

Nuclear and Radiological Security Programme-implementation

• Bilaterally—e.g. in Russia
• Multiple donors collaborating over RAD active spent sources facility in Ukraine
• With IAEA Office of Nuclear Security – on projects in Tajikistan, Armenia, Kazakhstan and Belarus—and scope will widen with the new UK contribution of £4M to Nuclear Security Fund
• With US DOE—in Kazakhstan, other Former Soviet Union states
Programme risks

• Prioritisation
• Sustainability
• Political
• Financial
• Legal frameworks for collaboration
• Donor and beneficiary coordination
• Manageability within UK resources
Challenges ahead

• Staying focussed on highest threats
• Completing existing programmes in Russia on agreed timescales, whilst widening scope
• Ensuring sustainability
• Evaluating impact—to demonstrate value for money and secure ongoing funding
• Managing expectations
Conclusion

• Countering proliferation is a key objective of the UK National Security Strategy

• UK Global Threat Reduction Programme is supporting the delivery of effective nuclear and radiological security worldwide

• Collaboration with the IAEA Office of Nuclear Security and other international partners is critical to success